

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

يَرْفَعُ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مِنْكُمْ

وَالَّذِينَ أُوتُوا الْعِلْمَ دَرَجَاتٍ

**Allāh exalts those of you who
believe and those who are given
knowledge to high ranks**

Holy Qur'ān (58 : 11)

MESSAGE OF THAQALAYN

A Quarterly Journal of Islamic Studies
Vol. 5, No. 1&2, Spring & Summer 1999/1419-20

**Editor-in-Chief
Editors**

Sayyid 'Alī Riḍā Furūghī
Muḥammad Sa'eed Bahmanpour
Sayyid 'Alī Shahbāz

Editorial Board

Dr. 'Alī Akbar Wilāyati,
Secretary General, *Ahl al-Bayt ('a)* World Assembly

Dr. Sayyid Muṣṭafā Muḥaqqiq Dāmād,
Martyr Beheshti University, Tehran

Dr. Ghulām Ḥusayn Ibrāhīmī Dīnānī,
University of Tehran

Dr. Ghulām Riḍā A'wānī,
Martyr Beheshti University, Tehran

'Alī Qulī Qarā'ī,
Editor-in-Chief, *Al-Tawḥīd*, Qum

Dr. Jalāl al-Dīn Raḥmat
Director, Muṭahhari Foundation, Indonesia

Published by:
The *Ahl al- Bayt ('a)* World Assembly

Address:
Keshāvarz Blvd., Corner of Quds St., Oppt. Laleh Park

Mailing address:
P.O. Box 14155-3831
Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran

Fax:
+98-21-8860882

Subscription Rates		
	Per Copy	One Year
Iran	2,000 Rials	8,000 Rials
India & Pakistan	50 Rs.	200 Rs.
Other Countries	8 US\$	30 US\$

Aims and Objectives

1. To provide a forum for scholars to make analytical studies of Islamic topics and themes.
2. To advance the cause of better understanding of the Qur'ān and the *Ahl al-Bayt*'s ('a) contribution to Islam.
3. To publish English translations of Arabic and Persian works of Muslim scholars.
4. To endeavor to find Islamic answers to questions relating to the social, political, and moral problems of today.

* * * * *

Scholars and writers from all over the world are invited to contribute to this journal.

Manuscripts should be typed double-spaced on one side of the page. (Standards: A4 or 8.5" × 11".)

References and notes should be listed at the end of the article and should contain complete bibliographical information.

Books and other items sent to the journal for review are welcomed.

All contributions and editorial correspondence should be addressed to: Editor-in-Chief, *Message of Thaqaalayn*, P.O. Box 14155-3831, Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran.

SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC CHARACTERS

CONSONANTS :

ء '	ز z	ق q
ب b	س s	ك k
ت t	ش sh	ل l
ث th	ص ṣ	م m
ج j	ض ḍ	ن n
ح ḥ	ط ṭ	ه h
خ kh	ظ ḏ	و w
د d	ع ʿ	ى y
ذ dh	غ gh	
ر r	ف f	

VOWELS :

Long: ا ā	Short: ا a	Doubled: اِى iyy (final from i)
آ Ā	أ u	أِو uww (final from ū)
و ū	إ i	Diphthongs: اِو au or aw
ي ī		اِى ay or ai

Contents

Documents:

The Message of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution Āyatullāh
Khāmene'ī to the World Congress on Mullā Ṣadrā 9

President Sayyid Muḥammad Khātami's Address to the World
Congress on Mullā Ṣadrā 13

Ḥadīth:

Du 'ā' Literature in the Shi'ī Tradition (Part 1) 19
Rasūl Ja'fariyān

Philosophy:

Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī: Life and Works 37
Seyyed Hossein Nasr

'Ilm-i Tafṣilī and 'Ilm-i Ijmā'ī
and the Possibility of Believing an Infinite Number of
Propositions 65
Muḥammad Legenhausen

Kalām:

The Origin and Development of the Science of *Kalām*
in Islam 79
Ridā Dāwari

Islamic Law:

Dialogue on the Basis of the Aims of Religion
A Way to Attain Mutual Understanding 109
Sayyid Muṣṭafā Muḥaqiq Dāmād

Islamic Personalities:

'Allāmah Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīn al-ʿĀmilī 119
Sayyid 'Alī Shāhbāz

Report:

The World Congress on Mullā Ṣadrā 133

Book Review:

Use of Force in International Relations
As seen by International Law and Islamic Law 147
Ḥamid Ḥājī Ḥaydar

The Message of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution to the World Congress on Mullā Ṣadrā

I praise God, the Most High, and I do take pride and pleasure in witnessing the holding of this great intellectual and scientific conference devoted to the thought and personality of the great Muslim sage, Ḥakim Ṣadr al-Muta'allihin Shirāzī.

Although acquaintance with this peerless scholar in the West, as in many parts of the Islamic world, is very little, the Iranian philosophy circles for the last three centuries, that is, almost a hundred years after the writing of '*Asfār*', have been nourished by the opinions of Ṣadr al-Muta'allihin and his books. His opinions, most of which are direct products of his individual initiative, at least in their rational and logical frameworks, have been fervently studied, taught, researched and critically evaluated.

It is interesting to note that, for the last four centuries, Ṣadr al-Muta'allihin has attracted both the greatest number of followers and plagiarists, and numerous critics and opponents. During this period, a greater number of the torch-bearers of transcendent theosophy and philosophy were the students and exegetes of the school of philosophy he founded, through his own genius and

initiative which, while it abrogated the *Mashshā'ī* (peripatetic) and *Ishrāqī* (illuminationist) philosophies, still safeguarded every prominent point contained in both these schools and laid out its fundamentals most lucidly in thousands of pages in his eloquent and attractive style. In the same period, many of the imitators of his opinions on such themes as the questions of existence, eschatology and resurrection, had to suffer the same sort of bitter experience which afflicted Ṣadrā himself during his life time and which made him leave his native place.

Certainly, serious, critical and scholarly research, divorced from reproach and controversy was also carried out. This kind of criticism, that was in fact begun by two of his closest students, has continued up to the present time, and some of our prominent theologians have indeed disputed some of the most basic principles of Ṣadrā's lofty philosophical system. There is no doubt, however, that both these adverse currents - the mesmerizing effect on some of our first-rate philosophers, and the intellectual and ideological reaction by the critics and opponents - only point to one thing, that is, the greatness of Ṣadrā's thinking, the great gift of ingenuity and the solid foundations found in the philosophy of this great philosopher.

The philosophical school of Ṣadrā, like his own life and character is a closely-knit combination of certain precious components which have ultimately attained unity. His philosophy makes use of some of the most sublime elements of knowledge such as logical reasoning, mystical intuition, and the Qur'ānic revelation. In his individual character are also found elements of research and logical deliberation, mystical trends and intuition, servitude to God, practical piety, abnegation and abstinence, as well as devotion to the Holy Qur'ān and *Sunnat*; all moulded into one personality which in the course of his 50-years of scholarly life took him to many distant scientific centres for the sake of

knowledge; to Kahak village of Qum for ascetic purposes and to perform the *Hajj* pilgrimage on foot seven times.

If the Ṣadrā'i school of philosophy - which Ṣadrā himself had termed 'Transcendent Theosophy'- marked the zenith of Islamic philosophy till the days of its exponent and was a decisive blow to the negative attacks of the sceptics and the opponents of philosophy during the medieval Islamic era, today also after four hundred years of benefiting from the research and investigation of the scholars of rational and transmitted sciences, elucidation and completion by philosophical circles, and enhancement and polishing at the able hands of certain prominent philosophers, especially at the theological centres of Isfahan, Tehran and Khorāsān, Ṣadrā's philosophy has once again emerged, only on a more solid foundation and livelier appeal, to take its proper position in the building up of culture and civilization, to gloriously shine in human minds and illuminate hearts and souls.

Ṣadrā's school of philosophy, as any other philosophy, may not be confined to the narrow frameworks of individual nations or geographical regions; it belongs to all the peoples and to all communities. Mankind is always in need of a convincing rational system of thinking to comprehend and to interpret its own being and the whole of existence.

No culture or civilization could, without such solid and acceptable basis, ever lead humanity to salvation, to preservation and to spiritual peace, and give some sublime meaning to existence.

Thus, in our opinion, the Islamic philosophy, particularly, in its Ṣadrā'i style and interpretation, seeks to fill its own vacant position in the minds of contemporary men, and we believe that it shall finally reach this end.

We in Iran are more indebted to this divine philosophy than others and, therefore, more duty-bound to its furtherance. Our own era has witnessed the appearance of such enlightened guides as

Imam Khumayni, who was not only a peerless man in the fields of philosophy, religion and politics but also a great scholar of the theological school of Ṣadrā; as well as the blissful presence of ‘Allāmah Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’i in theological circles, who was the most prominent teacher of Ṣadrā’i principles in Qum for some thirty years. The presence of such personalities together with the efforts of many of their students and contemporary scholars have, undoubtedly, ushered in a bountiful era for the ‘Transcendent Theosophy’ of Mullā Ṣadrā.

And now the holding of this august congregation of scholars from Iran and abroad, is, in fact, the harbinger of a much deeper and more extensive investigation to be carried out on Ṣadrā’s philosophy. Perhaps this will help some philosophers and thinkers in the West to make a comparative study of the direct, evolutionary and non-contradictory course of Islamic philosophy, especially after its enlightenment by Ṣadrā’s philosophy, with the complicated, contradictory and hurdle-ridden course of Western philosophy during the past four hundred years, and hopefully, provide yet another occasion for discussion and criticism among the members of the global club of knowledge and rational argument.

In the end, I deem it my obligation to extend my deep and sincere thanks to the esteemed organizers of this scholarly congress and its respected participants, and to re-emphasize my earnest desire for the publication of a collection of Mullā Ṣadrā’s opinions in one distinct volume.

Wa al-Salām ‘Alaykum wa Raḥmatullāh-i wa Barakātuh
Āyatullāh Sayyid ‘Alī Khāmene’i
Tehran, 22 May 1999

President Sayyid Muḥammad Khātami's Address to the World Congress on Mullā Ṣadrā

Praise be to Allah, the Agent of all sensible and intelligible things, and the End of all desires and duties, and blessings on the Chosen of His servants (Prophet Muḥammad [ﷺ]) and the Guides of creation (the Infallible Imams [‘a]) to its source and return.¹

The honouring and paying of tribute to Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Shirāzī is in fact a way of extolling and lauding thought and philosophy. The tribute to thought and philosophy should not be merely the declaration of a few elegant phrases of rhetoric to describe the characteristics of thoughts and thinkers. What may be expected, and should be expected, of this sort of conference is that our souls be awakened and purified, and that our minds be educated. What can we learn from Mullā Ṣadrā? What can such learning prepare us for? What we can learn from this great philosopher is so magnificent and vast that to learn it we should have to spend years studying under professors specialized in his thought. Our instructors themselves have only been able to learn and find guidance through the intricacies of his thought and the explicit and implicit foundations of his ideas, after spending long years in the study of his thought. They spent the sweetest hours of youth and middle age, engrossed day and night with the problems and topics of his philosophy. Whoever would attempt to reach from the exterior of his words and sayings to the interior of

his thought and his real views must know that this important task, requires patience and is a rare achievement, like :

“In season and out, grief’s cup of blood you must drain.”²

It is a great and difficult task to understand the principle of “the simplicity of Reality” as he has presented it, to fathom *The Secrets of the Verses (Asrār al-Āyāt)*,³ and to taste, at the high level of his presentation, the meaning of such realities as those of the tablet (*Lawḥ*), the pen (*Qalam*), the decree and destiny, the book, the word, this world and the afterlife, the throne (*‘Arsh*), the seat (*Kursi*), creation and command, and an acquaintance with the subtleties of his reasoning, the exquisite points of his demonstrations regarding the primacy of existence, the types of creation, the precepts of quiddity, the definitions of necessity and possibility, definitions of cause and effect, substance and accident, the one and the many, motion and rest, and in short, an acquaintance with his original thinking about substantial motion, copulative existence, and dozens of other deep discussions and lofty words on various topics of philosophy and different principles of theosophy. However, these fine and subtle points are by no means all that we can learn from Ṣadr al-Dīn Shirāzī. What we must obtain from him, in addition to these things, was perhaps implicit in the second question mentioned above, that is, for what can the learning we obtain from Mullā Ṣadrā prepare us?

Each of us frequently has faced the question: Of what use is philosophy? What benefits do we seek and what advantages do we obtain by learning philosophy? This question can be answered in various ways, but it is better to give a philosophical answer to a question about the use of philosophy. This question rests on a presupposition, namely, that there is a kind of relation between the truth and use its advantages. Beyond any doubt, man is an existent that essentially is attentive toward the truth and seeks reality. His search for truth is not accidental, temporary or merely prudential. However, at the heart of this question is the assumption that it is certain that the relation between interests and truth is a matter of fact. But this hidden presupposition is not one that can resist philosophical criticism. A devotion to the truth and reality, despite

all obstacles and hindrances, is the 'condition of the first step'⁴ of philosophical thought. In philosophical discussion, the philosopher is not concerned with the pursuit of what is in his interests or how he can avoid harm. He is a soldier on the front of truth and only truth can quench the thirst of his soul. In this regard we see Mullā Ṣadrā in the history of philosophy, who in his journey to approach the threshold of truth is afraid of nothing. He has no fear of those who would deceive the people and is fearless before the deceivers. In the preface to the *Asfār*, Mullā Ṣadrā considers a bit of these social difficulties and the ill intentions of the envious, shortsighted and narrow minded. He gives his counsel in two couplets of Persian verse:

از سخن پر در مکن، همچون صدف هر گوش را قفل گوه‌ساز، یاقوت زمردپوش را

در جواب هر سؤالی حاجت گفتار نیست چشم بینا عذر می‌خواهد لب خاموش را

Do not speak pearls into every shell of an ear.

Lock up the jewels. Hide the rubies and emeralds.

There is no need to speak in answer to every question.

The eyes that see beg pardon for the silent lips.

Then he corroborates this with the words of the Commander of the Faithful, Imam 'Ali ('a):

"I pondered what to do. Fight alone or be patient. For the world is dark and all face calamity, calamity that makes the old suffer and the young old, and imprisons the believer until he meets his Lord."⁵

Then he says, I chose the second way, following the example of Imam 'Ali ('a). Perhaps the conditions of the life of Mullā Ṣadrā and the socio-political circumstances in Iran of those days required such a decision, so that today, we are able to justify this retirement and consider isolation a proper policy for him. However, this sort of approach cannot be recommended absolutely for all times regardless of the relevant social and political circumstances. Likewise, Imam 'Ali ('a) himself made another decision when the political situation changed.

If we carefully consider what has been said, it seems that a brief implicit answer can be found to the two questions raised at the beginning of this talk. In order to comment and explain this further, it must be said that it seems that when philosophizing and teaching and learning philosophy, we do not consider any interest other than the search for the truth and finding reality. However, this very search for the truth brings about the most exalted benefits, socially, politically and personally. Aside from the uncountable philosophical points and an abundance of theosophical wisdom, we learn from Mullā Ṣadrā the adoption of an unshakable position, the defense of the truth in all circumstances, situations and times, and that “the beauty of the face of God” is the only “proof enough for us”, as he says:

به رغبم مدعیانی که منع عشق کنند جمال چهره تو حجت موجه ماست

Despite the contenders who would prohibit love,
The beauty of the face of God is proof enough for us.

If Mullā Ṣadrā did not present issues in the course of his works that some Western philosophers centuries later have expounded in terms of the relation between “courage” and “being”, still the course of his life and biography show that he traversed this very road. Of course, centuries before him, the Stoics also spoke in detail of the relation between courage and being and the discovery of the ontological horizons of courage.⁶ This Stoic-Existentialist doctrine today more than ever applies to the health of our socio-political life. Our thinkers must have the courage to maintain the balance of law and social standards, and to bravely confront the fundamental problems that have such a wonderful effect on the kind of socio-political life we have. On this path they should seek nothing but the pleasure of the Creator and the felicity of His creatures, and not neglect the truth.⁷ In devotion to this way, one must not be upset on the way from the “Nile to the *Ka’bah* by the irritation of a burr”,⁸ and one must not lose hope.

Another important point that we have to learn from Mullā Ṣadrā, in addition to his love of the truth, is his humility before the truth. They are not few who have acquired a little and are narrow

minded "raw and inexperienced"⁹ who, with "little capital" in knowledge and thought, fancy themselves to be the absolute owners of truth, and who always consider their opponents to be the opponents of God and religion. It is surprising how they play the tune of the dignity of being religious and the preservation of religion with claims of being the familiars of the truth and God.

The sentences with which Mullā Şadrā describes truth and his own relation to God are so eloquent, expressive and agreeable that it is good to read and listen to a few of those lines again:

Indeed, the Truth is not restricted on account of the understanding of all those who possess understanding, nor is it measured by the measure of all reason and imagination. O you who are opinionated, if you are opposed to beliefs about it or understanding of it acquired through sound zeal, do not deny it, and *above everyone who possesses knowledge is the All-knowing One.* (12:76). You should understand that one who is veiled by what he knows and who denies what lies beyond it, is stopped short at the limit of his knowledge and gnosis, veiled from the hidden mysteries of his Lord and his religion. I also do not claim to have reached the end of where it leads, by no means! The aspects of understanding are not limited to what I have understood or perceived. Knowledge of the Truth is not restricted by what I have defined or grasped, for the Truth is vaster than what can be encompassed by reason and definition and is more magnificent than what is encompassed by conclusions beyond conclusions.¹⁰

The humility of Mullā Şadrā before the Truth and his knowledge of his existential limits and human limitations is a great lesson we can learn from him. And as a great teacher we can be instructed by him and we revere the level he achieved.

The convening of the ceremonies to honour the great philosopher and Gnostic Mullā Şadrā which has been approved by the eminent Leader of the Islamic Revolution is a fruitful and valuable step to increase more than ever before the familiarity of

truth-seeking souls and awakened hearts, with the lofty thought and spiritual wayfaring of this rare philosopher and thinker, God willing.

I would like to thank all those who have had a part in the good work of putting together this conference; especially Ḥujjat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene'i. I would also like to extend my best wishes for success to all of the distinguished participants and attendants including professors, researchers and scholars, especially the dear guests of this conference.

Notes:

1. This is the opening of Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī's *al-Asfār al-Arba'ah*, Vol. 1, p. 1.

2. Ḥāfiz, *Tongue of the Hidden*, versions by Paul Smith (Melbourne: New Humanity Books, 1988), p. 82.

3. Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, *Asrār al-Āyāt*, Muḥammad Khājavi, ed., (Tehran: Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1981).

4. This phrase is taken from the poetry of Ḥāfiz:

در ره منزل لیلی که خطر هاست به جان شرط اول قدم آن است که مجنون باشی
*On the way to the house of Laylī, on which one risks ones life/
 The condition of the first step is that one be mad.*

5. *Nahj al-Balāghah*, Sermon 3.

6. See Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be*, translated into Farsi by Morād Farhādpur as *Shojā'at-e Budan*, p. 43.

7. *Love is great. Do not neglect it.* Ḥāfiz

8. در بیابان گر به شوق کعبه خواهی زد قدم سرزنشها گر کند خار مغیلان غم مخور
*On the prairie if you would go forth with zeal to the Ka 'bah, / Do
 not be upset by the irritations of the burr.* Ḥāfiz

9. *خامان ره نرفته چه دانند راه عشق دریادلی بسجوی و دلیر سرآمدی*
What do the raw and inexperienced know of the secrets of love? /

Search in the sea of the heart and eminent bravery. Ḥāfiz

10. *Asfār*, Vol. 1, p. 10.

***Du'ā'* Literature in the Shi'ī Tradition**

Part 1

By Rasūl Ja'fariyān

Translated from the Persian by 'Alī Qulī Qarā'ī

Du'ā', or supplication enjoys an exalted position in Shi'ī literature. The outstanding character of this part of Shi'ī literature is due to the prevalence of the culture of piety and renunciation (*zuhd*) and gnosis (*'irfān*) among the Shi'ī Imams (*'a*) and their genuine followers. The importance of worship and devotion in Shi'ī piety has given *du'ā'* its salient position, and Shi'ī learning has devoted special efforts to the development of this kind of religious literature.

The literature of *du'ā'* in Islamic culture begins in the Qur'ān itself, and it was expanded by the supplications narrated from the Messenger of God (ﷺ). The Sunnī literature in the field of *du'ā'* is limited to these two sources. However, in the Shi'ī tradition the Imams have authored innumerable supplications which derive their inspiration from the Qur'ān and the teachings of the Messenger of God (ﷺ).

The first stage in the composition of *du'ā'* among the Shi'āh begins with Imam 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (*'a*), and history does not know of a more devout and ascetic figure. After him, his infallible

descendants continued the tradition of his piety and gnosis, and the supplications that have been handed down from them, such as the *du'ā'* 'Arafah of Imam Ḥusayn ('a) and the *Ṣaḥīfat al-Sajjādiyyah*, the collection of supplications composed by Imam Sajjād ('a), along with other numerous supplications narrated from them, are a living evidence of the vitality and richness of this kind of literature in the Shī'i tradition. The *Ṣaḥīfat al-Sajjādiyyah* enjoys a special place in Shī'i *du'ā'* literature, and it calls for a separate study dealing with its manuscripts and versions as well as the commentaries that have been written on it.

On the whole, the books dealing with *du'ā'* fall into certain categories.

The first group of works are those which are exclusively devoted to supplications. In them the *du'ā'*s are arranged according to the subject, or according to the days of the week and month of the year marking the occasions for their recital, depending on the author's classification.

The second group consists of books relating to the etiquette of making supplication, such as the *Kitāb ādāb al-du'ā'* by Sayyid Muḥammad Bāqir b. Ismā'il Khātūnābādī (d. 1120/1708) (Catalogue of MS in Āyatullāh Mar'ashī Public Library [henceforth referred to as CML], shin 660).

The third group consists of books which are in some way related to the occult and mention protective incantations and formulas (*ta'widhāt*) and supplications.

The fourth group consists of books relating to *istikhārah*. The reason for including these works in *du'ā'* literature is that they also cite elaborate supplications to be recited while making an *istikhārah*. Moreover, *istikhārah* itself, like *du'ā'*, is an invocation of Divine assistance. Among this class of works are Sayyid Raḍī al-Dīn Ibn Ṭāwūs' *Fathḥ al-abwāb*, Majlisī's *Miftāḥ al-ghayb*, Khātūnābādī's *Miftāḥ al-faraj* (CML, MS 4424), and the *Minhāj al-mustakhīr* of Muḥammad Ḥusayn b. Kāzīm 'Alawī (Catalogue

of Tehran University Library Manuscripts [henceforth referred to as CTU], MS 3788).

The fifth group consists of books which deal with invocations of blessings (*ṣalawāt*) on the Messenger of God (ﷺ) and his family (*Ahl al-Bayt*) (‘*a*’) and these are also to be counted among *du‘ā’* works.

The sixth group consists of books containing the *ziyārāt*, which, since the beginning, have formed a part of *du‘ā’* literature. These are styled as ‘*kitāb al-mazār*’ or have similar titles. Shaykh Ṣadūq, Shaykh Mufid and a number of other Shi‘i scholars have compiled works on this subject. Among these works is the *Kāmil al-ziyārāt* by Abū al-Qāsim Ja‘far b. Muḥammad b. Qūlawayh (d. 360/970) and, among later works, the *Tuḥfat al-zā‘ir* of ‘Allāmah Majlisi. It must be said that *du‘ā’* and *ziyārah* were inextricably linked together in Shi‘i piety and usually went hand in hand. Another relevant example is that of *Kitāb al-ziyārāt wa al-faḍā‘il* by Abū al-Ḥasan Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Dāwūd al-Qummī (d. 368/978), which was in the possession of Ibn Tāwūs, and he cites from it in his *Iqbāl* and *Miṣbāḥ al-zā‘ir*. The association and intermingling of *du‘ā’* and *ziyārah* is so much that it is very difficult to separate them.

Here, we shall review the various stages in the development of Shi‘i *du‘ā’* literature, mentioning the most outstanding works of every period.

Shi‘i Du‘ā’ Texts Before Shaykh Ṭūsī:

In several respects, Shaykh Ṭūsī represents a point of departure in the development of Shi‘i thought, and he has also a special position in the development of Shi‘i *du‘ā’* literature. His magnificent work, the *Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid*, together with several other works, constitutes this point of departure.

From the time of the Infallible Imams (‘*a*’), their companions were keen to acquire supplications from them. They would

approach the Imams with requests for supplications. Such requests were not confined to the Shi'is. It was rather a general feeling among those who had a keen interest in supplications that the best *du'ā's* were those that were composed by the Prophet's family. Naṣr b. Kathir says:

“Several years ago I visited Ja'far ibn Muḥammad al-Ṣādiq ('a) in the company of Sufyān al-Thawrī. I told him that I was intending to set out on pilgrimage to the House of God, and I asked him to teach me a supplication. The Ḥaḍrat said to me, “When you reach the Sacred House of God, put your hand on its wall and say: *‘Yā sādīq al-fawt, wa yā ṣāmi' al-ṣawt, wa yā kāsi al-izāmi laḥman ba'd al-mawt,'* Then make any request that you may have of God.”

A well-known qāḍi says:

One of the sons of Furāt narrates from someone that he said, “I was with Abū Ja'far al-Ṭabarī (the famous historian and exegete) an hour before his death. Someone recited to him this supplication of Ja'far ibn Muḥammad ('a). Ṭabarī asked for paper and ink and wrote it down. They said to him, “What a time for writing!” He replied, “It behooves a man not to abandon the quest of knowledge until his death.”¹

Another example relates to the year 254/868 when Mūsā b. Bighā set out towards Qum to ravage the town. The people of Qum reported the matter to Imam 'Askari ('a) and requested him to send them a supplication. The Imam wrote a supplication for them, telling them to recite it.

However, before Shaykh Ṭūsī, a large number of works consisting of collections of such supplications had been compiled by learned Shi'is. For centuries, these were used as sources by the Shaykh and others. However, these works became extinct in the

course of time, as in the case of *ḥadīth* compilations, in which case the earlier compendia of traditions, known as the four-hundred *uṣūl*, disappeared following the compilation of much more elaborate and comprehensive collections. However, despite the disappearance of many of the early works, the lists of these works found in the catalogues compiled by Abū al-‘Abbās Najāshī, Shaykh Ṭūsī and others, such as Ibn al-Nadīm, give us some knowledge about the names of these works dealing with various subjects as well as the extent and character of the literary activity of the early Shī‘īs. In the field of *du‘ā’*, too, these lists enable us to draw up a list of relevant works.

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by Ibrāhīm b. Sulaymān al-Khazzāz al-Kūfi (Najāshī 18, Shaykh Ṭūsī’s *Fihrist* 6)

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by Ismā‘īl b. Mūsā b. Ja‘far (Najāshī 26, Shaykh’s *Fihrist* 11).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by Ḥusayn b. Sa‘īd b. Ḥammād b. Mihrān al-Ahwāzī (Najāshī 58, Shaykh’s *Fihrist* 58). Ibn Ṭāwūs mentions one *Kitāb al-du‘ā’ wa al-dhikr* as belonging to this author, and cites from it in his *Muhaj al-Da‘awāt* and *al-Mujtanā* (Kohlberg, *A Medieval Muslim Scholar at Work: Ibn Tawus and His Library*, p. 150).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Khālid al-Barqī (Najāshī 77, Shaykh’s *Fihrist* 21).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-Ḥasan b. Du‘al al-Qummi (Najāshī 90).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by Ḥumayd b. Ziyād b. Ḥammād al-Dihqān (Najāshī 132)

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, Sa‘d b. ‘Abd Allāh b. Abī Khalaf al-Ash‘arī al-Qummi (Najāshī 178). Ibn Ṭāwūs, in his works *al-Amān*, *Faṭḥ al-abwāb*, *Iqbāl* and *Muhaj al-Da‘awāt*, gives citations from a work of his entitled *Faḍl al-du‘ā’* (Kohlberg, p 158).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by ‘Alī b. Mahziyār al-Ahwāzī (Najāshī 253).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by ‘Alī b. al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad al-Ṭā’i al-Jarami al-Ṭāṭarī (Najāshī 254).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by ‘Alī b. al-Ḥasan b. ‘Alī b. al-Faḍḍāl (Najāshī 258).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by Muḥammad b. Ūramah al-Qummi (Najāshī 330).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by Muḥammad b. al-‘Abbās b. ‘Īsā (Najāshī 341).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by Muḥammad b. Sulaymān b. al-Ḥasan al-Zurārī (Najāshī 347).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by Muḥammad b. Mas‘ūd b. ‘Ayyāsh al-Samarqandī (Najāshī 351).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Farrūkh al-Saffār (Najāshī 354). Ibn Ṭāwūs mentions a book of his named *Faḍl al-du‘ā’* and gives citations from it in his *Iqbāl, Muhaj al-Da‘awāt*, and *Muḥāsabat al-naḥs* (Kohlberg, p. 159).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, in *al-Kāfi*, by Muḥammad b. Ya‘qūb al-Kulaynī (Najāshī 377, Shaykh’s *Fihrist* 135).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh b. Muḥammad (Najāshī 396).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by Muḥammad b. Wahbān b. Muḥammad (Najāshī 397).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by Mu‘āwiyah b. ‘Ammār al-Duhani (Najāshī 411).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, by Hārūn b. Muslim b. Sa‘dān (Najāshī 438).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’, (narrated from Imam ‘Alī [‘a]) by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad al-Jallūdi (Najāshī 241).

Kitāb (faḍl) al-du‘ā’, by Sulaymān b. Ja‘far b. Ibrāhīm al-Ṭalībī al-Ja‘farī (Najāshī 396).

Kitāb ad‘iyyat al-A‘immah, by ‘Ubayd Allāh b. Abī Zayd Aḥmad b. Ya‘qūb al-Anbārī (Najāshī 233).

Kitāb al-yawm wa al-laylah, by Mu‘āwiyah b. ‘Ammār al-Duhani (Najāshī 411).

Kitāb ‘amal yawm al-jumu‘ah, by Muḥammad b. ‘Ali b. Ya‘qūb, Ibn Abi Qurrah (early 5th/11th century) (Najāshī 398).

Kitāb ‘amal al-shuhūr, Muḥammad b. ‘Ali b. Ya‘qūb Ibn Abi Qurrah (Najāshī 398).

Kitāb ‘amal shahr Ramaḍān, Muḥammad b. ‘Ali b. Ya‘qūb Ibn Abi Qurrah, which might be related to his *Kitāb ‘amal al-shuhūr*. It was in the possession of Ibn Ṭāwūs and he has drawn from it in his *Falāḥ al-sā’il* and profusely in *Iqbāl* (Kohlberg, p. 108). In his *Fath al-abwāb* Ibn Ṭāwūs cites from one *al-Jāmi‘ fi al-‘amal* by Muḥammad b. ‘Ali b. Muḥammad (Ibn Abi Qurrah), and it is probable that it might be identical with his *Kitāb ‘amal al-shuhūr* (Kohlberg, p. 202).

Kitāb al-tahajjud, by Muḥammad b. ‘Ali b. Ya‘qūb Ibn Abi Qurrah (Najāshī 398). Ibn Ṭāwūs mentions its name as *Kitāb al-mutahajjid* and cites from it in his *Muhaj al-Da‘awāt* (Kohlberg, p. 292).

Kitāb al-mabsūt fi ‘amal al-yawm wa al-laylah, by al-Ḥasan b. Ḥamzah al-Ṭabarī (Najāshī 64).

Kitāb ‘amal al-Rajab, by Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. ‘Ubayd Allāh b. ‘Ayyāsh al-Jawharī (Najāshī 85, Shaykh’s *Fihrist* 33).

Kitāb ‘amal al-Sha‘bān, by Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. ‘Ubayd Allāh b. ‘Ayyāsh al-Jawharī (Najāshī 85, Shaykh’s *Fihrist* 33).

Kitāb ‘amal Ramaḍān, by Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. ‘Ubayd Allāh b. ‘Ayyāsh al-Jawharī (Najāshī 85, Shaykh’s *Fihrist* 33). The above three books were in the possession of Ibn Ṭāwūs and he quotes from them in his *Muhaj al-Da‘awāt* and *Iqbāl* (Kohlberg, p. 107).

Kitāb al-ta’dib, or *Kitāb ‘amal al-yawm wa al-laylah*, by Abū Ja‘far Ahmad b. ‘Abd Allāh b. Khanibah (3rd/9th century). Ibn Ṭāwūs mentions a “*Kitāb*” of his, but taking into account the material cited in *Falāḥ al-sā’il* it seems probable that it is the same book consisting of supplications (Kohlberg, p. 224).

Kitāb ‘amal al-Jumu‘ah, by Aḥmad b. ‘Abd Allāh b. Aḥmad b. ‘Abdūn (Najāshī 87).

Kitāb ‘amal al-Rajab, by ‘Alī b. Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Fārisī Ibn Khālawayh (Najāshī 268).

Kitāb ‘amal al-Sha‘bān, by ‘Alī b. Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Fārisī Ibn Khālawayh (Najāshī 268).

Kitāb ‘amal shahr Ramaḍān, by ‘Alī b. Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Fārisī Ibn Khālawayh (Najāshī 268).

Kitāb ‘amal shahr Ramaḍān, by Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Jurayrī al-Baṣrī (Najāshī 397).

Kitāb al-najāḥ fī ‘amal shahr Ramaḍān, by Faḍl b. Shādhān al-Nayshābūrī (Najāshī 307).

Kitāb ad‘iyyat al-safar, by Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Sulaymān al-Zurārī (Shaykh’s *Fihrist* 31).

Da‘awāt al-ayyām (Ad‘iyyat al-Ṭalaḥī), by Muḥammad b. ‘Īsā al-Ṭalaḥī (Shaykh’s *Fihrist* 130).

Kitāb ‘amal shahr Ramaḍān, by ‘Alī b. Ḥātim al-Qazwīnī (Shaykh’s *Fihrist* 98).

Kitāb ‘amal Dhī al-Ḥijjah, by Abū ‘Alī al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. Ismā‘īl b. Ashnās (d. 239/853), a teacher of Shaykh Ṭūsī.³ This book of his was in the possession of Ibn Ṭāwūs, and he has cited from it profusely in his *Iqbāl al-a‘māl* (Kohlberg, p. 107).

Kitāb ‘amal shahr Ramaḍān, by ‘Alī b. ‘Abd al-Wāḥid b. ‘Alī al-Nahdī al-Khumrī (alive at the close of 4th/10th century). Ibn Ṭāwūs has many citations from it in his *Iqbāl al-a‘māl* (Kohlberg, p. 108)

Kitāb ‘amal yawm al-Jumu‘ah, by Abū al-Faṭḥ Muḥammad b. ‘Alī b. ‘Uthmān al-Karājakī (d. 449/1057), which has been said to be probably a part of his *Kitāb al-Nāṣiriyyah fī ‘amal al-yawm wa al-laylah*. It is one of the sources of Ibn Ṭāwūs in his *Jamāl al-usbū‘* (Kohlberg, p. 109).

Al-Da‘awāt, from which Ibn Ṭāwūs cites many supplications with the words “*mā wajadnā fī nuskhatin min kutub al-Da‘awāt.*”

This collection had been in the handwriting of Abū Ghālib al-Rāzī (d. 368/978). It must be considered among the oldest of Shī‘ī sources of *du‘ā’*. The passages cited are mentioned in Kohlberg, p. 138. Among works that formed part of this old manuscript was the *Kitāb al-du‘ā’*, by Zayd b. Ja‘far al-‘Alawī, al-Sharīf Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Muḥammadi (5th/11th century), from which Ibn Ṭāwūs has also cited elsewhere (Kohlberg, p. 149). In the *Iqbāl*, Ibn Ṭāwūs cites from what he refers to as “*Kitāb ‘atiq fīhi da‘awāt wa riwāyāt min ṭariq aṣḥābinā*,” which is probably the same as the collection referred to as *al-Da‘awāt* (Kohlberg, p. 232).

Al-‘Ibādāt, like *al-Da‘awāt* mentioned above, Ibn Ṭāwūs has cited some supplications in his *Iqbāl* and *Jamāl al-usbū‘* from a collection that he refers to as *al-‘Ibādāt*, and most probably it was a work containing supplications and supererogatory and other rites of worship (Kohlberg, p. 185).

Daf‘ al-humūm wa al-aḥzān wa qam‘ al-ghumūm wa al-ashjān, by Aḥmad b. Dāwūd al-Nu‘mānī. Ibn Ṭāwūs has cited from it in his *al-Amān*, *Muhaj al-Da‘awāt*, and *al-Mujtanā*. The identity of the author and his era are unknown (Kohlberg, p. 138).

Kitāb al-du‘ā’ wa al-ziyārah, by Muḥammad b. ‘Alī b. Muḥammad al-Tirāzī (alive in the first half of 5th/11th century). Ibn Ṭāwūs has cited profusely from this book in his *Iqbāl* (Kohlberg, p. 151).

Ḥadā‘iq al-riyāḍ wa zahrāt al-murtāḍ wa nūr al-mustarshid, by Muḥammad b. Muḥammad, known as al-Shaykh al-Mufid. Ibn Ṭāwūs has cited repeatedly from this work of Shaykh Mufid in his *Iqbāl* (Kohlberg, p. 175).

“*Kitāb mushtamal ‘alā aḥrāz jalilah*,” Ibn Ṭāwūs refers to it in these words and cites from it in his *al-Amān* (Kohlberg, p. 233).

Majmū‘at al-ad‘iyyah al-mustajābāt ‘an al-Nabī wa al-‘A‘immah; Ibn Ṭāwūs cites from a book of this name in his *Muhaj al-Da‘awāt* (Kohlberg, p. 243).

Majmū' al-Da'awāt, by Abū al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. Hārūn b. Mūsā al-Talla'ukbarī (flourished in the last part of 4th/10th century). It is one of the sources of Ibn Ṭāwūs in his *Muhaj al-Da'awāt* (Kohlberg, p. 244).

Majmū'ah Mawlānā Zayn al-'Ābidīn, which is a work of Imam 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn ('a) other than the *Ṣaḥīfat al-Sajjādiyyah*. It appears that only some passages of it have survived in Ibn Ṭāwūs's *Iqbāl* (Kohlberg, p. 244).

Mukhtaṣar fī ad'iyah wa 'uwadh; according to Ibn Ṭāwūs it was a small treatise that formed part of a collection. He cites from it in his *Faraj al-mahmūm* (Kohlberg, p. 279)

Mukhtaṣar al-muntakhab; Ibn Ṭāwūs refers to it as "*Mukhtaṣar al-muntakhab fī al-ad'iyah*," and gives elaborate citations from it in his *Iqbāl*, remarking that its author was unknown to him (Kohlberg, p. 281).

Al-Wasā'il ilā al-masā'il, by Aḥmad b. 'Alī b. Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad. Ibn Ṭāwūs cites from it in his *Muhaj al-Da'awāt* and *al-Mujtanā*. The author probably belonged to the generation after Shaykh Ṣadūq (Kohlberg, p. 381).

Zād al-musāfir, by Aḥmad b. 'Alī b. al-Ḥasan b. Shādhān al-Qummi (flourished about the middle of the 4th/10th century). It was among the sources of Ibn Ṭāwūs (*Dhari'ah*, xii, 7, no. 40; Kohlberg, p. 386).

Zād al-musāfir, by Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. 'Abd Allāh al-Ṣafwāni (alive in 346/957). According to Shaykh Āqā Buzurg Tehrāni, Ibn Ṭāwūs has cited from it in his *Iqbāl* (*Nawābiḡh al-ruwāt*, 239; Kohlberg, p. 386).

Rawḍat al-'ābidīn wa ma'nas al-rāghibīn, by Ibrāhīm b. 'Umar b. Faraj al-Wāsiṭi. Ibn Ṭāwūs cites from it in his *Iqbāl*. It is not clear whether the author was a Shī'i or a Sunnī, and it is not known when he lived (Kohlberg, p. 314).

Du‘ā’ Literature from Shaykh Ṭūsī to Ibn Ṭāwūs:

The most important work on *du‘ā’* by Shaykh Ṭūsī, which must be considered a landmark in the history of *du‘ā’* literature, is his precious book *Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid*. This elaborate work on *du‘ā’* has in recent years been edited by Abū Dharr Bidār on the basis of several manuscripts and published in an elegant form by the Mu‘assah al-Fiqh al-Shī‘ah.

After compiling this work, Shaykh Ṭūsī compiled a condensed version of it with the title *Miṣbāḥ al-ṣaghir* (CML, MS. 7, 505, 2082, 2341, 7359).

‘Allāmah Ḥilli (d. 726/1325) has also compiled a condensation (*talkhiṣ*) of the *Miṣbāḥ* with the title *Minhāj al-ṣalāḥ fī ikhtiṣār al-Miṣbāḥ* (Majlis, MS 12362 written in 733/1331, Ākhūnd Library MS. 4643, Āstānah-ye Qum MS 390, CML, MS 1369). It has ten chapters with an eleventh on *‘ilm al-kalām* appended to. This is the same “Eleventh Chapter” (*Bāb Ḥādī ‘ashar*) which has served as a famous textbook on *kalām* in the religious academies.

A selection from the *Miṣbāḥ*, referred to as “*Ad‘iyyah muntakhabah min al-Miṣbāḥ*” exists in the library of Imam Riḍā’s shrine. Another selection, whose author is unknown, is *Mukhtaṣar Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid*, and a copy of it exists in the Central Library of Tehran University (*Fihrist-e Mishkāt* MS 1/205).

Ikhtiyār al-Miṣbāḥ, is another selection from Shaykh Ṭūsī’s *Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid* by Sayyid ‘Alī b. Ḥusayn b. Ḥasan b. Ḥusayn b. Bāqī Qurashi, completed in 653/1255 (*Fihrist-e Mishkāt* MS 1/2). Ibn Ṭāwūs has cited repeatedly from this book in his *Iqbāl* (Kohlberg, p. 271).

Mukhtaṣar Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid, by Mullā Ḥaydar ‘Alī b. Muḥammad Shirwānī (CML, MS 3948).

Mukhtaṣar Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid, an extant copy of this selection does not mention the name of its author (CML, MS 9750).

Tarjamah-ye Mukhtaṣār-e Miṣbāḥ, this very old translation probably pertains to the 7th/13th century (CML, MS 877, 5987, 8911). Manuscript no. 1985 in the catalogue of the library at the Masjid-e A'zam at Qum is probably another copy of the same work, and its writing has been attributed to 7th/13th or 8th/14th century.

Idāḡ al-Miṣbāḥ li ahl al-ṣalāḥ, by Sayyid Bahā' al-Dīn 'Alī b. 'Abd al-Ḥamid Najafī (8th/14th century) is a noteworthy commentary on the *Mukhtaṣār Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid*. This work was completed on 8th of *Dhū al-Qa'dat al-Ḥarām* in 784/1383 in the shrine of the Imams at Kāzimayn ('a) (CML, MS 4568).

Tarjamah Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid, by Muḡammad b. Ḥusayn Ilāhi Ardabili, who had translated the *Miṣbāḥ* for Khwājāh Na'im al-Dīn Ni'mat Allāh b. Khwājāh Muḡammad 'Alawi Ṣafawi Shahid (Catalogue of microfilms at Tehran University Library, No. 4613).

Another translation of the *Miṣbāḥ* was done by Muḡammad Qāsim in 1103/1691 and is mentioned in the catalogue of the Kitābkhāneh Salṭanati (MS 48).

Tarjamah Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid, by Ḥāfiḡ Ghiyāth al-Dīn b. Jalāl al-Dīn Wā'iz (CML, MS 5051; *Fihrist-e Kitābkhāneh Malik*, MS 1347).

'Amal al-sinah, a Persian translation of the *Mukhtaṣār Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid* by an unknown author (CTU, MS 2188). Another book with a similar title is mentioned as *Tarjamah Miṣbāḥ* in CML, no. 9394. A comparison of the contents of the two will show whether they pertain to the same work or not.

Another manuscript of a translation of *Mukhtaṣār Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid* is mentioned in *Fihrist-e Āstānah* (no. 88).

In one of the issues of the journal *Nuskah-hā-ye khaṭṭī* (vol. 7, p. 745) a translation of *Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid* which was written in 974/1566 in Yazd is mentioned ("*Fihristwāreh-ye fiqh-e hazār wa chahār-ṣad sāleh-ye Islāmi*," p. 94).

Ibn Ṭāwūs mentions a book *Hidāyat al-mustarshid* by Shaykh Ṭūsi which has not survived. It is said that it was on the subject of supplication and worship. (Kohlberg, p. 183)

* * * * *

Some other works of this period are as follows:

Zād al-'ābidīn, by Ḥusayn b. Abī al-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Khalaf Kāshgharī (alive in 484/1091). Ibn Ṭāwūs cites from him in *Muhaj al-Da'awāt* and *al-Muḍāyaqah* (Kohlberg, p. 385).

Muniyat al-wā'i wa ghunyat al-dā'i, by 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. al-Ḥusayn Tamīmī (flourished during early 6th/12th century). Ibn Ṭāwūs cites from it in his *al-Amān* and *Muhaj al-Da'awāt* (Kohlberg, p. 285).

Dhakhīrat al-ākhirah, by 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. al-Ḥusayn Tamīmī, written by him for Amir Muḥammad b. Abī Ṭālib Mūsawī. Two copies of it are known (See the catalogues of the manuscript at the libraries of Majlis, vol. 6, p. 19, no. 2020, and Gawhar Shād Mosque, vol. 4, p. 1963, no. 1375). Dānesht-pezhuh has cited its introduction in "*Fihristwāreh-ye fiqh*," p. 95.

Kitāb kunūz al-najāh, by Abū 'Alī Faḍl b. Ḥasan Tabrisī (d. 548/1153). This book was used by Ibn Ṭāwūs, and a copy of it was probably in the possession of Mirzā Ḥusayn Nūrī (Kohlberg, p. 233)

Kitāb al-ḥusnā, by Abū 'Abd Allāh Ja'far b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Dūrīstī (alive in 473/1080). Ibn Ṭāwūs has repeated citations from it in his *Iqbāl* (Kohlberg, p. 184).

Ad'iyyah Zayn al-'Ābidīn by Naṣir b. Riḍā b. Muḥammad 'Alawī, a pupil of Shaykh Ṭūsi.

Riyāḍ al-'Ābidīn, by Karājakī (d. 449/1057) is another *du'ā'* work of this era.

Ad'iyyat al-sirr, by Faḍl Allāh Rāwandī (d. 548/1153). A copy of it exists at Mar'ashī Library (MS 499) and a commentary on it exists at Tehran University Library (*Fihrist-e Mishkāṭ*, vol. 1,

p. 130). Āqā Buzurg Tehrani has discussed it in detail in the *Dhari'ah* (under *Ad'iyyat al-sirr*).

Da'awāt Zayn al-'Ābidīn, by Zayd b. Ishāq Ja'fari, teacher of 'Ubayd Allāh Ḥaskā, father of Shaykh Muntajab al-Din, author of the *Fihrist* (d. 548/1153) (*Fihrist-e Mishkāt*, vol. 1, p. 211).

al-'Adad al-qawīyyah li daf' al-mukhāwif al-yawmiyyah by Sadid al-Din 'Alī b. Yūsuf b. Muṭahhar al-Ḥilli (7th/13th century). This work pertains to acts and supplications relating to particular days of the year (CML, no. 260).

Nuzhat al-zāhid wa nahzat al-'ābid, by an unknown writer who lived in the 6th/12th or 7th/13th century, and is one of the most precious works of this era. It was written in 596/1199.

Ibn Ṭāwūs and Shi'i *Du'ā* Literature:

After Shaykh Ṭūsī's *Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid*, the works of Ibn Ṭāwūs constitute the next major landmark in the history of Shi'i *du'ā* literature, so much so that Shi'i works on *du'ā* written after him are greatly indebted to him.⁵ Not only many of his works have been the sources for later works, several of them have been translated repeatedly into Persian.

Ibn Ṭāwūs devoted all his life and scholarly efforts to *du'ā* and topics of ethical nature, and only a relatively small part of his efforts were directed to other subjects such as *ḥadīth*, history and biography. With a quest unprecedented in its dedication to a single topic, he collected the *du'ā*'s from whatever written heritage was accessible to him. Fortunately, his work was accomplished before the invasion of Baghdad by the Mongols, and therefore he had the opportunity to make use of many libraries and books that were lost or were rarely available to the following generations of scholars. Moreover, he himself was a keen collector of books, and this is evident from the works mentioned in his books. At one place he writes: "There are more than seventy books of *du'ā*' in my library."

According to Etan Kohlberg’s research, Ibn Ṭāwūs mentions 669 works in his extant books and gives some citations from them. Such a thing is rare or almost unparalleled in the works of that era. A large part of these works pertain to *du‘ā’*. Many of the Shi‘i works on *du‘ā’* that were compiled during the period extending from the 3rd/9th to the 6th/12th century which are not extant today were in possession of Ibn Ṭāwūs. A few of the supplications are Ibn Ṭāwūs’ own compositions. In such cases, he introduces them with such expressions as “*du‘ā’ min khāṭiri,*” or “*alfāz min khāṭiri,*” “*du‘ā’ awradahu Allāhu ‘azza wa jalla ‘alā khāṭirinā,*” “*Da‘awāt wuridat ‘alā khāṭiri,*” and “*du‘ā’un ansha’nāhu.*” Aside from such instances, Ibn Ṭāwūs is committed to narrating the *du‘ā’*s from the old texts.

Ibn Ṭāwūs had a great admiration for the *Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid*, the work of Shaykh Ṭūsi, his ancestor, and he spent his lifetime in completing Ṭūsi’s collection of *du‘ā’*s. He planned a collection of works which he called *al-Muhimmāt wa al-tatimmāt* or *al-Muhimmāt li ṣalāḥ al-muta‘abbid wa al-tatimmāt li Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid* and compiled his works in accordance with it. He had made two distinct plans for this project, one as a five-volume collection containing the following works:

1. *Falāḥ al-sā’il*, containing daily supplications.
2. *Zahrat al-rabī’*, containing weekly supplications.
3. *Kitāb al-shurū’ fi al-ziyārāt wa ziyādāt ṣalawāt wa da‘awāt al-usbū’ fi al-layl wa al-nahār wa durū’ wāqiyah min al-akhṭār fi mā yastamirru ‘amaluḥū fi kulli yawm ‘alā al-takrār*, containing monthly supplications.
4. *Al-Iqbāl*, containing yearly prayers.
5. *Asrār al-ṣalāt*, on the exposition of the esoteric meanings of some supplications.

Elsewhere he suggests another division based on a ten-volume project:

- 1 & 2. *Falāḥ al-sā’il*.

3. *Zahrat al-rabi'*.
4. *Jamāl al-usbū'*.
5. *Al-Durū'*.
6. *Al-Miḍmār*.
7. *Al-Masālik*.
- 8 & 9. *Al-Iqbāl*.
10. *Al-Sa'ādāt*.

Aside from the above project, the most important of his extant works on *du'ā'* are:

Al-Iqbāl bi al-a'māl al-ḥasanah fimā nadhkuruhu mimmā yu'malu marrah fī al-sinah; this book was arranged in two parts, the first containing supplications for the months extending from Shawwāl to Dhū al-Hijjah and the second containing supplications for the months of Muḥarram to Sha'bān.

Miḍmār al-sibāq fī maydān al-ṣidq; its was an independent work on the supplications and acts of the month of Ramaḍān which was later appended to the *Iqbāl*. *Iqbāl* has recently been published in two volumes with the *Miḍmār* as a third volume by Intishārāt-e Daftar-e Tablighāt-e Islāmi, at Qum. The *Iqbāl* has also been translated into Persian, and a translation carried out at the order of Princes Āghā Begum, the daughter of Shāh 'Abbās, and completed in Shawwāl 1089/1678 exists at Āyatullāh Mar'ashi Public Library (MS 1344).

Jamāl al-usbū' fī kamāl al-'amal al-mashrū'; it contains the acts of Friday.

Al-Durū' al-wāqiyah min al-akḥṭār fimā yu'malu mithluhū fī ayyām kulli shahr 'alā al-takrār; as its title indicates this book contains supplications to be recited on particular days of every month. This book has been published by Mu'assasat Āl al-Bayt, Qum.

Falāḥ al-sā'il wa najāḥ al-masā'il fī 'amal al-yawm wa al-layl; in two volumes, the second of which has disappeared except for a few passages. Its first volume relates to *du'ā'*'s to be recited

from noon until night. The second volume was about supplications to be recited from the time of waking up for the night prayer until forenoon. This work has been published by Intishārāt-e Daftar-e Tablighāt-e Islāmi, Qum.

Muhaj al-Da‘awāt wa manhaj al-‘ināyāt; this work of Ibn Ṭāwūs consists of various supplications and invocations for protection from various kinds of evils (*ḥirz*), to be recited after the prayers or in *qunūt* during the prayers and in times of distress and need. For this reason it does not have any particular order. It has been translated into Persian several times, and elsewhere we have mentioned these translations. In addition to those, there is yet another translation of the *Muhaj al-Da‘awāt* which is mentioned in *Fihrist-e Mishkāt* (vol. 1, p. 40).

Al-Mujtanā min du‘ā’ al-mujtabā. This work is similar to the *Muhaj al-Da‘awāt* and is among the last works of Ibn Ṭāwūs.

Of his books *Zahr al-rabī’ fi ad‘iyat al-asābī’*, which related to weekly supplications, and *Kitāb al-sa‘ādāt bil-‘ibādāt allatī laysa lahā awqāt mu‘ayyināt*, nothing has survived except a few passages.

Before concluding this section we must mention the book *Zawā‘id al-fawā‘id* by Sayyid Abū al-Qāsim ‘Alī ibn Sayyid ‘Alī ibn Musā ibn Ṭāwūs, son of Ibn Ṭāwūs.

To be continued—inshā’ Allah

Notes:

1. Al-Ṭabari, *Tārīkh*, vol. 15, p. 157, cited from Ibn ‘Asākir, *Ta’rīkh Jurjān* (al-Sahmī), p. 554.
2. Al-Ṭūsī, *Kitāb al-Rijāl*, p. 507.
3. *Mirāth-i Islāmī-ye Irān*, vol. 2, “Shakhṣiyyat wa Mashāyikh-i Shaykh Ṭūsī,” p. 387.
4. Sayyid ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ṭabāṭabā’i, *Maktabat al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī*, pp. 198-199.

5. Dānesh-pezhuh, *Fihristwāreh-ye Fiqh-e Hezār wa chahār-ṣad sāleh-ye Islāmī dar zabān-e Farsī* (Tehran: Shirkat-e Intishārāt-e ‘Ilmi wa Farhangī, 1367 H. Sh.).

6. Kohlberg, Etan, *A Medieval Muslim Scholar at Work: Ibn Tawūs and His Library* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), p. 183.

7. Dānesh-pezhuh, *Fihristwāreh*, p. 95.

8. *Fihrist-e Mishkāṭ*, vol. 1, p. 211.

9. Āqā Buzurg al-Ṭehrānī, *al-Dharī‘ah*, vol. 2, p. 165.

10. Ibn Ṭawūs, *Muhaj al-Da‘awāt*, p. 347.

11. Kohlberg, op. cit., p. 87.

12. See Kohlberg, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

13. See the translators’ footnote in the Persian translation of Kohlberg’s work, *Kitābkhāneh Ibne Ṭawūs wa aḥwāl wa āthār-i ū* (Qum: Āyatullah Mar‘ashī Public Library, 1371 H. Sh.), translated by Sayyid ‘Alī Qulī Qarā‘ī and Rasūl Ja‘fariyān, p. 86. Some of these translations are kept at the Āyatullah Mar‘ashī Public Library (CML. MS Nos. 2626, 4050, 6195, 6741).

14. For the details of its manuscripts, see the translators’ note in the Persian translation of Kohlberg’s work, p. 91.

15. For details about these and other works of Ibn Ṭawūs, see the second chapter of Kohlberg’s work, pp. 25-91 (Persian translation pp. 49-119).

Şadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī: Life and Works*

Seyyed Hossein Nasr

Life

Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Yaḥyā Qawāmi Shīrāzī, entitled Şadr al-Dīn and also Mullā Şadrā (in the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent simply Şadrā) as well as Şadr al-Muta'allihin, 'foremost among the theosophers', or called simply Ākhūnd by his disciples, was born in Shīrāz in 979-980/1571-72 into an influential and well known family, his father having been the governor of the province of Fārs. The date of his birth has not been specified in any of the traditional sources devoted to him¹ and in fact it was discovered only a few years ago when 'Allāmah Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā'i, a foremost contemporary sage or *ḥakīm* of Iran, was correcting the new edition of the *Asfār* and preparing it for publication. On the margin of a manuscript copied in 1197/1703 but based on a copy autographed by Mullā Şadrā and with certain marginal notes by the author himself, 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'i discovered the following sentence in the section devoted to the question of the unity of the intellect and the

* Şadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī and his Transcendent Theosophy, Background, Life and Works / by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 2nd. ed. , Tehran: Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, 1997.

intelligible: "I received this inspiration at the time of sunrise of Friday the seventh of Jamādi al-Ūlā of the year 1037 A.H.[corresponding to January 14, 1628] when already 58 lunar years had passed from the life of the author."² Since then other sources have confirmed this information. But because it is not possible to know whether the 58 years is a period of between 57 and 58 years or 58 complete years, one cannot determine the exact date of his birth beyond setting it between the years 979/1571 and 980/1572.

Being the only male child of a well-to-do family which had prayed long to be given a male descendant, he was brought up with the greatest care and provided with the best education possible in his city of birth. Shirāz had for centuries before the rise of the Safavids been the center of Islamic philosophy and other traditional disciplines, a center which was still alive in the tenth/sixteenth century although functioning less vigorously than before. The early period of training of Mullā Ṣadrā was in this tradition of learning. He was a precocious child, able to master rapidly all that was taught him. He displayed from the earliest age a profound piety combined with keen intelligence. He was soon able to master the religious sciences as well as all to which he could gain access in the field of the "intellectual sciences". With a firm knowledge of Arabic and Persian, the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth*, and an elementary training in the other Islamic disciplines, he now set out to expand further his intellectual horizons. He was not able to remain satisfied for long with what Shirāz could offer him. After benefiting to the extent possible from the lessons of the teachers of that city, he therefore set out for Isfahan, which in the field of philosophy had by now become the major intellectual center of Persia and perhaps of the whole Islamic East. The date of his departure for Isfahan is unknown, like nearly all other dates of his life except for those of his birth and death. But it is certain that he was still a very young man, a student, albeit an advanced one.

Isfahan did not disappoint him, for there he found several outstanding masters who influenced him profoundly. Mullā Şadrā studied with both Shaykh Bahā' al-Dīn 'Āmīlī and Mīr Dāmād and also possibly with Mīr Abū al-Qāsim Fīndirīskī in the Şadr School, which still stands in the bazaar of Isfahan. In the hands of these masters he soon became himself an authority in the Islamic sciences and reached a stage in which he even surpassed his teachers.

A few words must be said about the masters with whom Mullā Şadrā studied.³ Mīr Dāmād, his foremost mentor in the "intellectual sciences", was the founder of the philosophical and theosophical school in which Mullā Şadrā was trained, the school that is now rapidly becoming known as the "School of Isfahan". A great religious scholar, he was at the same time a logician, mystic and poet. While he taught the Peripatetic doctrines of Ibn Sīnā, he gave them an illuminationist color and himself wrote fine poetry under the pen-name of *ishrāq*. He expounded a rigorously logical philosophy and yet wrote a treatise on a mystical vision he had received in Qum.⁴ He harmonised Avicennan cosmology with Shi'ite Imamology and made the "fourteen pure ones" (*chahārdah ma'şūm*) of Shi'ism the ontological principles of cosmic existence. His own writings dealt mostly with the question of time and creation, in which he expounded the novel view of *ḥudūth-i dahri* ("eternal creation").⁵ His masterpiece, the *Qabasāt* (Firebrands), as well as some of his other well-known works such as *Jadhawāt* (Burning Billets), which he wrote in Persian, are known in their lithographed editions printed during the last century. But none has received the critical study that this profound but abstruse figure deserves.⁶

The difficulty of Mīr Dāmād's writings has become proverbial, in direct contrast to the lucid and clear writings of his student, Mullā Şadrā. It is said in fact, that before going on one of his journeys, Mīr Dāmād asked his students to write a treatise in his

absence. When he returned and read what Mullā Ṣadrā had written he wept, saying that he was both joyous to have such a student and sad in that he knew that Mullā Ṣadrā's writings would some day overshadow and replace his own. This was in fact a correct prediction. Soon the clear expositions of the student nearly completely replaced those of the master to whom he owed so much. But Mullā Ṣadrā himself remained completely devoted to his teacher and in several letters addressed to him openly confessed his profound debt to Mīr Dāmād. In fact he preserved his attitude of humility toward Mīr Dāmād even after he had ceased to be in any way in need of him.⁷

Shaykh Bahā' al-Dīn 'Āmilī, the close friend and associate of Mīr Dāmād, was equally celebrated. He was at once theologian, jurispudent, mathematician, architect, philosopher, occultist and poet. He displayed the versatility usually associated in the Occident with a Renaissance figure and also the profound faith and grounding in religious tradition characteristic of the medieval West. If we were to compare him with Occidental intellectual figures, he would have to be considered as a Leonardo and a St. Anselm or St. Bernard combined into a single person. His versatile genius produced outstanding mathematical treatises, buildings and gardens, irrigation charts that are still in use, theological and juridical treatises which are still studied, and well-known Sufi works. Although he was from the Jabal 'Āmil in the Lebanon and did not learn Persian until the age of twelve,⁸ he produced perhaps the finest Persian poetry of the tenth/sixteenth century.

Mullā Ṣadrā studied avidly with Shaykh-i Bahā'i, as he is usually known in Persia, but almost exclusively in the religious sciences. For the "intellectual sciences" he was more attracted to the circle of Mīr Dāmād. Yet he must certainly have been deeply influenced by Shaykh-i Bahā'i and his personality, since Ṣadr al-Dīn was a very perceptive student and the character of the teacher was very dominant.

As for Mir Findiriskī, this enigmatic and yet fascinating figure of Shāh ‘Abbās’ Isfahan, his associations with Mullā Şadrā remain uncertain. Only further research will determine whether Mullā Şadrā actually studied with him or not. Mir Findiriskī, also a close associate of Mir Dāmād and Shaykh-i Bahā’i, became famous in later history as a Sufi. He travelled extensively in India, composed two works on the *Yoga Vasīṣṭha*, yet to be edited and studied in detail, wrote a beautiful *qaṣīdah* which summarizes the principles of gnosis, and is credited in popular legend with many miracles. He taught, however, the *Canon* and the *Shifā’* of Ibn Sinā in Isfahan and the few treatises of his that have survived remain faithful to Peripatetic teachings and negate the ideas which are specifically associated with Mullā Şadrā, such as the independent existence of the “world of imagination” and “transsubstantial motion”.⁹ It is possible that Mir Findiriskī taught Peripatetic philosophy while he lived the life of a Sufi. In any case, his *qaṣīdah* and the recently discovered treatise on alchemy, not to speak of the works on Hinduism, suffice to confirm the presence of an esoteric side in him and the claim made that he was an outstanding Sufi. Whether, as has been claimed by some, Mullā Şadrā learned some of his characteristic ideas from him, rather than from Mir Dāmād and Shaykh-i Bahā’i, cannot be substantiated from the existing treatises of Mir Findiriskī. But since there exist in Islam distinct intellectual perspectives and that there have been figures like Fārābī and Naşır al-Din Ṭūsī who have been able to place themselves in each perspective and produce authoritative works in them, such a possibility cannot be overlooked in the case of Mir Findiriskī. It is possible for Mir Findiriskī to have taught and written Peripatetic works, which are “exoteric” from an intellectual point of view, and also to have transmitted an esoteric teaching to an elite group of his students and disciples. Such examples can be seen elsewhere in the Islamic world and can still be observed in Persia today.

Be that as it may, Mullā Ṣadrā studied avidly in Isfahan with these masters and also associated with the many other students who were then receiving training in Isfahan, some of whom, like Sayyid Aḥmad ‘Alawī, Āqā Ḥusayn Khawānsārī and Mullā Muḥammad Bāqir Sabziwārī, become in turn well-known masters. Mullā Ṣadrā soon became the foremost among them and would have become a celebrated figure even had he chosen to remain in Isfahan. But he sought yet another dimension in the full development of his intellect and personality and so left Isfahan to devote himself to a life of asceticism and inner purification. He thus ended the first period of his life, which was that of formal learning, to begin the second, which was devoted to the spiritual training that Mullā Ṣadrā considered the absolutely essential condition for those who aspire to reach the Divine Mysteries and to gain a true knowledge of *ḥikmat-i ilāhī* or “Divine Science” (literally *theo-sophia*).

The decision of Mullā Ṣadrā to retire from the cosmopolitan centre of Isfahan to Kahak, a small and faraway village near Qum, must have been caused by an inner urge to go into solitude; for in solitude are satisfied the needs of the contemplative soul for a direct encounter with the spiritual world in that “inner stillness” which is the prerequisite of all spiritual life. Mullā Ṣadrā must also have needed to evade the outward pressures that he was undergoing at that time. Because he wrote in a simple style and expounded gnostic and metaphysical doctrines openly, he was soon exposed to the attacks of the exoteric ‘*ulamā*’, some of whom even accused him of infidelity although he was the most pious of men, having never neglected his religious duties throughout his life. The introduction of the *Asfār*, his letters to Mir Dāmād and the *Sih Aṣl* contain in eloquent words his complaint that some of his contemporaries did not understand him. In the introduction of the *Asfār*, he mentions how he was able to master the wisdom of the ancients and the gnostic and theosophical doctrines of the *ḥakīms* before him, and how he had tried in vain to awaken those of his

contemporaries who remained ignorant of true knowledge. He continues, "The stifling of the intelligence and congealment of nature, which follow from the hostility of our period, forced me to retire to a faraway place, hiding myself in obscurity and distress, deprived of my hopes and with a broken heart Putting into practice the instructions of him who is my master and sustainer, the First Imam, ancestor of the holy Imams, the friends and witnesses of God, I started to practice the discipline of dissimulation [*taqiyyah*]"¹⁰ Likewise in his *Sih Aşl* which is more than any other of his works an autobiographical statement, he attacks the purely exoteric scholars who deny the reality of gnosis and the esoteric dimension of religion. He says, "Some of those who appear to be learned but who are full of evil and corruption, some of the *mutakallimūn* [theologians] who are deprived of correct logic and stand outside the circle of rectitude and the path of salvation, those who follow the religious law yet are deprived from the path of belief in metaphysics and eschatology, having tied the rope of blind imitation [*taqlīd*] around their neck, have made the denial of the *dervishes* their slogan."¹¹

It would, however, be false to conclude that Mullā Şadrā's retreat to Kahak was only for negative reasons. As we shall have the occasion to mention later, he was also urged inwardly to seek a retreat from the turmoils of social life in order to accomplish that inner purification which was the necessary basis for the attainment of the wisdom for which the whole body of his teachings stands. The town of Kahak itself was probably not chosen by accident. It is a small village near Qum off the road between Qum and Isfahan. It sits like a jewel in a valley surrounded by outwardly barren hills with higher mountain chains extending into the horizon. It belongs to that sacred natural *locus* where Qum itself is built, a city which remains to this day a holy center of Persia, prophesied to remain uncorrupted to the end of time, the city where Mullā Şadrā's own teacher Mir Dāmād had received his supreme spiritual vision.

There stands in Kahak today a pentagonal mosque of great beauty going back to the eleventh/seventeenth century, one that is most unusual for a small village. Perhaps Şadr al-Dīn lived near this mosque or perhaps it was even built for him. There also stands overlooking the town of one of the hills an *imām-zādah*, the tomb of a saint, of the same period, perhaps the spiritual master who attracted Mullā Şadrā to this idyllic and secluded oasis. There are mysterious aspects of his life which have not as yet been unraveled. It is in fact quite possible, as 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī believes, that he was initiated into Sufism by Shaykh Bahā' al-Dīn 'Amili himself, but his exact spiritual affiliation is still an unsolved problem.

In Islam, spiritual guidance is in general available only through the Sufi orders and the initiation made possible through the regular initiatic chain (*silsilah*) connecting these orders to the origin of the Tradition.¹² In addition, there is the rare instance of those who are initiated by the "invisible hierarchy" or Khaḍīr (Khidr in Persian) and who are called *afrād*. In Shi'ism there is in addition the possibility of initiation by the Hidden Imam, who is for the Shi'ites the ever-present spiritual pole of the Universe. Certain of the Shi'ite sages like Mīr Dāmād, the gnostic character of whose doctrines can hardly be disputed, did not have a human master, and must be considered as belonging to the second and third categories mentioned above. Others like Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmuli definitely had a human Sufi master. It is hard to decide the situation of Mullā Şadrā, to determine definitely whether he received regular Sufi initiation or was inspired by the invisible spiritual hierarchy.¹³ Be that as it may, it was during this period of stay in Kahak that Mullā Şadrā received his spiritual vision through the spiritual discipline of invocation (*dhikr*) and meditation (*fikr*). During a period that some sources have written to be seven, other eleven and yet others fifteen years, he devoted himself to meditation and spiritual exercise and emerged from this travail as

an illuminated sage for whom metaphysics had turned from intellectual understanding to direct vision.

Inasmuch as a great spiritual presence cannot remain ignored for long, Mullā Şadrā was soon induced by social pressure to return to public life. Şāh ‘Abbās II asked Mullā Şadrā to return to his teaching duties and Allāhwirdi Khān built a mosque school, completed by his son, in Shirāz to which Mullā Şadrā was invited to teach. Complying with the wishes of the Şāh, Şadr al-Din returned to his native city to begin the last phase of his life, during which he wrote most of his works and trained many students. His personality and science were such that they attracted students from near and far and made Shirāz a great centre of learning once again. The Khan school ¹⁴ became so famous that it even attracted the attention of foreign travellers. Thomas Herbert, an eleventh /seventeenth century traveller to Persia who visited Shirāz during the lifetime of Mullā Şadrā, wrote, “And indeed Shyras has a Colledge wherein is read Philosophy, Astrology, Physick, Chemistry and the Mathematics; so as ’tis the more famed through Persia.”¹⁵ Even today the room in which the master taught stands as it must have been when it was the scene of Mullā Şadrā’s discourse on *ḥikmat* three centuries ago, and the Khan school, despite the dilapidation of some of its parts, remains one of the most beautiful and architecturally perhaps the most important Safavid building of Shirāz.

During this period, which may have lasted up to thirty years, Mullā Şadrā, in addition to teaching and writing, made several pilgrimages on foot to Mecca. His intense piety not only continued undiminished but became even more illuminated through the spiritual vision that resulted from years of spiritual practice. It was upon returning from the seventh journey to Mecca that he fell ill and died in Basra in 1050/1640. His tomb was known in that city until a few years ago.¹⁶

From this brief sketch we can summarize the life of Mullā Ṣadrā by dividing it into three periods:

1. The period of formal education and training in Shirāz and Isfahan.

2. The period of asceticism and self-purification in Kahak, during which he devoted himself almost entirely to the spiritual life but composed a few works including the first part of the *Asfār*, *Ṭarḡ al-Kawnayn* (or *Risālat al-Ḥaṣhr*), *Ḥudūth al-‘Ālam* and possibly *Ḥall al-Muṣkilāt al-Falakiyyah fī al-Irādat al-Jazāfiyyah*.

3. The period of return to public life in Shirāz, devoted to writing and teaching, during which he wrote all the rest of his works and trained all of his famous students such as Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshāni and ‘Abd al-Razzāq Lāhiji.

The life of Mullā Ṣadrā is therefore itself an application of his metaphysical doctrines as from another point of view his metaphysical vision was the result of such a life. A life composed of two earlier periods of formal mental training and of inner purification produced its fruit in a third period in which the acute intellectual discipline of the first period and the mystical vision of the second became combined. Nearly all of Mullā Ṣadrā’s works, belonging to this third period, are based on these two foundations. Mullā Ṣadrā is in fact the supreme example of that class of sages who combine intellectual discipline with spiritual experience and whom Suhrawardī had called the *muta’allih*.¹⁷ It is in fact for this reason that Mullā Ṣadrā was given the highest title possible within the tradition of *ḥikmat*, the title of *Ṣadr al-Muta’allihin*, meaning foremost amongst the *Muta’allihin* or that group of men who are themselves the elite among all who seek the knowledge of things divine.

Works

All of the writings of Mullā Ṣadrā are of both intellectual and literary merit. Except for the beautifully written *Sih Aṣl*, the poems and a couple of recently discovered treatises which are in Persian, his works are all written in a lucid, simple and flowing Arabic that is among the best examples of philosophical Arabic in the long tradition of Islamic philosophy. Some have divided Mullā Ṣadrā's works into two classes: those devoted to the religious sciences (*naqlī*) and those which concern the intellectual sciences (*'aqlī*). But since Mullā Ṣadrā considered both of these types of sciences to be intimately related, and derived from the single source of knowledge, the luminous Divine Intellect, he has dealt existensively with religious problems in his thēosophical works and vice versa. Therefore, such a division is really untenable, although not by any means without meaning.¹⁸

Nor can his writings be classified chronologically, at least not in the present stage of research. The treatises mentioned above are known to have been written during the middle period of his life. But it is difficult to date the others. Perhaps the major difficulty is in the nature of the works themselves, in that Mullā Ṣadrā, like Suhrawardī, referred back to his works constantly, making additions and changes so that often they appear to have been written almost simultaneously.¹⁹

The writings of Mullā Ṣadrā range from the monumental *Asfār* to treatises of a few pages. Because of their immense importance most of them were printed in lithographed editions nearly a century ago in Tehran; some have appeared in new editions during the revival of interest in Ṣadr al-Dīn during the past decade, but most still remain to be critically edited and printed in editions that would make the contents of these works more easily accessible.

The bibliographical research of 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī, Shaykh Āl-i Muẓaffar, M.T. Dāneshpazhuh, Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyāni,

H. Corbin and the present author has made more or less known the list of Mullā Ṣadrā's works.²⁰ But some of the dubious writings need to be further examined and there are still many libraries in both Persia and the subcontinent that need to be catalogued before a definitive bibliography of his writings can be made available.

Basing ourselves on our present-day knowledge of Mullā Ṣadrā's writings, we can enumerate them as follows:

1. *Ajwibah al-Masā'il (Answers to Some Questions)*. A recently discovered series of answers to various metaphysical and philosophical questions from the library of the late Mīrzā Ṭāhir Tonekābonī. The first edition of the text has been printed by S.J. Āshtiyānī in his *Three Treatises (Rasā'il-i Falsafi)* By Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, with English preface by S.H. Nasr, Mashhad 1392/1973; pp. 98-126.

2. *Ajwibah al-Masā'il al-Naṣiriyyah (Answers to the Nasirean Questions)* (A.4; C.3; D.P.4).²¹ Answers to questions that had been posed by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī to Shams al-Dīn 'Abd al-Ḥamid ibn 'Īsā Khosrowshāhi but which had remained unanswered. These answers have been printed on the margin of Mullā Ṣadrā's *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, Tehran, 1313 (A.H. lunar).

3. *Ajwibah Masā'il Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Gilānī (Answers to the Questions of Shams al-Dīn Gilānī)* (A.3; C.1). Answers to questions posed by Mullā Shamsā, whom Mullā Ṣadrā addresses in familiar terms. Printed on the margin of *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*.

4. *Asrār al-Āyāt wa Anwār al-Bayyināt (Secrets of the Verses of the Qur'ān and Lights of Evident Truths)* (A.5; C.4; D.P.5). One of Mullā Ṣadrā's main gnostic commentaries upon the Qur'ān, consisting of an introduction and ten chapters. Printed with the commentary of Mullā 'Alī Nūrī, Tehran, 1319 (A.H. lunar).

5. *Dibāchah-yi 'Arsh al-Taqdīs (Introduction to "The Throne of Divinity")* (A.18; C.5; D.P.18). An introduction in Arabic-despite

its Persian title-to Mir Dāmād's *'Arsh al-Taqdis*, in he which praises highly Mir Dāmād.

6. *Diwān* (A.19; C.6; D.P.19). Poems collected by his student Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ, but not of the same quality as the poems of Fayḍ himself. Some of them have been published by S.H. Nasr as an appendix to his edition of *Sih Aşl*.

7. *Al-Ḥaşr (Risālah fi) (Treatise on Resurrection)* (A.14; C.8; D.P.14). Also known as *Ṭarḥ al-Kawnayn fi Ḥaşr al-'Ālamayn*, it deals in eight chapters with the resurrection and return of all things to God, including the mineral kingdom. Printed on the margin of *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*; on the margin of *kashf al-Fawā'id* of al-Ḥilli, 1305 (A.H. lunar); and in Mullā Şadrā's *Rasā'il*, Tehran, 1302 (A.H. lunar).

8. *Al-Ḥikmah al-'Arshiyah (Kitāb) (The Book of Theosophy Descending from the Divine Throne)* (A.15; C.9; D.P.15). One of Mullā Şadrā's major works, dealing in two sections with God and eschatology. The work is particularly significant in that it summarizes Mullā Şadrā's teachings on eschatology and man's posthumous becoming. This book was a major source of controversy among later schools of theology and was commented upon by Shaykh Aḥmad Aḥşā'i, the founder of Shaykhī movement, who criticized it, and by Mullā Ismā'il Isfahani, who answered these criticisms. It was printed in Tehran, 1315 (A.H. lunar), and again in Isfahan in 1341 (A.H. solar) with a Persian translation by Ghulām Ḥusayn Āhani.

9. *Al-Ḥikmah al-Muta'āliyah fi al-Asfār al-'Aqliyyah al-'Arba'ah (The Transcendent Theosophy Concerning the Four Intellectual Journeys of the Soul)*, usually known simply as *Asfār (Journeys)* (A.16; C.10; D.P.16). Mullā Şadrā's *magnum opus*. It was lithographed in Tehran, 1282 (A.H. lunar), and a new edition has been edited by 'Allāmah Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā'i, which has appeared over the years since 1378 (A.H. lunar) in Tehran. Thus far nine volumes have appeared containing

parts (*Asfār*) one, three and four with 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'i's own commentary in addition to selections from older commentaries. A Persian translation of the *Asfār* has been made by J. Muṣliḡ, vols. I and II including a summary of the first and third *safar* and the fourth *safar* being translated in its entirety. See J. Muṣliḡ, *Falsafah-yi 'Ālī yā Hikmat-i Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn, Talkhiṣ wa Tarjamah-yi Qismat-i Umūr-i 'Āmmah wa Ilāhiyyāt-i Kitāb-i Asfār*, Tehran 1353 (A.H. solar); and *'Ilm al-Nafs yā Rawānshināsi-yi Safar-i Nafs-i Kitāb-i Asfār*, Tehran, 1352 (A.H. solar).

10. *Ḥudūth al-'Ālam (Risālah fī) (Treatise on the Temporal Genesis of the World)* (A.13; C.11; D.P.13). Discusses the genesis of the world in time based on Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine of transsubstantial motion (*al-ḡarakah al-jawhariyyah*) and rejects the view of Mir Dāmād. A discussion is given of the views of the pre-Socratic philosophers. Printed in Mullā Ṣadrā's *Rasā'il*, Tehran, 1302 (A.H. lunar).

11. *Iksir al-'Ārifīn fī Ma'rifah Ṭariḡ al-Ḥaqq wa al-Yaqīn (The Elixir of Gnostics Concerning the Knowledge of the Path of Truth and Certainty)* (A.6; C.12; D.P.6). In four sections on the classification of the sciences and on the nature of man. Printed in the *Rasā'il*, 1302 (A.H. lunar).

12. *Al-Imāmah (Risālah fī) (Treatise on the Imamate)* (C.13). Mentioned only by Āqā Buzurgh in *al-Dharī'ah* (vol. 2, p. 333), no manuscript of this work has as yet been discovered although 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'i has stated that when he was in Tabriz in his youth he saw a manuscript of it and it contained a treatment of Mullā Ṣadrā's gnostic view of the Imamate.

13. *Ittiḡād al-'Āqil wa al-Ma'qūl (Risālah fī) (Treatise on the Unity of the Intellect and Intelligible)* (A.1; C.14; D.P.1). According to *al-Dharī'ah*, vol. 1, p.81, this treatise has been published in Tehran but we have not been able to find the printed

version. It includes an exposition of Mullā Şadrā's famous doctrine of the union of the Intellect and Intelligible.

14. *Ittişāf al-Māhiyyah bi'l-Wujūd (Risālah fī)* (Treatise on the Doctrine that Existence is a Predicate of Quiddity) (A.2; C.15; D.P.2). Discusses the relation between existence and quiddity in a manner that is opposed to his views in the *Mashā'ir*. He also criticizes Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī and Dawānī. Printed in *Rasā'il*, Tehran, 1302 (A.H. lunar) and on the margin of his *al-Taşawwur wa al-Taşdiq*, lithographed in Tehran, 1311 (A.H. lunar).

15. *Kasr al-Aşnām al-Jāhiliyyah fī Dhamm al-Mutaşawwifin (Demolition of the Idols of Ignorance in Blaming those who Pretend to Sufism)* (A.27; C.16; D.P.28). The word "mutaşawwifin" referred to here is not used according to its usual meaning of one who follows Sufism but means one who pretends to follow it. In this treatise, Mullā Şadrā criticizes the excesses of those in his day who, pretending to be Sufis, disregarded the *Şarī'ah* and its teachings. Edited in a critical edition by M.T. Dāneshpazhuh, Tehran, 1340 (A.H. solar).

16. *Khalq al-A'māl (Risālah fī)* (Treatise on the Creation of Human Action) (A.17; C.17; D.P.17). A discussion of free will and determinism in which Mullā Şadrā takes into consideration the views of different schools of *kalām* and *falsafah* before stating his own view. Printed in the *Rasā'il*, Tehran 1302 (A.H. lunar) and with the *Kashf al-Fawā'id* of al-Ĥilli and *Ĥaqā'iq al-Īmān* of Şahīd Thānī, Tehran, 1305 (A.H. lunar). This treatise has also been edited and published by M.A. Rawḡātī as *Risālah-yi Jabr wa Tafwīḍ Ma'rūf bi Khalq al-A'māl*, with an introduction by the editor and a short preface by J. Homā'i, Isfahan, 1340 (A.H. solar).

17. *al-Lama'āt al-Mashriqiyyah fī al-Funūn al-Manṭiqiyyah (Illuminationist Gleamings in the Art of Logic)* (A.10; C.38; D.P.10). Cited by the three earlier bibliographical works as *Tanqiyah*, this is a short but important work on logic, written partly in the style of Suhrawardī's *Ĥikmat al-Ishrāq* and containing in

nine chapters some of Mullā Ṣadrā's own new contributions to logic. It also mentions some of the metaphysical ideas which are distinctly his own. Printed with a somewhat free Persian translation and long commentary by 'A. Mishkāṭ al-Dinī under the title *Manṭiq-i Nuwīn* Tehran, (1347 A.H. solar).

18. *Limmiyyatu Ikhtiṣāṣ al-Manṭaqah bi-Mawḍi' Mu'ayyan fi al-Falak (Maqālah fi) (Treatise on Why the Zodiac is Located in a Determined Position of the Sphere)* (A.28; C.18; D.P.29). An as yet neglected treatise on this astronomical question.

19. *Al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād (Kitāb) (The Book of the Origin and Return)* (A.29; C.20; D.P.30). One of Mullā Ṣadrā's important works dealing with metaphysics, cosmogony and eschatology. Printed in Tehran, 1314 (A.H. lunar) with the commentary of Ḥājī Mullā Hādī Sabziwāri. Āshtiyāni has just completed a new critical edition, based upon a manuscript in the handwriting of 'Abd al-Razzāq Lāhijī, Mullā Ṣadrā's student, existing in the library of 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'i in Qum, under the title *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād (The Beginning and the End)*, with prolegomena and notes by Āshtiyāni, Persian and English introductions by S.H. Nasr, Tehran, 1976.

20. *Maḡāṭih al-Ghayb (Keys to the Invisible World)* (A.35; C.21; D.P.36). A basic work of Mullā Ṣadrā's period of maturity combining gnostic doctrines on metaphysics, cosmology and eschatology and containing ample references to the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth*. It has been among the most frequently studied of Mullā Ṣadrā's works and was lithographed in Tehran, n.d., and again along with the *Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Kāfi* with Sabziwāri's commentary, Tehran, 1282 (A.H. lunar); reprinted, Tehran, 1391 (A.H. lunar). A partial Persian translation, made during the Qājār period and including the introduction and part of the first chapter of the book, has been published by M. Mohaghegh in *Maqālāt wa Barrasihā (Dāneshkadāh-yi Ilāhiyyāt wa Ma'ārif-i Islāmi, Tehran)*, vol. 2, Summer, 1349 (A.H. solar), pp. 56-79.

21. *Al-Masā'il al-Qudsiyyah fi al-Ḥikmat al-Muta'āliyah* (*Spiritual Questions concerning the Transcendent Theosophy*). This work of Mullā Şadrā, recently discovered in the Majlis Library of Tehran,²² must be one of his last works, written as it was in 1049/1639, a year before he died. It includes in three chapters of mixed Arabic and Persian a discussion of ontology and proof for the existence of the “imaginal world”, the archetypes and “mental existence”. Mullā Şadrā mentions in this work, as in the *Mashā'ir*, that he first followed the view of principality of quiddity and only later accepted the principality of being. This work is contained in S.J. Āshtiyāni, *Three Treatises* (second treatise).

22. *Al-Mashā'ir (Kitāb)* (*The Book of Metaphysical Penetrations*) (A.30; C.22; D.P.33). One of Mullā Şadrā's cardinal works and his most studied *opus* in recent years, containing the synopsis of his ontology. This work was thoroughly studied by later Persian *ḥakīms* and subjected to many commentaries including those of Shaykh Aḥmad Aḥsā'i, Mullā 'Alī Nūri, Mullā Muḥammad Ja'far Langarūdi Lāhijī, Mullā Ismā'il Işfahāni, Mīrzā Aḥmad Ardakāni Shirāzī, Mullā Zayn al-'Ābidin ibn Muḥammad Ja'far Nūri and Mīrzā Ḥasan Jilwah.²³ After being lithographed in Tehran, 1315 (A.H. lunar), it was published in a critical edition by Corbin with the Persian translation of the Qājār prince-philosopher Badi' al-Mulk Mīrzā 'Imād al-Dawlah and a French translation which is the first of a complete work of Mullā Şadrā into a European language. A new Persian translation by Ghulām Ḥusayn Āhani appeared in Isfahan, 1340 (A.H. solar), while the commentary of Langarūdi was published in a critical edition by S.J. Āshtiyāni with extensive introductions by himself and J. Homā'i and an English preface by S.H. Nasr, Meshed, 1381 (A.H. lunar). It is now being translated into Japanese by T. Izutsu.

23. *Al-Maẓāhir al-Ilāhiyyah fi Asrār al-'Ulūm al-Kamāliyyah* (*Book of Divine Theophanies Concerning the Secrets of the Sciences that Lead to Perfection*) (A.33; C.23; D.P.34). Deals in

six sections with a series of metaphysical questions which are studied with reference to Quranic citations. Lithographed on the margin of *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, it was given a new edition by S.J. Āshtiyāni, Meshed, 1381 (A.H. lunar).

24. *Al-Mizāj (Risālah fi) (Treatise on Temperament)* (A.32; C.24; D.P.31). Discusses Mullā Ṣadrā's own views on temperament as a branch of the "science of the soul", summarizing his thought as contained in the *Asfār* in the section on substances and accidents.

25. *Mutashābihāt al-Qur'ān (On the Metaphorical Verses of the Qur'ān)* (A.31; C.25; D.P.31). An early work of Mullā Ṣadrā, dealing in a gnostic manner with the difficult verses of the Holy Qur'ān and including material that is also treated in his commentary upon the *Āyat al-Kursī* and in the *Maḡātib al-Ghayb*. This work is contained in S.J. Āshtiyāni, *Three Treatises* (first treatise).

26. *Nāmah-yi Ṣadrā bi Ustād-i Khud Sayyid Mir Dāmād (I) (The Letter of Ṣadr al-Dīn to his teacher Mir Dāmād)*. An Arabic letter, whose incomplete text has been published by Āshtiyāni in his *Sharḥ-i Ḥāl wa Ārā'-i falsafī-yi Mullā Ṣadrā*, Meshed, 1381 (A.H. lunar), pp. 225-28, and also by M. Walā'i, "Ṣadr al-Muta'allihin", *Nāmah-yi Āstān Quds*, vol. I, no. 9, Ādhar 1340, pp. 56-62.

Beginning: هذه صورة مكتوب الذى كتب صدر الحكماء

End: كما يجوزون ان يكون بعض اجناس الجواهر من بعض آخر و يقولون جواهر العالم.

27. *Nāmah-yi Ṣadrā bi Ustād-i Khud Sayyid Mir Dāmād (II)* (Persian). Second of four letters known to have been written by Mullā Ṣadrā to Mir Dāmād.

Beginning: قسم بمبدعى واجب الوجود

End: در مکتب او کرد همين خوانده فراموش صورت کتابت به اختتام رسيد

Published by M.T. Dāneshpazhuh, *Rāhnāmā-yi Kitāb*, vol. V, no. 8-9, 1341 (A.H. solar), pp. 757-65.

28. *Nāmāh-vi Şadrā bi Ustād-i Khud Sayyid Mīr Dāmād* (III) (Persian and Arabic). Third of four known letters of Mullā Şadrā to Mīr Dāmād.

Beginning:

لازال شمس الحكمة الايمانية

End:

بحق محمد وآله الاطهار صلوات الله العزيز الجبار

Published by M.T. Dāneshpazhuh, *Farhang-i Īrān Zamīn*, vol. 13, no. 1-4, 1966, pp. 84-95.

29. *Nāmāh-yi Şadrā bi Ustād-i Khud Sayyid Mīr Dāmād* (IV) (Persian). Fourth of Mullā Şadrā's known letters to Mīr Dāmād.

Beginning:

كفى شرفا انى مضاف اليكم

End:

مشاراليه راكلمه اى چند ...

The incomplete text, published by M.T. Dāneshpazhuh in *Farhang-i Īrān Zamīn*, vol. 13, no. 1-4, 1966, pp. 95-98, ends abruptly with the words cited above. The British Museum MS. Or. 2852 contains the complete text of this letter but it has not yet been published.

30. *Al-Qaḍā' wa al-Qadar fī Af'āl al-Bashar (Risālah fī Mas'alah)* (Treatise on the Problem of Divine Decree and Destiny concerning the Actions of Man) (A.26; C.28; D.P.27). Deals with predestination and free will and how divine providence can include what appears to man as evil. Published in the *Rasā'il*, Tehran, 1302 (A.H. lunar).

31. *Al-Qudsiyyah fī Asrār al-Nuḡṭat al-Ḥissiyyat al-Mushīrah ilā Asrār al-Huwiyyah (al-Risālah)* (The Sacred Treatise on the Mysteries of the Sensible Point which Alludes to the Mysteries of Divine Identity) (A.20; C.29; D.P.20). On the "science of letters" and the esoteric significance of the point. Its authenticity is doubted by Āshtiyānī. Lithographed on the margin of *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, Tehran, 1314 (A.H. lunar).

32. *Risālah-yi Fārsī Mansūb bi-Mullā Ṣadrā* (Persian Treatise attributed to Mullā Ṣadrā). A recently discovered work of Ṣadr al-Dīn in Persian, from a collection belonging to the library of Dr. Asadullāh Khāwari in Shirāz containing fourteen treatises (pp. 144-8 of this collection). The treatise was discovered by Mr. K. Ra'nā Ḥusaynī and is written in lucid Persian. It contains ideas which are certainly those of Mullā Ṣadrā, so that there is no reason to doubt its authenticity.²⁴

33. *Sarayān Nūr Wujūd al-Ḥaqq fī al-Mawjūdāt* (The Penetration of the Light of the Divine Truth in Creatures) (A.21; C.30; D.P. 21). A work of his youth, when Mullā Ṣadrā still believed in the principality of quiddity rather than of being. Some have attributed this work to Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī. Lithographed as part of the *Rasā'il*, Tehran, 1302 (A.H. lunar).

34. *Sharḥ al-Hidāyah al-Athīriyyah* (Commentary upon the "Book of Guidance" of Athīr al-Dīn Abharī) (A.24; C.32; D.P.24). A masterly commentary upon the famous *Kitāb al-Hidāyah* of Abharī in which Mullā Ṣadrā expounds a cycle of Peripatetic philosophy without dealing with his own particular doctrines. This work, which also displays his knowledge of mathematics, received much attention in Persia and many glosses were written upon it, such as those of Mullā 'Alī Zunūzī and Mirzā Abu'l-Ḥasan Jilwah. It also became particularly famous in the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent. A very large number of glosses and commentaries have been written upon it.²⁵ Both S.J. Āshtiyānī and 'A. Zaryāb Khu'i are preparing new editions of the work.

35. *Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Kāfi* (Commentary upon the *Uṣūl al-Kāfi*) (A.23; C.33; D.P.23). Perhaps the most important commentary ever written on this basic source book of Shi'ism, it is one of Mullā Ṣadrā's main religious works and deals in a Gnostic manner with most of the basic themes of Shi'ism. Although a large work as it stands, it was never completed, for the commentary on the text reached only up to Chapter XI of the *Kitāb al-Ḥujjah*. Its abrupt

break in the middle of a vast doctrinal development has been compared, not without justice, to the sudden interruption of Bach's *Art of the Fugue*.²⁶ Lithographed along with the *Maḡātib al-Ghayb*, Tehran, 1282 (A.H. lunar); reprinted, Tehran, 1391 (A.H. lunar); and lithographed independently, Tehran, n.d.

36. *Al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah fī al-Manāhij al-Sulūkiyyah* (*Divine Witnesses Concerning the Paths of Spiritual Realization*) (A.25; C.34; D.P. 26). Mullā Şadrā's "personal" masterpiece, which in five chapters written from a gnostic point of view summarizes more than any other work his own doctrines. It is one of his works most frequently commented upon, having been commented upon by such later masters as Mullā 'Alī Nūrī, Āqā Muḡammad Riḡā Qumshah'i and Sabziwāri. The monumental commentary of Sabziwāri, a masterpiece in itself, has been published along with the text of the *Shawāhid* in a critical edition by S.J. Āshtiyāni. It includes an extensive introduction by the editor and an English introduction by S.H. Nasr, Mashhad, 1346 (A.H. solar). The Lithographed edition of Tehran, 1281 (A.H. lunar) also contains Sabziwāri's commentary but in a form less complete than that given by Āshtiyāni.

37. *Sih Aşl (Risālah-yi) (Treatise on the Three Principles)* (A.22; C.31; D.P.22). Mullā Şadrā's most important Persian work, containing an autobiographical defense of his position and a treatment of the "science of the soul" in the light of the "Transcendent Theosophy". A critical edition of this work has been published along with an introduction concerning the author and this work by S.H. Nasr, Tehran, 1340 (A.H. solar).

38. *Al-Taḡsīr (Commentary upon the Qur'ān)* (A.9; C.35; D.P.9). Containing commentaries upon the following sections: *al-Fātiḡah*; *Sūrah 2 (al-Baqarah)* up to verse 61 and also *āyat al-Kursī* (v. 256); *āyat al-Nūr* (v. 35) in *Sūrah 24 (al-Nūr)*; *Sūrah 27 (al-Naml)*, v. 88; *Sūrah 32 (al-Sajdah)*; *Sūrah 36 (Yā Sīn)*; *Sūrah 56 (al-Wāḡi'ah)*; *Sūrah 57 (al-Ḥadīd)*; *Sūrah 62 (al-Jumu'ah)*;

43. *Al-Tashakkuḥ* (*Risālah fī*) (*Treatise on Individuation*) (A.7; C.40; D.P.77). An important though short treatise on one of the difficult problems of traditional philosophy. Lithographed in the *Rasā'il*.

44. *Al-Wāridāt al-Qalbiyyah fī Ma'rifah al-Rubūbiyyah* (*The Inspirations of the Heart concerning Knowledge of the Divinity*) (A.38; C.41; D.P.39). A criticism of worldly scholars, especially those of his contemporaries who supported oppressive rulers for worldly ends. Printed in *Rasā'il*, Tehran, 1302 (A.H. lunar). A complete Persian translation with commentary by A. Shafī'ihā was published by the Iranian Academy of Philosophy (Tehran, 1358/1978).

45. *Al-Wujūd* (*Risālah*) (*Treatise on Being*) (C.42; D.P.40). A treatise on ontology discovered by M.T. Dāneshpazhuh.

46. *Zād al-Musāfir* (*Provisions of the Traveller*). A masterly summary of the doctrines pertaining to eschatology made known only recently. Edited by Kāzīm Mudīr Shānahchī from a unique manuscript in his own collection, in *Nashriyyah-yi Dānishkadāh-yi Ilāhiyyāt wa Ma'ārif-i Islāmī-i Dānishgāh-i Mashhad*, no. 2, Spring 1351 (A.H. solar), pp. 134-44.

In addition, the following works have been attributed to Mullā Şadrā, but their authorship remains uncertain:

1. *Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāzarah*.
2. *Al-Fawā'id* (*Risālah fī*).
3. *Ithbāt al-Bārī'* (*Risālah fī*).
4. *Jawābāt al-Masā'il al-'Awīṣah* (most likely by Mir Dāmād).
5. *Al-Qawā'id al-Malakūtiyyah* (*Risālah fī*) (most likely the same as *al-Masā'il al-Qudsiyyah*).
6. *Sirr al-Nuḡṭah*.

Finally it must be mentioned that 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'i told us that in his youth in Tabriz he saw a collection of treatises of Mullā Şadrā on *Arwāḥ*, the *Barzakh* and *Qaḍā' wa al-Qadar*

different from the well-known treatise of this name. This collection, however, has not as yet been located.

Undoubtedly further research in libraries, especially in those of Persia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, will bring to light new works of Mullā Ṣadrā as well as new manuscripts of presently known writings. Meanwhile the recognized works, a list of which has been given above, must be edited and studied to make better known the monumental metaphysical edifice which was erected by the sage of Shirāz and to make possible the establishment of the relation of these works to each other in both a chronological and a doctrinal manner.

Notes:

1. For the traditional account of the life of Mullā Ṣadrā see *Rawḡāt al-Jannāt* of Muḡammad Khawānsāri, vol. II, Tehran, 1306 (A.H. lunar), pp. 331-2; *Rawḡat al-Ṣafā'*, the appendices (*Mulḡaqāt*) of Riḡā Quli Khān Hidāyat, vol. VIII, Tehran, 1270 (A.H. lunar), P. 129; *Mustadrak al-Wasā'il* of Ḥājj Mīrzā Ḥusayn Nūri, vol. III, Tehran, 1321, (A.H. lunar), pp. 422-3; *Amal al-Āmil* of Muḡammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ḥurr al-Āmili, Tehran, 1302 (lunar), p. 58 (note by Muḡammad Qummi); *Salāfat al-Āsr fī Maḡāsin al-Shu'arā' bi-Kull Miṣr* of Sayyid 'Alī Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Madanī, Cairo, 1324 (A.H. lunar), p. 499; *Rayḡānat al-Adab* of Muḡammad 'Alī Tabrīzi, vol. II, Tehran, 1331 (A.H. solar), pp. 458-61; *Qiṣaṣ al-'Ulamā'* of Mīrzā Muḡammad Tonekābonī, Tehran, 1313 (A.H. solar), pp. 329-33.

As for modern studies devoted to his life in Muslim languages see Abū 'Abdullāh Zanjāni, *al-Faylasūf al-Fārsī al-Kabīr Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī*, Damascus, 1936; Maḡmūd Muḡammad Khuḡayrī, "Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī", *Risālat al-Islām*, no. 2, 1950, pp. 212-18 and no. 3, 1951, pp. 318-27; Ja'far Āl-i Yāsīn, *Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, Mujaddid al-Falsafat al-Islāmiyyah*, Baghdad, 1375 (A.H. lunar); the introduction of Shaykh Muḡammad Riḡā Āl-i Muḡaffar to the new edition of the *Asfār*, vol. I, Qum, 1378 (A.H. lunar); Abū Maḡfūz al-Karīm Ma'ṣūmī, "Ṣadr al-Dīn

al-Shīrāzī”, *Indo-Iranica*, vol. XIV, no. 4, December 1961, pp. 27-42 (of Persian-Arabic section); Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, *Sharḥ-i Ḥāl wa Ārā’-i Falsafī-yi Mullā Ṣadrā*, Meshed, 1381 (A.H. lunar); S.H. Nasr (ed.), *Mullā Ṣadrā Commemoration Volume*, Tehran, 1380/1961; and the introduction of S.H. Nasr to his edition of Mullā Ṣadrā’s *Sih Aṣl*, Tehran, 1380/1961.

Works in European languages dealing with Mullā Ṣadrā’s life include H. Corbin’s introduction (Chapter I) to his translation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s *Kitāb al-Mashā’ir* under the title *Le Livre des penetrations metaphysiques*, Tehran-Paris, 1964; Comte de Gobineau, *Les religions et les philosophies dans l’Asie Centrale*, pp. 79-88; E.G. Browne, *A Year Among the Persians*, London, (published originally in 1893), 1950, pp. 141-3; S.H. Nasr, *Islamic studies*, Chapter 10, “Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī” (Mullā Ṣadrā), His Life, Doctrines and Significance”; and Nasr, “Mullā Ṣadrā” in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

2. See Nasr, introduction to *Sih Aṣl*, p. 2; Corbin, *Le livre des penetrations metaphysiques*, p. 2. See also the introduction to Sayyid Muḥammad Mishkāt to *Maḥajjat al-Bayḍā’* of Fayḍ Khāshānī, vol. I, Tehran, 1380 (A.H. lunar), pp. 13-24.

3. See note 9 of chapter I for sources on Mir Dāmād; as for Shaykh Bahā’ al-Dīn Āmīlī and Mir Fīndiriskī, see Nasr, “The School of Ispahan” and the chapter to appear shortly in vol. VI of the *Cambridge History of Iran*; S.H. Nasr, “Mir Fīndiriskī”, in the *New Encyclopedia of Islam*.

4. See Corbin, “Confessions Extatiques de Mir Dāmād”

5. See Nasr, “The School of Ispahan”, p. 917.

6. As already mentioned, a critical edition of the *Qabasāt* is now being prepared by M. Mohaghegh, and several other collaborators. T. Izutsu is writing an extensive philosophical analyses of this work.

7. The text of the letter of Mullā Ṣadrā to Mir Dāmād has been published by Āshtiyānī in his *Sharḥ-i Ḥāl wa Ārā’*, pp. 2258. Considering the fact that Mullā Ṣadrā was not in the habit of overpraising

people the titles with which he addresses Mir Dāmād (p. 225) are indicative of his deep respect for his teacher.

8. The famous Persian scholar Sa'id Nafisi, the only person to have devoted a separate study to him, calls him the most outstanding poet of his age. See his *Aḥwāl wa Ash'ār-i Shaykh-i Bahā'ī*, Tehran, 1316 (A.H. solar).

9. On the writings of Mir Findiriskī and commentary upon their contrast with the works of Mullā Ṣadrā see H. Corbin and S.J. Āshtiyāni, *Anthologie des philosophes iraniens*, Tehran-Paris, 1972, pp. 63-97 of the Persian and 31-47 of the French text. Also see S.H. Nasr, "Mir Findiriskī", in the *New Encyclopedia of Islam*.

10. Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Ḥikmat al-Muta'āliyah fī al-Asfār al-'Aqliyyah al-Arba'ah*, ed. by M.H. Ṭabātabā'ī, vol. I, 1378 (A.H. lunar).

11. Mullā Ṣadrā, *Sih Aṣl*, pp. 5-6.

12. See F. Schuon, *Understanding Islam*, trans. by D.M. Matheson, London, 1963, Chapter IV; S.H. Nasr, *Ideals and Realities of Islam*, London, 1966, Chapter IV; and M. Lings, *A Sufi Saint of the Twentieth Century*, 1971.

13. Corbin is of the view that he definitely did not have a master. As far as we are concerned, however, the question cannot be determined so categorically.

14. On the Khan school, its historical background, architecture, decorations and testament of endowment (*waqf-nāmah*), see H. Khoubnazar and W. Kleiss, "Die Madrasa-yi Hān in Schiras", *Archaeologische Mitteilungen aus Iran*, vol. 8, 1975, pp. 255-78.

15. Thomas Herbert, *Some Years Travells into Diverse Parts of Africa and Asia the Great*, London, 1677, p. 129.

16. The outstanding contemporary master of the school of Mullā Ṣadrā, Ḥadrat-i Āyatullāh Sayyid Abu'l-Ḥasan Rafi'i Qazwīnī, told us that nearly forty years ago, one of the Arab *Sayyids* of Baṣrah discovered in that city a tomb with the name of Mullā Ṣadrā engraved on the stone. Some years later when friends went to visit it, the tombstone had

disappeared. See S.H. Nasr (ed.), *Mullā Şadrā Commemoration Volume*, p. 11.

17. See Nasr, *Three Muslim Sages*, p. 11.

18. In our introduction to the *Sih Aşl*, pp. 9-12, we have divided in this manner.

19. In his study of the bibliography of Mullā Şadrā in the *Mullā Şadrā Commemoration Volume*, M.T. Dāneshpazhuh has stated in many cases the names of other of Mullā Şadrā's books which he mentions in the treatises under discussion.

20. The following bibliographical studies of Mullā Şadrā may be mentioned: 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'i, "Şadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn İbrāhīm Shīrāzī. ...", *Mullā Şadrā Commemoration Volume*, pp. 107-20; Aşhtiyānī, *Sharḥ-i Ḥāl wa Ārā'*, pp. 210-25, repeated with a few minor changes in his prolegomena to the *Three Treatises* of Mullā Şadrā (no. 1 of bibliography); H. Corbin, *Le livre des penetrations metaphysiques*, pp. 27-41; Abū Maḥfūz al-Karīm Ma'sūmī, "Şadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, ḥayātuhū wa ma'āthiruhū", *Indo-Iranica*, vol. 14, Dec. 1961, pp. 37-40; Nasr, introduction to *Sih Aşl*, pp. 9-12.

Abū Maḥfūz al-Karīm Ma'sūmī has given valuable information on manuscripts and commentaries of Mullā Şadrā's works in the subcontinent in his article, "Şadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī".

See also further studies of M. T. Dāneshpazhuh in his introduction to Mullā Şadrā's *Kasr al-Aşnām al-Jāhiliyyah* and in his "Nuktahā'ī dar Bārah-yi Āthār-i Mullā Şadrā", *Rāhnamā-yi Kitāb*, vol. V, no. 1, Farvardīn 1341 (A.H. solar), pp. 33-40. Also, in his catalogue of the manuscripts of the Tehran University Library (*Fihrist-i Kitābkhānah-yi İhdā'ī-yi Āqā-yi Sayyid Muḥammad Mishkāt bi Kitābkhānah-yi Dānishgāh-i Tīhrān*), 1332 onward (A.H. solar), Dāneshpazhuh has provided a wealth of information about the works of Mullā Şadrā. His references to Mullā Şadrā are scattered throughout the many volumes of this vast work.

21. In this bibliography C. refers to the catalogue of Corbin mentioned in the previous footnote, D.P. to that of Dāneshpazhuh in the

Mullā Ṣadrā Commemoration Volume and A. to the work of Āshtiyānī on Mullā Ṣadrā's writings mentioned above.

22. See 'Abd al-Ḥusayn Ḥā'irī, *Fihrist-i Kitābkhānah-yi Shawrā-yi Millī*, vol. IX, part I, 1346 (A.H. solar), p. 389; and part IX, 1347, pp. 948-9.

23. For thorough discussion of the *Kitāb al-Mashā'ir* and commentaries written upon it see Corbin, *Le livre des penetrations metaphysiques*, chapter III.

24. The treatise, which begins with the words... اللهم اشد عضده
سبحان ربك رب العزة عما يصفون و سلام على المرسلين و الحمد لله رب العالمين
and ends with the phrase

is published in the *Revue de la Faculte des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines* of Tehran University, vol. 17, no. 3-4, 1349 (A.H. solar), pp. 326-9.

25. Ma'sūmī in his article "Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shirāzī" mentions twenty-four commentaries upon it by well-known *ḥakīms* of the subcontinent.

26. Corbin, *Le livre des penetrations metaphysiques*, p. 38; see also Corbin, *Annuaire 1963-64, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Section des Sciences Religieuses*, Paris, 1963, pp. 73-7.

27. *Mullā Ṣadrā Commemoration Volume*, p. 33 of the English and p. 26 of the Persian.

28. Mullā Ṣadrā has also commented upon other *ḥadīths* in independent sections of some of his other works. See for example, Ḥā'irī, *Fihrist...* vol. IX, part II, p. 950, for the commentary upon the *ḥadīth*, *Kuntu Kanzan Makhfiyyan...* (I was a hidden treasure...).

29. Corbin has made a study of these glosses in his "*Le theme de la resurrection chez Mollā Ṣadrā Shirāzī (1050/1640) commentateur de Sohrawardī (587/1191)*", *Studies in Mysticism and Religion presented to G. Scholem*, Jerusalem, 1967, pp. 71-115.

‘Ilm-i Tafṣīlī and *‘Ilm-i Ijmāī*

and the Possibility of Believing an Infinite Number of Propositions

By Dr. Muḥammad Legenhausen

One of the most important issues in Islamic philosophy is the problem of unity and multiplicity. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, Sabzavāri and a host of other Muslim philosophers, existence and existents are both a unity and a multiplicity. In his *Commentary* on Mullā Ṣadrā’s *Kitāb al Asfār*, Sabzavāri elaborates this claim by means of a metaphor, as explained by Prof. Izutsu:

Suppose, he says, that a man is standing in front of many mirrors. In each of the mirrors the same man and the same humanity i.e. the ‘quiddity’ of man, or ‘being man’, are observable. Both ‘man’ and ‘humanity’ are diversified; there are as many men and humanities as there are mirrors. Yet in their very multiplicity and diversity they are but one single ‘reality’, in so far as they are only reflections having no reality of their own.¹

This idea of unity and multiplicity is primarily a topic of metaphysics, although we find a very brief indication of the

epistemological variation on this theme in the section on 'Knowledge' in Sabzavāri's *Sharḥ al-Manẓūmah fi al-Ḥikmah*:

'Knowledge' is either 'separative' or 'collective.' The former is a 'knowledge' of numerous things through distinguished 'forms' separated from each other. The latter consists in that one knows these things through one single 'form' without separating one from the other.

Suppose you are asked a number of questions which you have mastered beforehand: you will be able to find the answer to the whole of them ready at hand, but it is still a simple state which can produce details. This kind of single and simple knowledge of answers is the "collective" one. But when you begin to explicate it in successive order, you bring into your mind the answers through numerous 'forms.' This is the 'separative' knowledge.²

'*Tafṣīlī*' and '*ijmālī*' are translated as 'separative' and 'collective' respectively. These are difficult terms to translate into English, and I am reluctant to quarrel with Profs. Mohaghegh and Izutsu who have so much more expertise in this area than I. Nevertheless, I may be bold enough to offer a few words of caution. The idea of the *tafṣīlī* is that of something which has been particularized by being rendered in detail. *Ijmālī* does not mean collective in the sense of something formed by collecting various pieces together, but 'collective' will do if it is understood along the lines of 'collective noun', that which appears singular in form but applies to a multiplicity.

My purpose in this paper is not an exegesis of the epistemology of Mullā Hādī Sabzavāri, a task for which I am ill equipped. Rather, I would like to consider how the distinction between separative (*tafṣīlī*) and collective (*ijmālī*) knowledge can

shed light on a question in contemporary Western epistemology: Is it possible for a person to have an infinite number of beliefs? The answer I wish to explore is that in the separative sense it is not possible, but in the collective sense it is possible to have an infinite number of beliefs. If I am successful, I will have shown how the philosophy of Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī may serve as a fountain of insights, even for problems far removed from the tradition in which he worked.

Of course, the distinction between these two types of knowledge is not original with Sabzavārī. A related discussion may even be found in Ibn Sinā:

We should realize, furthermore, that the knowledge which we can possess is of two kinds: one kind necessarily implies multiplicity (*bisyārī*), whereas the other does not necessarily imply multiplicity. The former is called mental knowledge (*'ilm-i naḥsānī*), while the latter is called intelligent knowledge (*'ilm-i 'aqlī*). . . . Consider, for instance, an intelligent person engaged either in a debate (*munāẓarah*) or in a discussion (*mudhākarah*) with another person who makes many statements to all of which a response is required. By means of a single thought which comes to the mind of the intelligent person, the answer to all of the questions may be revealed to him, while the answers to particular questions are not formulated separately in his mind. Thus, that which comes from the form in an orderly manner results in thought and words, and constitutes a single thought in the mind. The mind reflects thereafter on the form of the form. The result of this reflection (*nigāh*) is in fact knowledge which is subsequently expressed in the form of language. Both modes of knowledge are actually knowledge. That

person to whom the thought came was previously certain that he knew the entire answer. . . .

It has become evident how there can be a knower of many things without admitting multiplicity in this knower.³

Here the distinction drawn by Ibn Sinā between mental knowledge (*'ilm-i nafsāni*) and intellectual knowledge (*'ilm-i 'aqlī*) corresponds roughly to Sabzavāri's distinction between separative knowledge (*'ilm-i tafṣilī*) and collective knowledge (*'ilm-i ijmāli*).

Sabzavāri's terminology may also be found in Suhrawardī, who, like Ibn Sinā, uses the example of someone who finds that he has the answer to a multiplicity of questions even before he formulates separate answers to them.⁴ Ibn Sinā, Suhrawardī, and Sabzavāri all emphasize that the distinction between collective (intellectual) and separative (mental) knowledge is not to be confused with that between potential and actual knowledge. Collective knowledge may be just as actual as separative knowledge.

With these points of Islamic philosophy in mind, let us turn to the Western epistemological concern about infinitudes of beliefs. Some philosophers have concluded from arguments of the following kind that a person can have an infinite number of beliefs:⁵

(1) For any person, S, any proposition, p, and any time, t, if, upon being asked, at t, whether p is the case, S would sincerely and unhesitatingly answer in the affirmative, then, at t, S believes p.

(2) If one asks a normal literate adult whether 2 is larger than 1, then (if he is willing to co-operate) he will sincerely and unhesitatingly answer affirmatively; and the same applies to the question whether 2 is larger

than $11/2$, and so on for each of the other members of the infinite series, $1, 11/2, 13/4, 17/8, \dots$. Hence,

(3) Every normal literate adult has an infinite number of mathematical beliefs.

Let us begin by examining the first premise. This premise links unhesitating affirmation with belief. The link is also to be found in Plato's famous dialogue between Socrates and a slave boy, in which Socrates seeks to demonstrate the doctrine of *recollection* by leading the boy through a series of questions by means of which the boy arrives at a geometrical theorem, although the boy had not been trained in geometry.⁶ The ready affirmation of a proposition is taken as evidence for a pre-existing belief.

Robert Audi has argued against the first premise. He claims that ready affirmation may be explained by the hypothesis that one arrives at a new belief by something like a nearly instantaneous inference. For example, one has the general belief that a fraction whose numerator is smaller than its denominator is less than one. Upon being presented with the fraction $63/64$, one's general beliefs and recognition that 63 is less than 64 yields the new belief that the fraction is less than two. Thus, we have Plato, on the one hand, claiming that the belief was already present, and Audi, on the other hand, claiming that the belief was formulated only upon consideration of the proposition.

The distinction between collective and separative knowledge may be employed to suggest that both are right, if we extend the distinction to cover belief as well as knowledge. We assume that the normal literate adult has mastered mathematics to the extent that he understands fractions. He will then be able to find the answer to the question whether $63/64$ is smaller than two ready at hand. This indicates the pre-existent presence of a simple state from which details could be produced. Thus, we may say that the person had a pre-existent *collective* belief. Nevertheless, we may admit that the specific form of the proposition was only brought to

mind when the question was proffered, at which time a *separative* belief was formulated.

Audi argues against the Platonic account that it fails to distinguish between dispositionally (in the sense of ‘non-occurrently’) believing that *p*, and being disposed to *come* to believe that *p* ‘instantaneously’ upon considering it. Audi illustrates the distinction with the example of a person who has no belief of any kind about how loud he is speaking, yet who readily would admit that he had been speaking too loudly were he just to entertain the proposition. The person has a disposition to believe but he does not have a dispositional belief.

Could this sort of criticism be applied to the Sabzavarian admission of collective belief? I think not. As Sabzavāri explains the distinction, collective knowledge is attributed to the person who has mastered some knowledge and who finds answers to questions on the mastered topic ready at hand. This does not seem to be the case for the loud speaker. The loud speaker does not introspect and find that he can produce some detailed account of what he believes which would include the admission that he has been speaking too loudly. Rather, upon being presented with the proposition that he has been speaking too loudly, he turns his attention to a subject which he had not previously considered, vocal volume.

Ibn Sinā, Suhrawardī and Sabzavāri seem to have anticipated the objection raised by Audi about confusing dispositional belief and disposition to believe. The acceptance of the difference between a disposition to believe and a dispositional belief allows for agreement with Audi that the Platonic contention of pre-existent geometrical knowledge in the slave boy is to be rejected. Perhaps the boy had potential knowledge. At least he had a disposition to believe geometrical truths. We may even go so far as to concede the doctrine of recollection without claiming that the boy, prior to the recollection caused by the questioning of Socrates, had actual knowledge, whether separative or collective. Those

who distinguish collective and separative knowledge are clear of the charge of having confused dispositional beliefs with dispositions to believe.

Nevertheless, we are forced by Audi's example of the loud speaker to admit that premise (1), as it stands, is incorrect. Not all cases of sincere and unhesitating affirmation are reports of previously held belief. Sabzavāri describes collective knowledge not merely in terms of readiness to provide answers, but readiness to provide answers on a subject which one had previously mastered. Before reformulating premise (1), a few other points should be noted.

Consider a more ordinary case of recollection than the Platonic variety. S has studied Arabic grammar, but he has forgotten some of what he had learned. Nevertheless, it may only take a bit of prodding to get him to recall the forgotten lessons. Maybe even without the prodding, just by concentrating, S could remember what he had been taught. If answers to questions about Arabic grammar come only slowly, hesitatingly, uncertainly, and with much mental effort, we may be unwilling to grant that S knows his lessons. If, to the contrary, S is able to answer readily any question put to him on the topic, we will say that he knows the subject. It is a matter of degree. When he knows the subject we say that his knowledge of the subject was collective; it becomes separative upon consideration of specific questions. S may never have imagined some of the sentences he has been asked to analyze, yet there is a sense in which he already knew, in a general form, the grammatical role played by each word in the sentence.

It will be objected that we are confusing knowledge of a general proposition with knowledge of its instances. The charge may be repulsed by showing that it is possible to have knowledge of a general proposition without having collective knowledge. This will occur when one's general knowledge does NOT yield ready recognition and assent to instances. For example, one may know

that no prime number, x , greater than y is divisible by y , while one is only able to recognize relatively simple instances of this formula, because of the difficulty of recognizing large primes. With respect to an unrecognized large prime n , we cannot say that one who knows only the general formula knows that for all y less than n , n is not divisible by y . In such a case there is neither collective nor separative knowledge.

We are now in a position to reformulate premise (1):

(1') For any person, S , any proposition, p , and any time, t , if, upon being asked, at t , whether p is the case, S would sincerely and unhesitatingly answer in the affirmative, then, at t , S believes p , provided that S had previously become acquainted with the topic to which p pertains, and p was either explicit or implicit in that aspect of the topic with which S had become familiar. With this revision, we may answer a second objection to (1) raised by Audi:

Now consider the alleged dispositional belief that the sun is more than 100,542 miles away. . . . Presumably such beliefs would be formed when one forms the belief that the sun is about 93,000,000 miles from the earth, and doubtless the latter belief would be admitted to be typically the basis of beliefs like the former. But is it at all likely that my belief that the sun is more than 100,542 miles away, was formed before I even entertained the proposition, given that (for instance) I never perceived, inferred, or introspected it, nor experienced anything in which it figured in any special way? This is quite doubtful. Anyone defending Premise (1) owes us an argument to show otherwise.

Here is the argument, but in defense of (1') instead of (1). The doubts expressed by Audi make sense with respect to

separative belief, but not with respect to collective belief. It makes sense to attribute the implicit belief that the sun is more than 100,542 miles away to a person who had never considered that particular proposition because the proposition correctly describes, albeit with respect to a detail not previously explicitly considered, the cognitive state of one who understands arithmetic and that the sun is about 93 million miles away. We should not say of one who knows how far the sun is from the earth that he does not know that the sun is more than 100,542 miles from the earth. But assuming, along with the vast majority of epistemologists, that knowledge implies belief, then he also believes this.

We may grant that there is some sense in which one should not be said to have a belief that *p* unless one has explicitly considered that proposition. The point is merely that this is not the only sense in which belief ascriptions are made. After all, we may be willing to ascribe beliefs to animals without committing ourselves to the idea that the animals could explicitly consider any proposition. In that case it seems that the animal has some cognitive state which we would describe in terms of belief in a number of propositions while admitting that the animal could never explicitly elaborate such propositions. Perhaps we should say that the animal has collective belief without any possibility for separative belief. Quine writes:

In thus ascribing propositional attitudes to men and beasts by quotation I do not ascribe a command of the quoted language, or of any. A cat can believe 'A mouse is in there'. The language is that of the ascriber of the attitude, though he projects it empathetically to the creature in the attitude. The cat is purportedly in a state of mind in which the ascriber *would* say 'A mouse is in there'.⁷

Audi also takes exception to premise (2). He argues that no one could believe of each of the elements in the series that it is less than two, because the expression of some of the elements in the series will take more than a million numerals. Such elements will be too cumbersome to be grasped, and hence cannot be believed. Audi assumes what he calls 'the generally accepted point that S can believe that p only if S can grasp p, in a sense that entails understanding it'. Maybe for separative beliefs the point is generally accepted, but Quine's discussion of cat beliefs indicates that there is some sense of belief for which the point is not generally accepted.

Consider the following argument:

- (1) Ann knows that the room is empty. So,
- (2) Ann knows that there is no Burmese cat in the room.
- (3) If S knows that p then S believes that p. So,
- (4) Ann believes that there is no Burmese cat in the room.

Audi protests that we cannot plausibly infer that Ann believed there was no Burmese cat in the room prior to entertaining the thought:

For her believing it when she affirms it is readily explained on the weaker and more economical hypothesis that as a normal person who believed the room empty, she immediately came to believe there was no Burmese cat in it upon considering this proposition.⁸

We may grant that upon consideration of the proposition a detailed explicit belief was formed, but this is not to deny that the belief was already implicit in Ann's cognitive state. Ann's behavior is warrant for one to ascribe to her the implicit belief that there is no Burmese cat in the room, just as the cat's behavior warranted the ascription of belief about the presence of the mouse. In neither case does the ascription of implicit belief require the

strong uneconomical hypothesis that our concepts of Burmese cat or mouse are present in the minds of Ann or the cat. Audi protests that none of us can grasp an infinite number of semantically primitive terms or all the concepts they would express, and reasons that we therefore could not have an infinite number of beliefs each with a different descriptive content. Once again, Audi fails to consider any but explicit beliefs. The fact that one's conceptual repertoire is finite does imply that one cannot have an infinite number of separative beliefs each with a different descriptive content, but this does not imply that we do not have collective beliefs such that infinite descriptive content is implicit in a single cognitive condition.

Consider a final argument. S believes p. S understands logic, including the principle that p implies (p or q) regardless of what proposition is designated by 'q'. With this understanding S is ready to affirm any proposition of the form (p or q). There are infinitely many propositions to which 'q' could refer. Hence, S has an infinite number of implicit beliefs, even though it is not possible for S to have an infinite number of explicit beliefs.

There are good reasons to assert that people have collective beliefs, or implicit beliefs. First, there is the argument about knowledge. When S knows that p, and p obviously and immediately implies q, we normally would claim that S knows q. Knowledge implies belief, so it makes sense to ascribe belief in q to S. Since the relevant propositions we could put for 'q' are often propositions which S has never considered, it is not plausible to attribute explicit belief to S that q, so we discover the need to distinguish between explicit and implicit beliefs in a way that appears to correspond at least roughly with the distinction in Islamic philosophy between collective and separative knowledge. Second, when one has mastered a subject, it is often possible for one to describe what one has learned in numerous ways. In the elaboration there is a sense in which new beliefs are formulated,

for the propositions affirmed might never been previously considered, but there is also a sense in which the beliefs were already implicit. One is merely describing in new ways what one already knew. Third, the ascription of animal beliefs provides evidence that there is a sense of belief which is clearly independent of that abilities of the subject to which the belief is ascribed to grasp the terms in which the belief is described. Explicit belief does not have this sense, so it plausible to posit implicit beliefs. Fourth, not all of our thoughts take the form of sentences in the mind. Sometimes it seems that we visualize circumstances. This visualization may be considered a kind of belief, the belief that reality, or some portion of it, is as visualized. The elaboration of some such visualization may be the source of an endless series of descriptive propositions. Thus, one may come to the view that one has an infinite number of beliefs, not explicitly, of course, but *ijmālan*.

This does not mean that there must be an infinite number of forms in the mind, each corresponding to a proposition. The argument for collective beliefs is motivated by a recognition that a multiplicity of propositions may correspond to a single mental form. In view of this it may be more perspicuous to speak of believing an infinite number of propositions rather than of having an infinite number of beliefs.

Notes:

1. Toshihiko Izutsu, *The Concept and Reality of Existence* (Tokyo: The Keio Institute, 1971), p. 137.
2. *The Metaphysics of Sabzavārī*, tr. Mehdi Mohaghegh and Toshihiko Izutsu, (Tehran: Iran University Press, 1983), p. 211.
3. *The Metaphysics of Avicenna (Dānesh Nāmah-ye 'Alā'ī)*, tr. Parviz Morewedge, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 62. As Morewedge points out, (p. 128) the theme of this passage may be traced through Proclus' thesis that the gods have an undivided knowledge of

divided things to Plato's contention in the *Theatetus* (186 C-D) that knowledge is not to be identified with a series of impressions, but is a reflection on them, a 'synthetic unity' rather than a multiplicity in the mind of the knower.

4. Suhrawardi, "Kitāb al-Mashārī wa al-Muṭārahāt", in *Oeuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques*, Vol. 1 (Tehran: Academie Iranienne de Philosophie, 1976), p. 478.

5. The argument is discussed in Robert Audi, "Believing and Affirming", *Mind* (1982) Vol. XCI, 115-120. Audi attributes this sort of argument to Richard Foley, "Inferential Justification and the Infinite Regress", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 15 (1978).

6. See the *Meno*, 81a-81c, cited by Audi, p. 115.

7. W.V. Quine, *Pursuit of Truth*, revised ed., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 68.

8. Audi, p. 119.

The Origin and Development of the Science of *Kalām* in Islam

Dr. Ridā Dāwarī

Translated from the Persian by A. N. Bāqirshāhī

The religion of Islam comprises of two parts: Knowledge and Obedience. Knowledge is also of two kinds. One is the knowledge of practical rules and the second is the knowledge of beliefs and the principles of religion. The former constitutes the subject matter of *fiqh* and the latter is the subject matter of the Science of *Kalām*. The term *Kalām* and *Kalāmī* issues were not paid much attention, at least till the time of Abū al-Ḥasan Ash‘ari, by the group known as *Ahl al-Hadith* and the general Muslims who had differing impressions about *Kalām*. But after the advent of Abū al-Ḥasan Ash‘ari, Sunni Muslims seriously delved into the principles of religion and paid more attention to them.¹ Abū Ḥanifah without referring to the term *Kalām*, called the Science of Beliefs as the ‘great *fiqh*’ (*fiqh-i akbar*), while others have used the terms: Science of the Principles of Religion, Science of Tawḥīd and Divine Attributes (*ṣifāt*) and the Science of Reasoning and Deduction. It seems that until the early period of the third century hijrah this science did not find its proper name of *Kalām*.

Why the Science of Beliefs is Called the Science of *Kalām*?

There are different opinions about the origin of this science and even theologians (*Mutakallimūn*) hold different views about the origin of the word *Kalām*. Though from one aspect it is not very important to discuss the origin of this word, but by knowing the viewpoints of the upholders of this science, certain ambiguities may be removed. There are some ten viewpoints about the origin of the term *Kalām* of which some are very important. According to one idea one of the questions that gave rise to the origin of the word *Kalām*, was related to the Divine Scripture or Divine Word (Holy Qur'ān), as to whether it is eternal in nature or created in course of time. This idea seems to be logically strong enough, for before the appearance of such a question the word *Kalām* was used against the word *Ḥadīth*. It is said that once Ahmad ibn Ḥanbal was debating with Abū Dāwūd in the presence of the Abbasid caliph Mu'taṣim and said: I am not an upholder of *Kalām* and my school of thought is *Ḥadīth*. Ibn Hanbal was of the view that anybody who studies *Kalām* will not be guided. It is said that Mālik ibn Anas was also an opponent of *Kalām*.

Thus, when scholars like Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal and Mālik ibn Anas feel to detach themselves from *Kalām*, it means at that time there was a heated debate about issues like the eternity of the Qur'ān or whether it was created in course of time. Presumably such debates were so intensive that the Caliph decided to side with the Mu'tazilites and consequently ordered the punishment of the opponents of the idea of the creation of the Qur'ān. In this way the Science of the Principles of Religion appeared in the name of *Kalām*. But this idea about the origin of *Kalām* does not seem to be true, for if, by *Kalām* the Divine Word was meant, then a person like Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal would not have detached himself from the *Kalāmī* School of Thought and said that he was of the *Ahl al-Ḥadīth*.

Apart from this theory of the origin of the term *Kalām*, it is believed that the term originated from the title of chapters of books on the principles of religion, such as *al-Kalām fi Jowhar* (Discourse on Essence), *al-Kalām fi Qadar* (Discourse on Predestination), etc.² We will try to focus on other views in this regard so it might be clear why the science of reasoning in religious matters came to be known as *Kalam*. Ibn Khaldūn, citing different reasons for the origin of the term *Kalām*, is of the view that since this science deals with the arguments concerning heterodoxy and innovations, hence it is called pure or unadulterated *Kalām*. This view of Ibn Khaldūn is identical with that of the author of *al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Karim Shahrīstānī. Thus, in the light of Shahrīstānī’s definition of *Kalām* we can be in a better position to understand Ibn Khaldūn’s idea. Shahrīstānī is of the view that since the upholders of the principles of religion sought to compete with the philosophers who used logic, they used the word *Kalām*. The word *Kalām* is synonymous with logic (probably they used *Kalām* (word) which is the Arabic version of Logos versus logic). It can be concluded that *Kalām* is synonymous with dialogue and polemic and those who used to discuss about the principles of religion were called *Mutakallimūn* and their studies was called the Science of *Kalām*. Indeed dialectic in logic is also meant polemic and in common usage it is meant *Kalām*.

Let us now refer to the views of some of the Muslim philosophers concerning the Science of *Kalām* in order to give a more clear picture of the origin of this science. According to Abu Nasr Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā and others who followed them, in philosophy only inductive reasoning (*qiyās*) is considered to be the valid reasoning (*burhān*), since it is based on certain premises, but the *Mutakallimūn* have a polemical approach and the premise of their inductive reasoning is based on *musallamāt* (*jadāl* is a kind of syllogism which is based on *musallamāt*, i.e. on postulates).

Mutakallimūn proceed to argue with the help of certain known views and actions that are defined clearly by religion, and therefore, anything that stands against those views is considered to be invalid. In his *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm* Fārābī writes that whatever the *Mutakallimūn* do and say is within the framework of divine rules or commands.³ We are not concerned here with the view of philosophers that *jadāl* (polemic) is lower than *burhān* (demonstration of reasoning), and on this assumption the Science of *Kalām* is below that of *ḥikmat* or philosophy. The conclusion is that if *ḥikmah* is the science of *burhān*, the Science of *Kalām* is not only polemic in nature but the origin of the term itself is rooted in its polemical approach. Modern European thinkers have coined the term Dialectical Theology for the Science of *Kalām* which supports our viewpoint here.

Science of *Kalām*: Definition

As said earlier, *Kalām* is called the Science of Principles of Religion, Science of *Tawḥīd* and Divine Attributes (*ṣifāt*), and the Science of Reasoning and Deduction. In order to elaborate this point let us refer to other definitions of the science of *Kalām*.

Ibn Khaldūn holds that the Science of *Kalām* deals with religious beliefs and use of rational reasoning to argue against the innovators and those who deviate from the path of their predecessors and the traditionalists. In other words Ibn Khaldūn holds that the Science of *Kalām* comprises those religious beliefs whose truth has been taken for granted. Through rational proofs theologians tried to prevent any innovation and heterodoxy. In fact, the Science of *Kalām* appeared to give a rational and defensible form to religious beliefs against the objections of opponents, since it is similar to the speculative sciences so far as its reasoning and dialectical nature are concerned.

I do not call the Science of *Kalām* as a speculative science since philosophers in their classification of sciences do not consider *Kalām* as a purely speculative science. In his classification of

sciences in his book *Ihṣā' al-'Utūm*, Fārābī places the Science of *Kalām* after *fiqh*. In Fārābī's view the scholars of *Kalām* have a practical end in convincing or silencing their opponents by any means. There is a difference between philosophy and *Kalām*. Philosophers use logical arguments in their approach and do not refer to divine revelation as the basis of their argument although it does not mean that they deny revelation.

Philosophers hold that their reasoning is based on certain self-evident rules. Thus, they believe that religious rules should be compatible with philosophy, otherwise they should be interpreted. However, *Mutakallimūn* for their part, maintain that philosophers have stepped beyond their limits for considering reason as the only authentic source of judgement. Regardless of the *Mutakallimūn*'s views about philosophers and vice versa, the fact is that *Kalām* is influenced by philosophy. Therefore it was developed with the development of philosophy and gradually reached to the extent that today it is difficult to demarcate them and attach the label of philosophy or *Kalām* to a text. For instance, 'Abd al-Razzāq Lāhijī's book *Shawāriq al-Ilhām* is a commentary on Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd al-'Aqā'id* (a concise work on Shi'i *Kalām* on which over a hundred commentaries have been written so far). Here it is difficult to say whether Lāhijī's book is on philosophy or *Kalām*. Changes in *Kalām* have been so extensive that researchers have demarcated the earlier *Kalām* from the new *Kalām* and given a separate definition to each of them. In the view of earlier Muslim philosophers, the Science of *Kalām* enabled one to protect the religious rules by certain reasons that are rooted in self-evident premises. This definition is extracted from Lāhijī's book *Gohar Murād*. According to this definition there is no common point between philosophy and *Kalām* with regard to their subject matter, proof and usefulness. So far as the subject matter is concerned, philosophy has no commonality with *Kalām*, for philosophy deals with being as it is, while *Kalām* according to Ibn

Khaldūn, has no specific subject matter except the situation of Shari‘ah and religious beliefs. The argumentation of philosophy also differs from that of *Kalām*. Philosophical argumentations have their origin in self-evident rules while in *Kalām* the matter of proofs are taken for granted. The end of philosophy also is not identical with *Kalām*, for philosophy aims at the perfection of speculative faculty and gaining the knowledge of reality whereas *Kalām* aims only at protecting the Shari‘ah. In other words the end of *Kalām* is to move from the lower stage of initiation to the zenith of certainty, for those who seek guidance in the light of proofs and who protect the precepts of religion against the opponents by compelling them to state their arguments. As is said, the Science of *Kalām* is a science which pursues a definite goal, i.e. protecting religiosity. But it is not possible to assert to what extent it has been successful so far.

Thus new *Kalām* differs from the earlier *Kalām*. In fact, new *Kalām* is closer to philosophy, that is, they are alike in their subject matter and goal. They differ with each other only in the way of reasoning (philosophy bases its reasoning on self-evident premises while *Kalām* proceeds its reasoning from the truths of religion). The scholars of new *Kalām* define the Science of *Kalām* as follows:

“It is a science that deals with beings in religious perspective.” Let us compare this definition of *Kalām* with that of philosophy which concerns with being within the limit of man’s ability. The realm of the Science of *Kalām* is religious rules while the limits of philosophy depends on the limits of man’s reason and ability.

4. Science of *Kalām*: Its Opponents and Exponents

How did the Science of *Kalām* come into existence? When it is said that the Science of *Kalām* concerns the demonstration of religious principles and refutation of the views of opponents, then it must be concluded that the origin of *Kalām* is associated with the rise of certain disputes and outbreak of disunity among Muslims.

When the Muslims were at war with their enemies and led a simple life in the time of the Prophet (ﷺ), there were no such debates at all. That is, they had no time to involve themselves in such discussions. But later on, when the faith of Muslims became weak, and ethnic and tribal prejudices that had been eclipsed by the majestic expressions of *Allahu Akbar* (God is Great) and *Lā Ilāha illā Allah* (There is no god but Allah), began to emerge, and Muslims became acquainted with the sciences of non-Arab nations who had accepted Islam, and began translating the works of Iranians, Greeks, etc. into Arabic, obviously following such confrontations and differences of views, certain problems came to the fore. Thus, it became necessary to refer to the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth* to find out the right solution.

The emergence of various schools of thought is not related to the Qur'ān. In fact, when different tendencies and schools of thought appeared, the upholders of each school tried to refer to the Qur'ān in order to justify their stand. For some thirty years the Muslims had been reading the Qur'ān enthusiastically and nobody ever asked whether it was possible for sinners to go to heaven and for righteous people to go to hell. In case of any problem of this kind, they used to refer to the Prophet (ﷺ) and his companions. (The Shi'ites, however, entered the field of *Kalāmī* disputes later on with the aim of presenting their arguments about the issue of Imamate. Indeed they had no need to involve themselves in *Kalāmī* issues before, for they believed in the Infallible Imams ('a) as the successors of the Prophet (ﷺ), and whenever any controversy arose they used to refer to the Infallible Imam ('a), since the word of the Imam ('a) was sufficient proof of authority [in the absence of the Prophet (ﷺ)]. Shi'i *Mutakallimūn* were disciples of the Infallible Imams ('a) and benefited a lot from their teachings, especially from Imam Ja'far al-Ṣādiq ['a]).

Later on certain issues became controversial and the upholders of each school tried to support their view by referring to

the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth*. The history of differences of views in Islam dates back to the great discord at Saqifah Banī Sā'idah where the bid of the *Anṣār* to have an administrator to govern their affairs was challenged by the *Muhājir* and resulted in the election of a caliph in violation of the verses of the Qur'ān and the explicit instructions of the Prophet (ﷺ). The other difference took place in the last days of the caliphate of Uthmān ibn Affan and after his assassination. These difference found their new forms during the temporal caliphate of Imam 'Alī ('a). First Talḥah, Zubayr and 'Āyishah broke their pledge of allegiance to Imam 'Alī ('a) and started the Battle of Jamal, and then a group of renegades called Khawārij (outcasts) appeared, caused great trouble for the successor of the Prophet (ﷺ) and finally assassinated him in the state of prayer in the Mosque of Kūfah. The Khawārij were strange people. They were rigid in performing the duties that appeared to them as religious, and if anybody they thought was careless in doing these duties, they considered it as a mark of departing from religion. It was their misconception and incorrect inferring of knowledge and understanding that made them go astray and fall into manifest error.

The origin of the Khawārij is probably related to Mu'āwiyah's behaviour in Syria but they undermined the just administration of Imam 'Alī ('a) and later involved themselves with the Umayyads without getting any result. The advent of the Khawārij marks the beginning of the ignorance of the reality of Islam. Following the seizure of power by the Umayyads, the interpretation, or more properly misinterpretation of religion began. Before that the caliphs used to follow the simple life-style of the Prophet (ﷺ), but Mu'āwiyah built the green palace for himself in Damascus and started a luxurious life. Before this period there was no difference between Arab and non-Arab and nobody whipped up the feelings of Arab chauvinism. Mu'āwiyah and his successors revived the Arabism of the days of *Jāhiliyyah*

and replaced it with Islam. In this way many of the norms and necessities of Islam were given up. A group called Murji'ah appeared and entrusted everything to God and the Hereafter. The Umayyads greatly benefited from the ideas of the Murji'ah and uninhibitedly indulged in whatever they wished, even ignoring their own claim to be the successors of the Prophet (ﷺ), which required the observance of the rules of religion.

According to another idea that was propounded in the early period of Umayyad rule, whatever Allah wishes occurs and therefore whatever occurs is according to the wish of Allah. This meant that mankind has not been given any independent will and power by Allah. On the basis of this absurd idea Mu'awiyah said Imam 'Ali ('a) was killed by Allah.

Change of the political leadership, revival of the narrow Arab nationalistic prejudice of the *Jāhiliyyah* and adoption of the customs of the courts of Persia, Byzantine and Egypt, were some of the incidents that led some thinkers to find a religious justification for them. To this end they sought to take help even from non-religious sources. But if an idea or mode of thought is serious then it will not remain confined to a particular community and will never serve as a means of domination of a party. Hence, the emergence of views, beliefs, debates and intellectual discussions did not help to prolong Umayyad rule, and when Arab prejudice began to give way to the domination of non-Arab Muslims, it was but natural for the Umayyad dynasty to collapse. However, the discussions and debates on view continued and developed.

Some thinkers are of the opinion that the Science of *Kalām* was developed to refute the opponents of Islam. But an insight into the history of *Kalām* proves that this idea also is not true. We can hardly find any cases regarding the refutation of opponents in the words of the early *Mutakallimūn*. Though, later on when *Kalām* was developed and defined its framework the argumentation against the opponents also was started. For instance, various books

on *Kalām* were written by Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians after the advent of Islam and the *Mutakallimūn* also made attempts to answer the objections that were raised in those works. For example Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār Hamadānī, the Mu‘tazilite *Mutakallim* answered the objections raised by the Jews and Zoroastrians. If we do not want to exaggerate, as the orientalist have done on the impact of Greek thought in the development of *Kalām*, we must say that some of the *Mutakallims*, to some extent, were influenced by the views of the Greeks in posing certain *Kalāmī* issues. As a matter of fact, the Science of *Kalām* did not come into existence to defend the religion. In other words, the necessity of defending religion was not the cause of the development of this science but it was the outcome of the study and investigation of the Muslims of their own beliefs and principles of faith. When the Science of *Kalām* emerged, Muslims not only did not pay any attention to it, but considered it as absurd. Thus the early scholars of *Kalām* started to defend the Science of *Kalām* itself instead of employing it to defend religion. The *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* group did not feel the need for the Science of *Kalām* and said that since there were no *Kalāmī* issues in the Prophet’s time, the Muslims will not adhere to this belief. Later on we will discuss how the *Mutakallimūn* responded to the objections of the *Ahl al-Ḥadīth*.

5. Emergence of the M‘utazilite School of Thought

There are many schools of *Kalāmī* thought and it is outside the scope of this brief article to discuss all of them here. We will deal with the three important schools of thought which have exercised great influence in the history of Islam. These three are 1. Mu‘tazilites, 2. Ash‘arites, 3. Shi‘i.

It is said that one day while Ḥasan Baṣrī was teaching in a mosque, a student asked him whether one who commits a major sin could be categorized as a believer or an unbeliever? Before Ḥasan Baṣrī could reply, Wāṣil bin ‘Atā’ stood up and said that one who commits a major sin is neither a believer nor an unbeliever. Ḥasan

Başri got angry with the reply and said in Arabic *I'tazil 'annā* (dissociate from us). Wāṣil got up and moved away to a corner of the mosque and was joined by some of his friends including 'Amr bin 'Ubayd, who were attending the class of Ḥasan Başri. The argument of Wāṣil was that the term 'believer' is positive and carries praise, and if applied to a wrongdoer who has committed a capital sin, it might indicate that he is being lauded and is worthy of praise. At the same time the sinner cannot be called an unbeliever (*kāfir*), since he has testified that God is One and Muḥammad (ﷺ) is His Prophet. Hence, according to Wāṣil, such a person is neither in the category of believers nor of unbelievers, and is between these two states.

Whatever the authenticity of this incident, which has been recorded in the account of the Mu'tazilites, *I'tizāl* (keeping away) was not a spontaneous idea born in that gathering. Wāṣil bin 'Aṭā' and 'Amr bin 'Ubayd used to share similar views in the gatherings of Ḥasan Başri', and if the difference between Ḥasan Başri and Wāṣil ibn 'Aṭā' had been the definition of a Muslim who commits a major sin, then it was not necessary to part ways. There were rather deeper differences between them. It could even be said that the term Mu'tazilah was not born from the word *I'tazil* as uttered spontaneously by Ḥasan Başri. Before the establishment of the Mu'tazilite school of thought, there was a group of people who had not participated in the Battles of Jamal and Şiffin and had refused to side with either group and practiced *I'tizāl*. 'Abdullāh bin 'Umar and Sa'd bin Abi Waqqāṣ were among this group. It is possible that Wāṣil bin 'Aṭā' and 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd were related to this group, since these two persons also did not side with either of the parties in the Battles of Jamal and Şiffin. Without siding with any particular group they merely said that one of the two groups in the said battles was not on the right path. 'Amr bin 'Ubayd used to say that he will not accept the testimony of anybody who had

participated in the Battle of Jamal, for the testimony of one of the parties to the said battle is invalid.

In view of the above facts, can we not say that the Mu'tazilites borrowed their name from the group of 'Abdullāh bin 'Umar and Sa'd bin Abī Waqqāṣ? However, irrespective of the origin of its name, the Mu'tazilite school of belief stood against the *Ahl al-Zāhir* and *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* sects. That is, they believed that apart from the literal meanings of the words of the Divine Scripture and *Ḥadīth*, one is allowed to use intellect so as to understand the meaning of those texts as well. Here the misconception might arise, especially in the modern times, that the Mu'tazilites believed the *Shari'ah* to be subordinate to the judgement of the intellect and that they stood against the *Shari'ah* on the basis of intellect. Though some of the Mu'tazilites like Ibn al-Rāwandī and Jāḥiẓ are accused of being irreligious and even Wāṣil ibn 'Aṭā' is charged with blasphemy, by referring to the intellect they probably did not mean to deny the divine revelation. They rather meant to understand the meaning of the revealed words profoundly and follow the rules of *Shari'ah* knowingly and with full knowledge.

6. Mu'tazilites Ideas

Mu'tazilites have their particular ideas that can be subsumed under the following five principles 1. *Tawḥīd* (monotheism), 2. *'Adl* (justice), 3. *Wa'd wa Wa'id* (promise and threat), 4. *Manzilat bayn Manzilatayn* (middle course), 5. *Amr-i bi al-Ma'rūf wa al-Nahy-i 'an al-Munkar* (enjoining the good and forbidding the evil). It is to be added that there is difference of view among the Mu'tazilites regarding each of these principles and they have gone into intricate details concerning them, but in general there is a unanimity of opinion shared by all regarding these five principles. The first two principles are more important and the other three principles are sub-divisions of these two principles. A question may arise here as why do they not believe only in these two principles instead of all five? The reply is that the Mu'tazilites

consider themselves as the upholders of *‘Adl* (justice) and *Tawhīd*. They say all the principles of religion are included in these two principles, and the reason they mention the other three principles is to challenge other groups and schools of thought.

Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār Hamadāni has written a book on the five principles, wherein he says, that each chapter of his book is related to one principle with which he has tried to refute the views of opponents. For instance regarding the principle of *Tawhīd*, he refutes the views of the *Malāḥidah* (heretics), *Dahriyyah* (atheists) and *Mushabbihah* (those who ascribe form to Allah). On the basis of the principle of justice, he refutes the views of the *Jabri* (fatalist) school of thought, on the issue of *Wa‘d wa Wa‘id*, he rejects the views of the Murji‘ah, on the principle of *Manzilat bayn al Manzilatayn*, he exposes the views of the Khawārij and finally on the principle of *Amr-i bi al-Ma‘rūf wa al-Nahy-i ‘an al-Munkar*, he has attempted to answer the Imāmiyyah school. According to Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, the Imāmis hold that *Amr-i bi al-Ma‘rūf wa Nahy-i ‘an al-Munkar* is obligatory if the Infallible Imam (‘a) is present (according to the Shi‘ites this condition is necessary but how is it possible to enjoin others to do good and forbid the evil and not say anything about the state of the administration)! Later on while discussing about each principle it will be proved that how these five principles are convertible into the first two principles.

1. *Tawhīd*

Tawhīd is the common belief shared by all Muslims but each school of thought has its own understanding of *Tawhīd* and interprets it from its own viewpoint. Today a new method of *Kalām* has emerged and some people are trying to interpretate *Tawhīd* from the social point of view.¹¹ The Mu‘tazilites too had different ideas about the principle of *Tawhīd*. The divergent views of the various schools are rooted in their different interpretations of *Tawhīd*, and does not mean that any of the Islamic groups deny the fundamental principle of monotheism.

As we know the Qur'ān describes certain attributes of Allah, such as life, power, hearing, seeing, knowledge, etc. The question is whether these attributes are in addition to Divine Essence and are eternal? The Mu'tazilites believed that if attributes were to be considered as something additional, it would amount to polytheism, since in such a case they would be regarded as partners of Allah. However, since Allah is the Source of everything, the Living and the All-Powerful, how could this problem be solved?

The Mu'tazilites held essence to be the procurator of attributes. That is, when it is said that Allah is Living, Omnipotent and All-Knowing, it means the opposite attributes cannot be ascribed to Him. When it is said Allah Wills, it means the will to create, or if it refers to actions of worshippers, then it means the commandments and prohibitions that he has decreed. Thus, according to the Mu'tazilites, Allah has no eternal attribute. Because of this idea, the Mu'tazilites did not believe that Allah's Word is eternal and this view became the official stance of the Abbasid Caliphate from the time of Ma'mūn. Consequently the Abbasids harassed and persecuted those who maintained that the Qur'ān is eternal and not created in course of time. It is surprising to note that in such an atmosphere more attention was paid to the development of philosophy and other branches of science. Ma'mūn even established the *Bayt al-Ḥikmah* (House of Wisdom) where he assembled scholars from different parts of the world including those who had no religion or were non-Muslims.

In such an atmosphere, those who held the Qur'ān to be eternal had no sufficient reason to prove their claim. Indeed the eternity or accidental creation of the Qur'ān was not important for them, and what they wanted to emphasize was that there is no evidence in the Holy Scripture or *ḥadith*, proving that the Qur'ān is created. Thus, they said it is *bid'ah* (innovation) to believe that the Qur'ān is created. Owing to their views on the attributes of Allah, the Mu'tazilites used to argue that the Qur'ān is created. The

caliphate exploited the issue of the Qur'ān as an instrument in view of the disagreement of the *Mutakallimūn* over the interpretation of *Tawhīd* and divine attributes. The views of the Mu'tazilites thus shows inclination towards *tanzīh* or purifying and in their discussions they tried to keep away from any idea that they thought led to *shirk* (polytheism) or *tashbīh* (resemblance or comparison to Allah).

2. Justice

Allah is just and the order of creatures, which is a manifestation of His will and action, is the most excellent order. It is due to this fact that Allah is not the agent of evil and whatever is evil it stems from the creatures themselves. Some of the Mu'tazilites held the view that Allah is incapable of evil deeds and is capable of good only. Thus one of the meanings of justice is that Allah is far away from evil. This justice is of genetic or structural nature, that is, in the order that prevails among the creatures, everything is good and in its proper place and their existence is purposeful. Justice has another form that is '*Adl-i Taklifi*'. The Mu'tazilites were of the view that Allah has created man and granted intellect to him to act voluntarily. They also believed in a kind of *Tawhīd* in relation to actions (though this concept of Unity of Actions is in contrast to the Unity of Actions as the Gnostics believe) and held the view that Allah has no more than only one action by which He has created the world and mankind, granted the human beings the best physical form and imbued them with the faculty of intellect to distinguish between good and evil.

Regarding those who ascribe all actions of human beings to Allah, the Mu'tazilites held that if the actions do not emanate from the free will of the human beings and the real agent of all human actions is Allah Himself, then *wa'd wa wa'id* and reward and punishment have no meaning and are absurd. Is it logical to penalize somebody who does not have free will and is a mere instrument of action? It is not possible to take someone to task for

doing no action or for being the means of other's action. The Mu'tazilites maintained that if it is said that Allah causes man to do some deed and at the same time takes him to task for an action which is deemed wrong, it would mean the ascribing of injustice to Allah, while Allah is free from injustice. Hence, the Mu'tazilites advocate justice and delegation of authority (*tafwīd*), which means Allah has empowered man to act freely. Such power is interpreted as capability (*istiṭā'at*), and capability refers to man's power before he acts.

There is, however, difference of views among the Mu'tazilites whether capability is granted before an action or during the action itself. The opponents hold that capability is accidental and accident has no subsistence. Capability, they argue, is granted while an action is taking place and it disappears after the action. There is also difference of views concerning power and capability, whether it is the same in cases of obedience and disobedience, or whether more than one? Abū Ḥanīfah is of the view that the power which leads man towards disobedience should have guided him towards obedience instead. He argues that it is not possible to be both obedient and disobedient through one single power.¹² But the Mu'tazilites hold that capability (*istiṭā'at*) is not a power of the bodily organs although it is identical to them.

The Ash'arites for their part, hold that man is not the agent of his own actions but the earner (*kāṣib*), or more properly reaper of the consequences of his action. They do not deny capability (*istiṭā'at*), but say that capability occurs only during an action and nothing exists before the action and nothing remains after it. Here the question arises: What is *kasb*? If man is the reaper of the consequences of his actions and Allah is the real agent, what is the meaning of reward and punishment? The matter of *kasb* is posed first by those Mu'tazilites who were inclined towards predestination (*jabr*) like Dirār bin 'Amr. But Abū al-Ḥasan Ash'arī and the Ash'arites expanded it, and such great changes

occurred compared to its original form, that the view of Imam al-Ḥaramayn Juwayni who was an Ash'arite *Mutakallim* was totally different from that of Abū al-Ḥasan Ash'ari. Abū al-Ḥasan Ash'ari ascribes all actions to Allah Himself, and in his view the earning of its consequences, is associated with the will.

Ash'ari's view regarding man's actions met with objections and the Asharites reconsidered this view, to the extent that Juwayni, in the manner of philosophers tried to argue that Allah is the remote cause (*'illat-i ba'id*) of action or the cause of all causes. Ash'ari's views concerning mysticism were expressed in a way that the objections of some of his opponents were neutralized, for he claimed that a Gnostic (*'arif*) sees his action as imperfect, considers reward as a favour, and punishment as justice. This approach could not be called predestination (*jabr*) either. As Rūmī says:

And if this be compulsion, it is not the compulsion of (suffered by) the vulgular: it is not the compulsion of (exerted by) the evil-commanding self-willed (soul).

O son, (only) they Know (the real meaning of) compulsion in whose hearts God has opened the sight (of the spiritual eye)...

The Imami Shi'ah hold the middle path which is between the two extremes; neither predestination (*jabr*) nor delegation (*tafwīd*). Shi'ite philosophers and *Mutakallimūn* consider man as the near or direct cause and Allah as the far or indirect cause of action, that is, cause of all causes (*Musabib al-Asbab*), although this is one of the interpretations of *amr bayn al-amrayn* (the position between two positions). The Shi'ah do not support the Mu'tazilite theory of *tafwīd* (delegation of all authority to man) completely, but hold that according to divine justice, everybody will see the result of his action, that is, reward or punishment, as per the measure and degree of the deeds done. Ash'ari, who does not believe in divine justice, says that Allah might throw a virtuous person into hell and

send a wicked sinner to heaven. The Mu'tazilites and the Shi'ah do not agree with this viewpoint, particularly the Shi'ah who believe that Allah the Almighty and Just, although He is capable of doing this, will never do this, especially the casting of a virtuous person into hell, since it is against the principle of divine justice. Divine forgiveness for a repentant sinner is an entirely different matter pertaining to Allah's Mercy.

Regarding promise and threat¹³ and the position between the two stations and the enjoining of good and forbidding of evil, we have already discussed them so it is not necessary to deal with them again.

7. Views of the Ash'arites

Asharites are the followers of Abū al-Ḥasan Ash'ari. He was at first the disciple of Abū 'Alī Jabā'ī Mu'tazili, but after differing with his ideas founded a new school of thought in *Kalām* which came to be known by his name, and managed to attract most of the Muslims. With the emergence of the Asharites, the Mu'tazilites began to lose ground and gradually confined themselves to the field of philosophy. After the rise of Abū al-Ḥasan Ash'ari, only two figures are considered important in the development of Mu'tazilite ideas. One is Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār Hamadānī, and the second is Maḥmūd bin 'Umar Zamakhshari who wrote the famous exegesis on the Qur'ān titled *Tafsīr al-Kashshāf*. The Mu'tazilite school had an extensive impact on philosophy because of which it persisted in the following centuries.

The great contribution of Ash'ari to the Science of *Kalām* is that he brought about a reconciliation between *Mutakallimūn* and *Ahl al-Ḥadīth*. He disagreed with the Mu'tazilites who had combined philosophical ideas with *Kalām*. He also criticised the *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* for their unwillingness to enter into discussion concerning beliefs, and as a result succeeded in attracting most of the followers of the four Sunni Imams to his school of thought concerning the principles of religion. However, the Ash'arite

school also underwent changes. Here we cannot give a detailed account of Ash'ari's ideas and works and will limit our discussion to two points.

Ash'ari's Debate with his Teacher Abū 'Alī Jabā'i:

In confronting their opponents, one of the methods of the *Mutakallimūn* was to pose certain meticulous questions so as to push their opponents towards a position from where they had no proper answers. The questions were posed in such a way that the questioner could anticipate the possible answers, and thus keep up the pressure on his opponent. By studying such dialogues one can understand the ideas of the debaters. According to Ibn Khallikān once Abū al-Ḥasan Ash'ari asked his teacher Abū 'Alī Jabā'i that if there are three brothers and one of them is a pious man and the second is a disbeliever and the third died in his childhood, what will be the condition of each of them in the Hereafter. Abū 'Alī replied: The pious brother will go to heaven and the disbeliever will go to hell while the third one will be among those who are saved (the reply is based on the Mu'tazilite idea of justice and promise and threat). Abū al-Ḥasan asked: Does that child enjoy certain privileges over there? Abū 'Alī said: No. Abū al-Ḥasan asked: If that child objects by saying that if I had more opportunity to live in the world I could have obeyed Allah and earned certain merits, then what answer would be given to him? Abū 'Alī said that the reply would have been such: Allah knew that he would turn out to be a transgressor, so He actually blessed him by taking away his life before he reached the age of puberty. (On closer scrutiny this contention does not match the Mu'tazilite position, and is possible that the Ash'arites may have fabricated the dialogue or changed its contents in view of the fact that the Mu'tazilites do not hold future action as predestined, but believe that action emanates from man's free will which consequently earns him reward or punishment. A point to note is that Abū 'Alī is of the view that Allah has not taken away anything from his servants

which would have made them obedient ...) ¹⁴ Abū al-Ḥasan Ash‘ari said: If the disbelieving one says that “O, Allah you were aware of the fate of all of us, but you looked with favour on those two brothers and did not favour me and did not take my life in my childhood so as to be saved from the torment of hell.”

Abū ‘Alī Jabā‘i failed to answer Ash‘ari and merely called him mad. Ash‘ari replied that he was not mad but the boat of the Shaykh (i.e. Jabā‘i) was obviously stranded on the rocks. The fact is that when Ash‘ari began to ask such questions from his teacher, firstly he was aware that his teacher cannot reply them. Secondly, he himself had the answers but he considered it against his belief and a dead end in the dialogue to say that it is incumbent on Allah to reward good people and punish the transgressors. Moreover, Ash‘ari did not wish to prove anything, rather he wanted to bring to the notice of Jabā‘i that he will be in trouble by saying that it is incumbent on Allah to look at the said persons favourably.

The second point to which we intend to draw attention, is Ash‘ari’s refutation of the Mu‘tazilite views concerning Divine Attributes, Justice, and Promise and Threat. He was of the opinion that attributes are the same as essence. Attributes, he said, are eternal and depend on Allah’s essence. By Divine justice it does not mean that Allah is bound by certain rules, and neither is Allah unjust, for injustice means to take possession of other’s property or to place something in other than its proper place. But, argued Ash‘ari, since Allah is the possessor of all the universe, He can do anything He likes and give anything to anybody. Justice and injustice, said Ash‘ari, do not fall in the realm of rational ideas, since without referring to religious laws one cannot distinguish between good and evil. Whatever religious law considers evil is evil and whatever it considers good is good. In other words good and evil are not inherent things, so intellect cannot perceive them independent of religious laws. Hence, according to Ash‘ari’s contention, man is not in a position to say that what Allah must do

or ought not to do. He is the owner of His property. He can do whatever He wishes. Nobody can object to Him.

Such ideas had certain social and political implications particularly on the issue of Imamate and rulership. Unlike the Zaydiyyah, Khawārij and some of the groups of Mu'tazilites as well as the Shi'ah, who do not approve obedience to an unjust ruler, the Ash'arites hold that in order to protect the life and property of Muslims, all those in power should be obeyed and no one should rise against any type of government and be the cause of bloodshed.¹⁵

8. Development of the Science of *Kalām*

As was said Abū al-Ḥasan Ash'arī mediated between the *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* and the *Mutakallimūn* and gradually the study of *Kalāmī* books and teaching began in religious centres. As a result, many great *Mutakallimūn* appeared and extended the Ash'arite school. Though *Kalām* in Ash'arite thought has undergone changes, Abū al-Ḥasan Ash'arī's works and views are considered to reflect one of the stages of the Science of *Kalām*. When he began to defend *Kalām* nobody dared to oppose it seriously. In order to consolidate his position Ash'arī sought to give reply to the objections of *Ahl al-Ḥadīth*, who were of the view, particularly Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal, that the Science of *Kalām* is useless, since the Prophet (ﷺ) and his companions had nothing to do with *Kalām*. And there is nothing in the Qur'ān about *Kalām* as well. Thus to deal with anything that is not in the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth*, is considered an innovation (*bid'ah*). According to Ash'arī *Kalāmī* issues can be found in the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth*, although these were not discussed since they were not deemed important at that time. Moreover, according to the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth*, efforts to understand the principles of religion are not forbidden. *Kalām* is not at all considered to be an innovation in the Qur'ān. Ash'arī further said that the *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* in opposing the Mu'tazilites maintain that the Qur'ān is eternal, while this issue is neither touched upon in the Qur'ān nor in the *Ḥadīth*.

The advent of Ash'ari and his defence of the Science of *Kalām* and his view that intellect ('*aql*') should follow hearing (*sam'*), marks a new stage in the history of *Kalām*. Till his time the central issue of *Kalām* was the principles of religion, and while explaining those principles, scholars used to defend religion and refute the objections of the opponents. Gradually, the defence of religion became the central issue of *Kalām*. Fārābī, who was a contemporary of Ash'ari, has a tone of complain when he refers to the *Mutakallimūn*, and is of the view that some of them take recourse to any means [or methods] to convince or silence their opponents. Apart from Fārābī other philosophers also have the same impression about the *Mutakallimūn* and usually refer to them with contempt. The *Mutakallimūn* also were not happy with philosophers and shunned and excommunicated them.

However, Shī'i *Mutakallimūn* were on good terms with philosophers since most of them like Khawājah Naṣir al-Dīn Tūsī, 'Abd al-Razzāq Lāhijī etc, were philosophers themselves. It is also wrong to hold that the *Mutakallimūn* weakened philosophy and struck a blow at it. Although a study of the history of Muslim philosophy shows that some of the thinkers like Ghazzālī and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī were against philosophy, this impression is wrong. As a matter of fact since Ash'ari and like-minded thinkers believed that the goal of *Kalām* was to protect and defend religion, while opposing philosophy they began to study logic and philosophy and indirectly they were under the influence of philosophy.

Moreover, the objections of the *Mutakallimūn* against philosophy were constructive. Thus we can conclude that from their first confrontation with philosophy the *Mutakallimūn* actually served philosophy. For instance in his *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* Ghazzālī posed new issues for philosophers and Imam Fakhr Rāzī by writing his *Sharḥ-i Ishārāt* in the time of Suhrawardī the

founder of *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, caused Khawājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī to think profoundly.

Apart from the *Mutakallimūn*, mystics and sufis also criticised philosophy and were of the view that Greek philosophy and logic misguide people. For instance Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar Suhrawardī wrote the following books against Greek philosophy: *Rashf al-Naṣā’ih al-Īmāniyyah wa Kashf al-Faḍā’ih al-Yūnāniyyah*. But all these attacks and criticisms never led to the destruction of philosophy, rather *Kalām*, gnosticism, Illuminationist wisdom (*ishrāq*) and peripatetic thought (*mashshā’*) culminated in a philosophy like Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Theosophy (*al-Ḥikmat al-Muta‘āliyah*). Those who hold that philosophy could not resist the onslaught of the *Mutakallimūn* and the mystics should note that on the contrary it was indeed *Kalām* that was weakened versus philosophy. As is known, Mu‘tazilite *Kalām* very soon dissolved in philosophy and though certain prominent Ash‘arite figures like Abū Bakr Bāqlāni, Abū al-Ma‘ālī, Imam al-Ḥaramayn Juwayni and Abū Ishāq Isfarāyini were not influenced by philosophy, others like Ghazzālī, Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, ‘Aḍud al-Dīn Ījī Kāzīrūnī, and Mīr Sayyid Sharif Jurjānī (and even Taftāzānī who was possibly a Mātiridi, not an Ash‘arite) benefited from philosophy in their *Kalām*. Hence there remains hardly any difference between philosophy and *Kalām*. Ibn Khaldūn also acknowledged the development of *Kalām* and the impact of philosophy upon *Kalām*. He suggests that the seekers of *Kalām* should take care in selecting books for study and it is better to read for instance Imam al-Ḥaramayn’s book *Irshād*.

In the early phase of Shi‘i *Kalām*, emphasis was on the issue of *Imāmah*, but other *Kalāmī* issues were also discussed and many interesting points were posed by Shi‘i theologians concerning *Imāmah*. Difference of views concerning this issue should not be mixed with the personal differences. The Shi‘i conception of Imam is totally different from that of other sects of Islam. Owing to their

belief in the Infallible Imam, they have a particular view about certain issues like knowledge, education and politics. Belief in the Infallible Imam who is the heir to the knowledge of Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ) is related to other principles of religion like *Tawḥīd*, prophethood (*nabuwwah*), resurrection (*ma'ād*), and justice (*'adl*). According to the Shi'ah, Imamate is one of the five principles of religion, while the Sunnis consider it as part of secondary issues of religion. In the Sunnī books, since the time of Shāfi'i, Imamate is discussed in jurisprudential issues. Anyway, Shi'i *Kalām* absorbed almost all philosophical issues and Khawājah Naṣir al-Dīn Tūsi's book *Tajrīd al-I'tiqād* is an example of such *Kalām* upon which tens of commentaries were written.

Here it is appropriate to mention the contribution of Ismā'ili Muslims to *Kalām*. There were certain prominent figures among the Ismā'ilis who were well known for their proficiency in dialogues and debates. For instance, mention could be made of Abū Ya'qūb Sijistāni, the author of *Ithbāt al-Nabuwwah* and *Kashf al-Mahjūb*. Another leading Ismā'ili scholar in this field was Abū Ḥātam Rāzi, the author of *I'lām al-Nabuwwah* which was written to refute Zakariyyā Rāzi's ideas. Other great Ismā'ili thinkers are Ḥamid al-Dīn Kirmāni, Nāṣir Khosrow Qubādiyāni and Mu'ayyid Shirāzi. Their ideas are not discussed here because they sought to interpret religion through philosophy and they exaggerated in hermeneutics (*ta'wīl*) concerning revelation and religious rules.

Conclusion

The first point is that apart from the soundness or inaccuracy of the arguments of the *Mutakallimūn*, the Science of *Kalām* was a bastion for defending religion. Although philosophy preceded *Kalām*, but when religion was pitted against philosophy, those religious scholars who borrowed the technique of argument from philosophy, applied it against philosophy itself and against any idea that they deemed threatening to religion. Thus, *Mutakallimūn* consider logic and reason as means that should be at the disposal of

religion since it is not reason alone but religiousness or piety that constitutes the essence of man. Moreover, unlike the philosophers who defend reason alone, the *Mutakallimūn* hold that reason has its limitations and it is revelation that helps broaden the horizon of reason. Here we have nothing to do with the contribution of *Kalām* to religion or the harmful effect of philosophy upon religion. Perhaps *Kalām* did not have any considerable effect on philosophy and philosophy did not do any great damage to religion. But the reality and spirit of *Kalām* proves the need and want of man while philosophy relies on the power of the reason of man.

The second point is that though philosophy and *Kalām* became one or came closer to each other but apparent similarities between *Kalām* and contemporary philosophy are more. For instance, one of their common points is the issue of the scope of the human knowledge and reason. But human limitations in *Kalām* and contemporary philosophy are not identical. *Kalām* speaks about man's weakness or natural inability versus Divine Power while in contemporary philosophy power and weakness of man is discussed but as a being who should prove his power. For instance there is similarity between Ash'arite *Kalām* and modern western philosophy, particularly David Hume's philosophy, regarding causality and the perception that good and evil are not inherent. *Kalām* strives to prove the indivisible particle and Hume also believes in psychological atomism. But these two are different so far as the origin and goal of their ideas are concerned. Both the Ash'ari *Mutakallimūn* and the empiricist philosophers hold causality to be something ordinary without there being any necessity for it, but Ash'ari talks about what he calls as 'habit of Allah' while Hume refers to the same thing as 'habit of human being'. Accordingly, Ash'ari denies that good and evil are personal characteristics in order to prove the authority of revelation and religion, while David Hume the empiricist philosopher seeks to prove the power of human beings and considers man as the source

of good and evil. Thus, though there are some similarities between *Kalām* and modern western philosophy they stand against each other as well.

In the west there is a faint *Kalāmī* current which has no relevance to these philosophies. At present we are in need of returning to *Kalām* but patiently and cautiously otherwise it is not difficult to refute what we do not know and do not like, and accept what seems convenient for our habits, particularly in the case of interpreting the past thinkers. This is not the correct criterion since social interpretation of *Kalāmī* views should not be done in haste.

The Umayyads might have benefited from the ideas of Ḥasan Baṣrī or the Abbasids might have exploited the views of Wāṣil bin ‘Aṭā’ and ‘Amr bin ‘Ubayd, but the reason that Abū Ḥanīfah, Mālik bin Anas, Shāfi‘ī, and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal did not accept the yoke of the caliphate, was because of their being to some extent the disciples of Imam Ja‘far Ṣādiq (‘a) and since they knew that Islamic government is not identical with monarchy. If one tries to counter philosophy or rational issues it does not mean that one approves the ruling power or is opposed to freedom or independence. When reason and philosophy are at the service of rulers, freedom means the servitude of reason. If the *Mutakallimūn* failed to observe the various facets of the servitude of reason, the sufis and mystics, to some extent, succeeded in doing so and proved that reason should rely on other sources otherwise it will change into a mere imitator of reason and such a reason may ultimately end up as a tool in the hands of rulers because of its lack of independent approach. We should note that independent reason is a great blessing and guide. This reason should not be equated with ‘*aql-i bulfuḏūl*’ (obtrusive or non-independent reason). Usually the opposition of ignorant persons and the sophists to philosophy and reason is superficial and has selfish motives. Most of the opposition to philosophy and reasons in the contemporary era is also of this kind.

Notes

1. Philosophers were usually in dispute with the *Mutakallimūn*. For instance in different books ranging from Fārābī's *Iḥṣā' al 'Ulūm* to Lāhijī's books, philosophers attacked the Science of *Kalām* and the *Mutakallimūn*, and in this regard the Shi'ites more or less sided with the philosophers. In his book *Nash'at al-Fikr al-Falsafī fī al-Islām*, 'Alī Sāmī al-Nashshār claims that Ḥasan Baṣrī is the source of all *Kalāmī* Schools of Thought. The Shi'ites hold that he was the voice of the Umayyads and that without the sword of Ḥajjāj bin Yūsuf Thaqaḥī' and the tongue of Baṣrī it was difficult for Marwān and his successors to run the worldly affairs (1965, third edition, p. 307).

2. Each book can be classified into different chapters, sections, etc. The title of the chapter of the books cannot be the reason for giving such titles to this science.

3. In their books philosophers do not aim at defending religion and never refer to the Book of Revelation (Qur'ān) as the base of their arguments but follow only rational argument, even though most of the philosophers under discussion here were Muslim.

4. Dialectic.

5. It is unrealistic to say that *Kalām* was useless for Islam. The Science of *Kalām* developed in the shadow of Islamic teachings and the history of Islam. It was under the influence of philosophy but it does not mean that it is alien to Islam and that external factors were effective in its growth and development. The Science of *Kalām* began to pave the way for better understanding of the principles of religion. It is true that it was mixed a little with philosophy while religion in reality was not in need of it, but philosophy and *Kalām* came to co-exist to acquaint people with religion.

6. In contrast to the present conditions in the early days of the Science of *Kalām* each party tried to interpret the Qur'ānic verses in a bid to prove the soundness of their particular ideas, although the Prophet (ﷺ) addressing the ummah had explicitly said: "I am leaving among you the Book of Allah and my *'Itrat* (progeny, the *Ahl al-Bayt*)." He meant that Muslims should refer to these authorities among his progeny in order to have a correct understanding of the holy Qur'ān. However, because of

their differences, the Muslims entertained different views in understanding the Book of Allah, particularly the scholars who tried to refer to certain verses of the Qur'ān which were matching with their viewpoints. But when they saw their views were in contradiction to the purport of divine verses, they tried to interpret in a way that would suit their viewpoint. This is called *ta'wīl* and these interpretations were useful for the rulers in their political designs. Indeed contemplation of the Qur'ānic verses has nothing to do with social and political interests or with ethnic feelings. Those who pursued such interests failed to understand the Qur'ān and properly interpret it. It was the habit of the Umayyad rulers to employ certain so-called traditionalists or commentators of the Qur'ān to interpret religion according to their interests. So this matter had no role in the origin and development of the Science of *Kalām* as claimed. The dominant idea is that while Muslim scholars were trying to understand the Qur'ān they confronted certain apparent contradictions, i.e. in some of the verses they found support for man's freedom while other verses they thought contradicted this freedom. The Ash'arites thus refer to certain verses to support their claims while the Mu'tazilites refer to other verses to support their own ideas. There are certain verses of the Qur'ān that are related to such issues as the vision of God, justice, promise and threat, Islam, and faith. These issues are interpreted differently. For example, in his book *Man and Fate* the late Murtadā Mutahhari quoted those verses and *Aḥādīth* that are related to predestination. The other point is that if political and social interests motivate the interpretation of the principles of religion and the Qur'ān, then not only this will be harmful to religion, but nothing can be gained by it. If we aim at understanding the reality of religion and try to reconstruct religious thought, then we may achieve political and social interests also. Truth does not depend on any purpose and intention but vice versa is the fact.

7. There is a *Ḥadīth* from Imam 'Alī ('a) saying: "Do not kill the Khawārij after me." Apart from this *Ḥadīth* in *Nahj al-Balāghah*, it is written that only Imam 'Alī ('a) dared to fight against a group of people who were absorbed in apparent worship. Imam 'Alī ('a) was the manifestation of both *ẓāhir* and *bāṭin* and as the symbol of Islam he was well aware that the Khawārij were shallow Muslims and they did not

understand Islam. Shallowness was the chief characteristics of these people.

8. Of course one should be cautious in dealing with these issues. The Murji'ah are divided into different groups. According to an orientalist they believe in tolerance and they thus helped the Umayyads. In the view of that orientalist, the Murji'ah are opposed to the 'Alawiyyūn. In his book *Niẓām al-Ḥukm wa al-Idārah fī al-Islām*, Muḥammad Mahdī Shams al-Dīn, the contemporary Shi'ī scholar holds that the Murji'ah was a political Umayyad group.

9. It should be pointed out again that Banū Sufyān and Banū Marwān were outright political opportunists without being persons of any particular views or bound by religious dictates, hence their views should not be taken as the views of the religious. Since the time of the Prophet (ﷺ) the Mujbirah, Jabriyyah or Qadariyyah were active and according to certain *Ḥadīth*, Imam 'Alī ('a) replied to their questions. In his book *Nash'at al-Fikr al-Falsafī fī al-Islām*, 'Alī Sāmī al-Nashshār writes that in 'Umar ibn al-Khattāb's time there was a person named 'Abdullāh bin Ṣabīgh who used to argue about *qadar* and 'Umar forade him to do so. But Imam 'Alī ('a) who was the Gateway of the City of Knowledge, believed in constructive dialogue, hence, Sunni 'ulamā' like Abū Ḥanīfah and Shāfi'ī and his followers followed his method.

10. Since the statement of Qādi 'Abd al-Jabbār may cause this misunderstanding that the Shi'ites do not believe in enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, I state it here that the Shi'ites consider this principle as part of *furū'* and not of the *uṣūl al-dīn*. No Shi'ite jurist denies the obligatory nature of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil. Some of them consider it as *wujūb-i 'aynī* (essential obligatory) and some others consider it as *wājib kifā'ī*. But Qādi refers to this point that according to the Shi'ah the enjoining of good and the forbidding of evil has certain conditions and degrees and the higher degrees are special to the Imams ('a) and their deputies, and that other people are not to undertake them (i.e. executing the religious sanctions, and undertaking the political, judicial, and financial affairs of the Islamic society). 'Alī Tehrani, *Amr bih Ma'rūf wa Nahy az Munkar dar Islām*, Mashhad, 1354. p. 298.

11. If these interpretations of Islam lack sincerity then their effect will be less and will not last longer but if they are based on truth then it will bring in its wake independence of thought and idea.

12. It is said that Abū Ḥanīfah in a treatise has proved that capability is simultaneous with action and not prior to it.

13. All Islamic schools of thought accept *wa'd* (promise) and *wa'id* (threat) but each interprets it differently. Promise means that Allah will give reward for a good action. Indeed paradise is related to promise. But *wa'id* (threat) pertains to bad consequences and punishment of the hell for sinners. According to the Sunni scholars Allah promises what He commands and His threat concerns forbidden things, that is, anybody who is entitled for reward, he will get it and anybody who is supposed to be punished, he will be punished.

14. Shahristāni, *Milal wa Niḥal*, Tehran, 1350, H.S., p. 59.

15. The Shi'ites have discussed the issue of *Imāmah* seriously and consider it as one of the principles of religion. It seems that the first book on this issue was written by Hishām bin Ḥakam who was the disciple of Imam Ja'far Ṣādiq ('a). The second one to write on this subject was Ibn al-Rāwandī who wrote his book on *Imāmah*. In the last chapter of his book Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār Hamadānī who was a Mu'tazilite has tried to refute the belief of the Imāmiyyah in the principle of *Imāmah*. In his book *Shāfi* Sayyid Murtaḍā 'Alam al-Hudā gave answer to Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār. The Shi'ites believe that appointment of the Imam is obligatory on Allah but according to the Sunnis, the appointment of the Imam is obligatory on the ummah. The Shi'ites hold that the Imams are infallible, while the Sunni Muslims do not believe in infallibility of the Imams. Some of the opponents even do not consider knowledge and justice as the condition of *Imāmah*. It is interesting to note that Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī is of the view that *Ulū al-Amr* (holder of authority) is infallible but not in the sense that the Shi'ah believe. For he holds that *Ulū al-Amr* is the symbol of the ummah so, by *Ulū al-Amr* he means ummah in general. In Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī's view *Ulū al-Amr* are the notables who decide and determine (*ahl al-ḥall wa al-'aḳd*) as well as those capable of *ijtihād*. These, he says, are the symbol of the ummah and the ummah is also immune from any sin and fault.

Dialogue on the Basis of the Aims of Religion: A Way to Attain Mutual Understanding

By: Dr. Sayyid Muṣṭafā Muḥaqqiq Dāmād

Translated by: Shahyār Sa'ādat

The idea of a Dialogue between civilizations, set forth by the United Nations upon a suggestion made by the president of Iran and the chairman of the Islamic Conference Organization Ḥujjat al-Islām Sayyid Muḥammad Kātami, is a response to one of the most profound problems faced by the world today. In our opinion, Dialogue based on the effort to achieve the aims of religion can provide the focal point around which all religions may be brought together. In the present work our aim is to briefly discuss this proposition.

Between the 14th and the 17th centuries, the hold of the feudal system and the Church over Europe was weakened, and as the result of untiring efforts by such individuals as Cardinal Richelieu and Louis XIV in France, Gustav Adolph in Sweden, the Tudors in England and Peter the Great in Russia, a new order based upon powerful nation-states was established. However, since power, whether in an individual or a state, is in its very nature expansionist, this new order soon led to the creation of empires. Such nations as Great Britain, France, Spain, Austria and the Ottoman empire brought vast territories under their dominion and

extended their empires to far off reaches of the globe. Moreover, this expansionism did not remain purely territorial, but led to cultural, religious, political and social imperialism as well. Cultures, large and small, that had once enjoyed power and credibility in the eyes of their people, surrendered in various degrees to the cultural domination of the victors. This surrender was sometimes superficial and involuntary and at other times real, in the sense that gradually new ways and customs replaced some of the ancient ones. In any case, however, neither the victors truly desired to create exact replicas of their own cultures in the other parts of the globe, so that they would face competitors just like themselves in the future, nor were the vanquished nations willing or able to easily abandon their traditional ways.

This chapter in world history gradually came to an end following the end of the First World War in 1918. France and England, the main victors in the war, dismantled the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires and stripped Germany of her colonies. After the Second World War, however, they too had to face the same fate. England acted more wisely and acceded independence to India more easily, while France was not prepared to accept the inevitable until she had to let go of Algeria at the conclusion of a bloody and unjust war. In any case, the result of this first period of decolonialization was the birth of newly independent states that became members of the United Nations one after the other. There they had a podium from which to air new historical and cultural claims. There still remained the Soviet Union, officially composed of numerous internal territorial and political units in Asia and Europe, but in reality ruling the eastern European countries as well. Thus, vast areas of the world were divided into the Communist and the Capitalist blocs, and each of these tried to exercise control over still another section of the globe which came to be called the Third World. This rivalry sometimes even took the form of bloody conflicts and wars, such as the Soviet

interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the wars in Vietnam and Korea. There was no real Dialogue between the two poles during this period. There was all conflict and aggression. As for the Third World nations, if they did not join one of the rival camps, they tried to play off one side against the other, maintain their balance, preserve their interests and avoid being swallowed by either bloc.

The situation suddenly changed in the late 1970s with the rise of Islamic movements throughout the world. Up to that time all Third World anti-colonial movements had modernism as their ideological base. Even in India, Gandhi and his associates had used tradition as a tool, first to drive out the British and then to set foot on the path leading to modernization. The Islamic movement that emerged in Iran, on the contrary, had as its objective a return to the traditional and genuine values of Iranian society, and perhaps for the first time made culture the focal point of the struggle. With the collapse of the Marxist state in its principal bastion, the Soviet Union, and in Eastern Europe, and the accompanying disillusionment with Marxism throughout the world, a great ideological vacuum appeared. As a result, Islamic ideology easily entered this vacuum and filled it for many of the oppressed peoples of the world.

This situation has led a number of Western thinkers to look for a solution. On the one hand, they have tried to revive the old conflict between "the cross and the crescent." Just as in the 11th century a mixture of religious fanaticism and desire for material gains had led some Christians into embarking upon the Crusades, these thinkers also have conjured up visions of a great war between the mostly Christian West and the Muslim World and have considered such a conflict to be ultimately inevitable. On the other hand, they have planned to foment strife and discord among the various Muslim sects and denominations. Unfortunately, this notion ignores two significant points. First of all, there is not the

least similarity between the world of the 20th and the 21st centuries and the world in the period between the 11th and the 13th centuries, when the Crusades took place. Second, like almost everything else, problems and afflictions today are global. Advances in science and technology in the last millennium have been such that one must speak of qualitative rather than quantitative change. A similar transformation has also occurred in the minds and the thinking of men. Communication has reached such a degree that the repercussions of any important event taking place anywhere in the world are felt world-wide. Moreover, modern weapons recognize no borders and mistakes by the world's political leaders can plunge the Earth into the jaws of death and destruction.

As it was pointed out above, the pain and suffering of man has also taken on global dimensions. Large sections of humanity lack peace and security. Neighbours regard each other with suspicion and distrust. Men and women feel alienated from each other. Children are dying because of a shortage of food and medicine. Poverty and hunger have robbed numberless people of the opportunity to live a decent and dignified life. In many places social and judicial security is no more than a mirage. Vengefulness and violence are running amuck. Religious and ethnic wars and conflicts in such places as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Algeria and Turkey claim lives on a daily basis. Tyranny, despotism, chaos and civil strife have turned life into a living hell in many other countries.

Under such circumstances, to speak of a clash of religions, of confrontation, and of the impossibility of Dialogue and understanding between them is nothing short of madness. If such a collision occurs no one living in the most advanced and peaceful areas of the West would be safe from its evil and destructive consequences. Dialogue and mutual understanding between different denominations and sects, and even between different religions, is no longer a luxury but a vital necessity. Since 1950

the Eastern and the Western blocs relied on their nuclear weapons to deter the other side from attacking them. In other words they established a form of "balance of terror." Now, however, we face an entirely different equation. The present conflict is not between two superpowers who may exercise restraint and thus prevent their rivalry into turning into a world war. Now the conflict is between a number of different cultures, each of which desires to occupy a position on the world stage that it deems it rightfully deserves. At the same time, they face common problems and challenges that may destroy them all if they do not show good will and do not enter into fruitful Dialogue with one another. The most prominent of such problems is environmental deterioration and destruction, which, if left unchecked, will have catastrophic consequences for rich and poor alike and shall visit misery, disease and death on all.

It must be pointed out however, that Dialogue and better understanding between religions is a way and a method and cannot solve the problem unless it is based on a firm foundation. What may serve as the basis for this Dialogue? The only possible foundation for Dialogue and mutual understanding is the sense of responsibility and the basic and commonly shared values that are not only the objectives of Islam, but that may also be found in all the great religions of the world and may therefore be referred to as global ethics. In the opinion of this author the reliable and firm foundation just referred to may be found only if we refuse to be content with only the commandments or precepts of religion, but try to realize its ultimate objectives. These aims are the ends while the precepts are the means. And it goes without saying that means and preliminaries should lead to the desired objectives and not to anything else. Now let us see what the aim of Islam is. The aim of Islam is the revival of fundamental and true human values. This has been clearly stated by the Prophet (ﷺ):

انى بُعثتُ لِاتمّم مكارمَ الاخلاق

Indeed I was sent to complete the best of morals

Our task must be to strengthen and deepen those rights stipulated in the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, by relying on the religious, ethical and cultural values and teachings which we share with the members of other faiths and cultures. This global ethics is based on the following four pillars:

1. Solidarity and social and economic justice
2. Non-violence and respect for all forms of life
3. Tolerance and sincerity
4. Equal rights for all human beings

It should be pointed out here that commitment to the above principles does not mean either that we have mistaken promiscuity for freedom, or that overwhelmed by multiplicity and pluralism, we have lost sight of reality and truth.

The Holy Qur'ān, which in our eyes is the highest source of ethical teachings, not only affirms all the above-mentioned rights, but in many cases goes far beyond them. The Qur'ān liberates man from the chains of oppressive and empty traditions, all forms of economic, political and religious tyranny, tribalism, racism, slavery, and anything else that may prevent him from reaching his true and final goal in life. This goal is delineated in the *Sūrah al-Najm*: "*And that to your Lord is the goal*"¹. All basic human rights are confirmed and emphasized by the Qur'ān. Concerning the right to life, for example, it says: "*And do not kill anyone whom Allah has forbidden except for a just cause....*"² and "*That whoever slays a soul unless it be for man-slaughter or for mischief in the land, it is as though he slew all men; and whoever keeps it alive, it is as though he kept alive all men*"³ Ethical teachings and precepts can be found scattered in numerous places in the Qur'ān. However, in two places they are presented in a group.⁴ It may be said that these principles constitute Islam's suggestion for a world ethics. It is

interesting to note that in one of these cases the Qur'ān calls these principles "the principles of wisdom," and in the other, "God's right path." The concept of the natural rights of man is based on these innate ethical principles, which may be highlighted, revived and presented to humanity by the great religions of the world. In this way, these great religious traditions may help promote Dialogue and mutual understanding and respect between civilizations and cultures. In this way they can, on the one hand, serve the cause of world peace, and, on the other, prevent the rise of despots and tyrants.

Islam is a religion both divine and social. The latter dimension necessitates a third aspect, which is that of an administrative system . The role of *ijtihād* (the ability to make independent judgement concerning various religious decrees and rules) is to harmonize these three dimensions. It decides the way in which religious duties, practices and observances must be carried out by individuals, society and government so as to ensure realization of the ultimate aims and objectives of Islam. It is *ijtihād* that defines what Islam expects from each of these three elements. It decides what characteristics a man must have so that he may be called a Muslim, what specifications must a society have so that it may be regarded as Islamic, and, finally, what social, political, economic, educational and legal structures and mechanisms must a government have so that it may be a true Islamic state.

Islam approves a system of government that is just: *and that when you judge between people you judge with justice*⁵. It commends a society that is equitable: *that men may conduct themselves with equity*⁶, proud and honorable: *and to Allah belongs the might and to His Apostle and to the believers*⁷, united and indivisible: *and (as for) the believing men and the believing women, they are guardians of each other*⁸, and finally, one in which all members compete to be better and more virtuous than the

other: *therefore strive with one another to hasten to virtuous deeds*⁹. Islam approves of those human beings who have a correct worldview and are pious and charitable: *And (as for) those who believe and do good deeds, these are the dwellers of the garden*¹⁰.

If *ijtihād* is ignorant of the problems and issues of the day it has negated the principle reason for its existence, for it exists so as to guide the course of events from a religious perspective. When we speak of “the issues of the day” or “current affairs,” we mean all the different kinds of problems that contemporary man faces in his daily life. Those elements that are present in the life of contemporary man, but are not dynamic, but static and unchanging, are not the main subjects of *ijtihād*, since man has experienced them in the past and has already devised ways of dealing with them. *Ijtihād* deals with the evolving and changing aspects of life, for it is here that religion must have a dynamic presence and be able to provide appropriate and timely answers. One can say that *ijtihād* fills the role of spokesman for religion here.

From what has gone above it may be concluded that *ijtihād* must pay the closest attention to two points:

1. That all derived judgements must serve to promote the realization of the final aims and objectives of Islam; that is, ethical values, equality, justice and so on, and that in no way should they be detrimental to the realization of such values.

2. That whatever decrees and judgements dealing with different subjects are necessary for the realization of those aims but have not yet been derived, must be derived and made available to the believers. It is for this reason that the number of Qur’ānic verses that contain religious commandments and injunctions (*āyāt al-aḥkām*) are far less than that of the traditions and narrations that do so (*akhbār al-aḥkām*).

For example, it may very well be that in contemporary *ijtihād*, the verses mentioned in this paper, dealing with justice, honor, unity, virtue, etc., may not be interpreted as belonging to the

category of Qur'ānic verses that carry divine commandments and injunctions, but be regarded as matters which are simply advisable from an ethical point of view. However, in the opinion of this writer such ethical principles are the aims and objectives of Islam, are foundations on which all jurisprudential considerations must be based, and must be observed in all religious judgements and rulings. It is by adhering to these principles that we may reach agreement and mutual understanding and avoid rulings that lead to controversy and disagreement; rulings which, according to the Qur'ān, are bound to lead to social and cultural division, tension and fragmentation.

All must feel that they are members of the same body and that their happiness and success depend on each other and on the bounties and blessings God has provided them on the Earth. We should treat others as we would like to be treated. We must tread the path of justice and charity, avoid violence and respect peace and harmony. We must seek social and economic justice, make sincerity, kindness and fairness our Islamic ideals under all circumstances because of our faith in the truth of divine retribution and the existence of an eternal God. We must not allow differences in traditions and cultures to lead to religious conflict, so that we find ourselves arguing and fighting with one another in the name of God and His Messenger (ﷺ), and daily move farther away from the aims of *Shari'ah* in the name of its decrees and rulings.

Notes:

1. *Al-Najm* (53:42).
2. *Al-Isrā'* (17:33).
3. *Al-Mā'idah* (5:32).
4. *Al-Mā'idah* (5:50-53), *al-Isrā'* (17:22-39).
5. *Al-Nisā'* (4:58).
6. *Al-Ḥadīd* (57:25).

7. *Al-Munāfiqūn* (63:8).
8. *Al-Tawbah* (9:71).
9. *Al-Mā'idah* (5:48).
10. *Al-Baqarah* (2:82).

Islamic Personalities (4)

‘Allāmah Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amin al-‘Āmili

By: Sayyid ‘Alī Shāhbāz

The pen of scholars, it is said, is mightier than the sword of warriors. It breathes life into the society and preserves for posterity the heritage of civilization, without which it would be difficult for humanity to chart out the path of future progress. If the Almighty Allah has pledged by the pen,¹ Prophet Muḥammad (ﷺ) and the infallible Imams (‘a) have given practical shape to the divine teachings. The followers of the Prophet and his *Ahl al-Bayt* (‘a), inspired by the Holy Qur’ān and the *Sunnah*, have wielded the pen more dexterously and more prolifically. I do not mean to belittle the efforts of others, but as the pages of history bear witness, the ‘ulamā’ of the School of the *Ahl al-Bayt* (‘a), which is also referred to as *Tashayyu’*, have left indelible marks on human minds and conscience.

One such scholar who could well be called a contemporary, was Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amin al-‘Āmili of Syria. A prolific writer possessed with a keen and encyclopedic mind, his services to the cause of Islam and Muslims will be remembered as long as his works are reprinted and read and as long as the new breed of

scholars in Damascus, Beirut and elsewhere continue to build upon the firm socio-cultural foundations that he laid. He was not a book worm, voraciously absorbing the works of the ancients to produce just another of those bulky and often-repeated collection of religious writings, as a westoxicated Lebanese writer has alleged.² Sayyid Muḡsin was a reformer, a social worker, a political activist, and above all a scholar who practiced what he preached and who kept himself abreast with, and influenced the developments on the national and regional scenes.

Such was the author of—among other books—the famous biographical encyclopedia titled *A'yān al-Shi'ah*. As the name suggests this voluminous work is a Who's Who of scholars, statesmen, scientists and other savants who trod the trail blazed out by the *Ahl al-Bayt* ('a) and left their mark on Islamic civilization. Spread over 52 volumes, the book stands as a lasting testimony to the erudite scholarship of Sayyid Muḡsin and his quest for first-hand information that took him to several countries and spanned half a century to complete. In continuation of my series of brief sketches of the leading luminaries of the world of *Tashayyu'* in the *Message of Thaḡalayn*, I hope I would be able to focus in this issue on Sayyid Muḡsin al-Amin al-'Āmili and his legacy.

Readers, however, are advised not to jump to a hasty conclusion that the author of *A'yān al-Shi'ah* might have had a biased and sectarian outlook. This would be a gross injustice to this worthy son of the Jabal 'Āmil region of present-day Lebanon, who like his equally great contemporary Sayyid 'Abdul-Ḥusayn Sharaf al-Din al-Mūsawī,³ was a practical proponent of Islamic unity among the different Muslim denominations, as could be gleaned from his famous statement:

“O Muslims, indeed you believe in the same One God, the same Prophet, the same Book, the same *Qiblah*, the same *Shari'ah* and the same religion. The religion with Allah is surely Islam, and all of you bear

the testimony that there is no god but Allah and Muḥammad (ﷺ) is the Messenger of Allah. You pray five times a day bowing towards the holy *Ka'bah*. You fast the month of Ramaḍān. You believe in the obligation of *Zakāt* and the pilgrimage to the House of Allah for those who can afford. You also sanction the *ḥalāl* of Allah and prohibit the *ḥarām* of Allah... There is no point of difference or dispute among you except the issue of caliphate which is actually a non-issue in our times. And some of the disputes concerning the companions of the Prophet have elapsed and passed away...’’⁴

Jabal ‘Āmil and *Tashayyu’*

Before proceeding further, it would not be out of context to cast a cursory glance at the history of *Tashayyu’* in Jabal ‘Āmil and Syria. I do not want to repeat what I have already said in my article on Sayyid Sharaf al-Dīn al-Mūsawī in an earlier issue.⁵ But the point worth emphasizing is that Abū Dhar Ghifārī’s exile to Syria by the third caliph and his consequent banishment by Mu‘āwiyah to the rugged outback of the mountains, proved a fertile ground in sowing the seeds of pure Muḥammadān Islam in Lebanon. Although it cannot be ascertained which parts of Lebanon were actually graced by that grand companion of the Prophet, there are two sites in Jabal ‘Āmil which are associated with Abū Dhar in the villages of Mis and Sarfand and on which two mosques stand.⁶

Whatever the origins of *Tashayyu’* in Lebanon, the migration of Arab tribes from the Ḥijāz, Yemen and Iraq, paved the ground for the spread of the teachings of the school of *Ahl al-Bayt* (‘a) in the region. In the subsequent centuries the hold of the Fatimids of Egypt on parts of Syria including Jabal ‘Āmil, further strengthened *Tashayyu’*.

However, it was with the coming to power of the powerful Hamdanid Arab state in Aleppo that the school of the Prophet's *Ahl al-Bayt* ('a) began to flower in Syria. Among those who embellished the court of Amīr 'Alī bin Ḥamdān Sayf al-Dawlah (d. 356 AH/967 CE), mention could be made of the great philosopher Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, and the poet Abū Firās. It was Sayf al-Dawlah who checked the numerous onslaughts of the Byzantine empire to save the Levant and possibly Iraq from the designs of the Christian rulers at a time when the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad had weakened and splintered into many states.⁷

Thus, *Tashayyu'* became so strongly planted in what was once the Umayyid heartland, that between the years 414 to 472 AH Aleppo and the surrounding areas became the stronghold of another Shi'ite state ruled by the Bani Mirdās. The House of Mardas, like the Hamdanids before them, acted as a firm bastion on the frontiers of the Islamic realm to neutralize the repeated aggressions of the Byzantines. It could rightly be said that the Shi'ite states of Syria played the role of warden of the marches against the looming threats from Europe in the pre-Crusade period, before the Turks displaced them and took over their lands. The Shi'ite principalities were active both on the political and cultural scenes.⁸

Later, Tripoli became the seat of the Shi'ite Bani 'Ammār state which is noted for its patronising of scholars. The *Dār al-'Ilm* (House of Learning) which was both a college and a library and regarded as the pride of the Bani 'Ammār was sacked by the Crusaders in 502 AH.⁹ According to Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amin the library of the Bani 'Ammār contained almost a million books, an account which is supported by the events of the First Crusade by the historian Ibn al-Qalānisi.¹⁰ Abū 'Alī ibn 'Ammār Fakhr al-Mulk, finding the Saljūq-controlled caliphate in Baghdad indifferent to the invasion from Europe, fought single-handed till

the end, first in Tripoli and later in Jubayl in 503 AH. The Bani ‘Ammār state was revived in 724 AH and lasted till 803 AH.¹¹

It would be tedious to detail the subjugation of the Shi‘ites of Syria, first by the Crusaders and later by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Ayyūbī. Sufficient to say, the Shi‘ite community, especially in Jabal ‘Āmil, outlived both the foreign conquerors and thrived, to the extent that it produced an immortal scholar in the person of Shaykh Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Makki al-‘Āmili who was tragically martyred in 786 AH., and subsequently became famous as *Shahīd Awwal* or the First Martyr. In Ottoman times, Jabal ‘Āmil offered another great sacrifice to the cause of the School of the *Ahl al-Bayt* with Shaykh Zayn al-Dīn al-‘Āmili earning immortality as *Shahīd Thānī* or the Second Martyr.

However, despite the periodic bouts of persecutions, Jabal ‘Āmil continued to produce outstanding ‘*ulamā*’, some of whom like Shaykh Muḥammad Bahā’ al-Dīn al-‘Āmili and Shaykh Muḥammad bin Ḥasan Ḥurr al-‘Āmili migrated to the Safawid realm and enriched the Shi‘ite culture of Iran. The last named is of relevance to the present article in view of the valuable biographical account of the region he has left behind titled *Amal al-‘Āmil fī ‘Ulamā’ Jabal al-‘Āmil*. The work of Shaykh Ḥurr al-‘Āmili, although it inspired the writing of several supplements on the scholars of Jabal ‘Āmil, was dwarfed by ‘*Ayān al-Shī‘ah* and appears regional in character when compared to Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amin’s magnum opus.

I need not give an explanation of *Tashayyu’* here since the readers of this magazine are quite familiar with the term. Thus before taking up the details of the life and works of the subject of the article, it could be said that Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amin was heir to a rich heritage which he documented with meticulousity and left to posterity to marvel and develop upon.

Early Life

Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amin was born in 1284 AH/1867 CE in the village of Shiqrah in Jabal ‘Āmil in a family tracing its descent from Zayd the Martyr, the son of Imam Zayn al-‘Ābidin (*‘a*). His father was Sayyid ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Amin, who was a pious and God-fearing man. His grandfather Sayyid ‘Alī was an outstanding jurispudent of Jabal ‘Āmil, while his maternal grandfather, Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Falāḥ al-‘Āmili al-Maysī, was a poet and scholar, who died in Iraq where he was engaged in the pursuit of knowledge. Sayyid Muḥsin started his basic education at the age of seven by learning the holy Qur’ān. At the age of twelve he began his formal religious studies including Arabic grammar, syntax and calligraphy under the learned members of the family such as Sayyid ‘Abbās Murtaḍā and Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Aḥmad. At sixteen he went to Bint Jubayl to study jurisprudence under Shaykh Mūsā Sharārah, who had been educated in Najaf.

After three years of study he was confronted with military conscription as the Ottoman army needed reserves. But when Sayyid Muḥsin applied to the authorities at Sidon for exemption from military duty on grounds of being a religious student, the Turkish officer in charge who seemed to have a prejudice against learning, dispatched him to his superior in Beirut with a note that he was an ordinary farmer reporting for army service. It was one of the most crucial junctures in Sayyid Muḥsin’s life with military career threatening to cut short his quest for scholarship. But fortunately in Beirut, an Ottoman official after examining his case and conducting a written test of his knowledge of religious sciences, granted him the necessary exemption from military service. The world of learning had thus triumphed with the pen again proving mightier than the sword.

Immediately afterwards in 1890, Sayyid Muḥsin set out for Iraq for the great theological centre of the holy city of Najaf. Here his horizons widened and new vistas of knowledge were opened to

him which he later noted with emphasis on the syllabus in his autobiographical account. The next 10 years saw him master the various religious sciences and reach the level of *ijtihād* under the leading *ulama* of Iraq. Among his teachers in Najaf, mention could be made of Shaykh Muḥammad Bāqir Najmābādi, Shaykh al-Shari‘ah Isfahāni, Ākhūnd Mullā Muḥammad Kāzim Khurāsāni the author of *Kifāyah al-Uṣūl*, Shaykh Āqā Riḍā al-Hamadāni and Shaykh Muḥammad Ṭahā Najaf.

The books which Sayyid Muḥsin had the opportunity to read in Najaf and the great scholars which he met, made a lasting impression on his mind and laid the foundations for his future greatness as an authoritative scholar and social reformer. Some of the famous ‘*ulamā*’ whom he met in Iraq were Mirzā Ḥabibullāh Rashti, Shaykh Ḥasan al-Māmaqāni, Shaykh Zayn al-‘Abidin Māzandarāni and Mirzā Muḥammad Ḥasan Shirāzi of the famous tobacco prohibition act which saved Iranian economy from British schemes.

The Reformer

In 1900 Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amin returned to his native Jabal ‘Āmil from Iraq, with his fame as an accomplished scholar preceding him. The next year, he was invited to settle in Damascus by the Shi‘ites of that city. To the small Shi‘ite community of Damascus, he came like a waft of fresh air. He settled down in the locality which was later named in his honour as Ḥayy al-Amin and undertook the gargantuan task of compiling the voluminous biographical work on which his fame rests.

But Sayyid Muḥsin was not one of those scholars who sit in dark recesses oblivious of the developments on the social and political scenes. Way back in 1290 AH/1873 CE, if as a six-year boy in Jabal ‘Āmil his young mind had been sensitive to the siege of Istanbul by the Russian forces and the seizure of Cyprus from the Turks by the British, now as a 50-year old scholar of repute he

was witness to the flames of the First World War in Syria and the parceling out of Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire between the French and British Christians from Europe. Sayyid Muḡsin had to take up the social cause to thwart the goals of the colonialists. Syria including Lebanon fell to the lot of the French under the League of Nations mandate, and in 1920 Fayṣal, the son of the British agent Sharif Ḥusayn of Mecca, was installed as king in Damascus. Fayṣal, however, had to flee Damascus four months later because of opposition from all sections of the Syrian people, and was later made king of Iraq by the British.

Next he saw the administrative separation of Lebanon from the rest of Syria by the French in order to invest powers in the hands of the Maronite Christian minority. But the most disconcerting development for Sayyid Muḡsin was the opening of Christian missionary schools by the French. He was pained to see Shi'ites enrolling their children in such schools in their quest for a better modern education. He therefore resolved to establish a school for boys to teach the modern curriculum but in an Islamic atmosphere and named it *al-Madrasah al-'Alawiyyah*. The standard of this school was on a par, if not better, with the French missionary and government schools, and in addition it also imparted religious education. The task of setting up the school was not an easy one for the small and impoverished Shi'ite community of Damascus, and sacrifices had to be made. Sayyid Muḡsin himself took the lead and converted his own house into the school building. After establishing the school, he made it known that Shi'ite children should not attend any other school except *al-Madrasah al-'Alawiyyah*.

He had thus set in motion a great educational awakening among the Shi'ite community, and soon a separate school for girls on the same model was established. The two schools became so popular that later after Syria's independence from French colonial rule, a Syrian cabinet minister preferred to send his daughters to

the Islamic Girls High School established by Sayyid Muḥsin because of its stress on ethics and moral behaviour. It is almost 70 years now since the founding of the two schools in Damascus, which continue to cater to the educational and cultural needs of not only the Shi‘ite community in the Syrian capital but of other sections of the population as well.

Sayyid Muḥsin stood like a bulwark against French designs to pass laws in violation of the *Shari‘ah* as well as their attempts to create discord among the Syrian Muslims. When the colonialists offered to make him the Ra‘is al-‘Ulamā’ of the Shi‘ite community of Damascus, he turned down the proposal since it sounded sectarian and was divisive in nature. Later after the French withdrawal when the Syrian government drafted a set of laws for the parliamentary elections which placed the Shi‘ites among the minorities, Sayyid Muḥsin strongly expressed his opposition. He wrote a letter to the authorities saying that the “Shi‘ites should not be classified separately from their Sunni brethren.” The government agreed and dropped the discriminatory laws, declaring there was no difference between Islamic schools and the Muslims were one ummah.

Religious Reformer

Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amin campaigned against ignorance that was clad in religious garb. He believed that the best way to remove superstition was to impart proper education not just to the children but to the whole community. There was no better school in this regard than the Ḥusayniyyahs during the mourning months of Muḥarram and Ṣafar. The task was enormous since the traditional preachers and the elegists with their recitation of weak and often baseless transmissions had reduced these gatherings to mere passion plays where the message of Karbalā was lost in such innovations as frenzied self-infliction with swords to the beat of drums, cymbals and flutes, the loud wailing of women among crowds of strangers and non-*maḥram* men, and the parading of

unveiled women in litters on camel-backs to depict the Umayyid oppression of the Prophet's Household. If such misconstrued practices had come to be considered as acts of devotion by the Shi'ite community of Damascus, these were nothing more than amusement for non-Shi'ite onlookers.

Sayyid Muḥsin, therefore, resolved to groom groups of young persons and send them to preach at the Ḥusayniyyas and mosques so that the public would become enlightened of the rationalism of Islam and the philosophy of Imam Ḥusayn's ('a) immortal movement. He himself undertook the writing of several books in this regard, some of which could be mentioned as follows: *Aṣḍaq al-Akḥbār fi Qiṣṣat al-Akhdh bi al-Thār* (1331 AH/1912 CE), *Lawā'ij al-Ashjān fi Maqatal Abī 'Abdillāh al-Ḥusayn, al-Majālis al-Saniyyah fi Manāqib wa al-Maṣā'ib al-'Itrat al-Nabawiyyah* (1343 AH/1924 CE) and *Risālah al-Tanziyah wa al-Durūs al-Diniyyah* (1346 AH/1927 CE).

The book *al-Majālis al-Saniyyah*, written in 5 volumes in the style of recitation from the pulpits, is a detailed and authentic account of the revolutionary movement of Imam Ḥusayn ('a), the tragic events of Karbalā and its aftermath, and the life of the other Infallible Imams. Sayyid Muḥsin who was a poet in his own right also composed moving elegies on the tragic events of Karbalā, away from the myths that had accumulated out of sheer ignorance. Two of his collections of elegies are titled *al-Durr al-Naḍīd fi Marāthi al-Sibṭ al-Shahīd* and *Iqnā' al-La'im fi Iqāmat al-Mātam*. His authority over *ḥadīth* literature and his sense of duty to reform the community, made him write a three-volume manual of prayers, supplications and *ziyārahs* (standard form of salutations for the Prophet, his daughter, the 12 Infallible Imams and other dignitaries of Islam), under the title *Miftāḥ al-Jannat*.

A'yān al-Shi'ah

But the greatest task undertaken by Sayyid Muḥsin was his encyclopedic work on the biography of prominent Shi'ites from the

time of the Prophet (ﷺ) to his own era. During his student days in Iraq where he came into contact with followers of the *Ahl al-Bayt* (‘a) from different lands, he had felt the need of a comprehensive book which could cover the different strata and the different climes of the Shi‘ite world. Here in Syria he resolved to give the shape of a voluminous book to the raw material he had gathered in Iraq and which kept on growing during his travels to Bayt al-Muqaddas, Egypt, the Ḥijāz and Iran. It was the acquiring of a copy of Mirzā Muḥammad Bāqir al-Mūsawī al-Khawānsārī’s *Rawḍāt al-Jannāt fi Aḥwāl al-‘Ulamā’ wa al-Sādāt*, which made him more determined in his resolve. As he himself says:

“I never saw such a book and decided to compile a comprehensive work from the beginning to my own time which would include all strata (of Shi‘ite society) as well as women, with necessary details such as dates, their roles and contributions and (in case of poets) their specimens of poetry.”¹²

In each and every generation Islamic scholars have left a treasure trove of general and classified information. Names of books of *Rijāl* or biographical works which spring to mind include the *al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā* of Ibn Sa‘d, *al-Isti‘āb* of Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr al-Mālikī, *al-Iṣābah fi Tamyiz al-Ṣaḥābah* of Ibn Ḥajar ‘Asqalāni and *Usud al-Ghābah fi Ma‘rifat al-Ṣaḥābah* of Ibn Athir, all of which focus on the companions of the Prophet (ﷺ). On the other hand, books like *Mu‘jam al-Udabā’* of Yāqūt, *Mu‘jam al-Shu‘rā’* of Marzbāni and *Tadhkirat al-Huffāz* of Dhahbī are of a specialized nature as the titles suggest, and deal respectively with the accounts of the literati, the poets and the memorizers of the Holy Qur’ān. Still other famous works of biographical reference like the *Wafayāt al-A’yān* of Ibn Khallikān and *al-Wāfi fi al-Wafayāt* of Ṣafḍī, do not do justice to the Shi‘ites. Plus there are Who’s is Who accounts of scholars of particular professions such as physicians, jurists,

grammarians ... and of particular sects like the Shāfi'is, Ḥanbalis, etc.

Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amin 'Āmili had all these books in mind and had gone through their contents. In addition he had the heritage of the School of *Ahl al-Bayt* ('a) to browse through and build upon. He had meticulously scanned Kāshshī Samarqandī's *Rijāl* and Shaykh al-Ṭā'ifah Ṭūsī's *Rijāl* two of the early extant works focusing on those who have narrated from the Prophet (ﷺ) and the Infallible Imams. Ṭūsī like his contemporary Shaykh Najāshī is also the writer of a bibliographical work of Shi'ite authors titled *Fihrist*. Another famous 5th century AH *Fihrist* of prominent Shi'ites is that of Muntajab al-Dīn Ibn Bābawaiyh's. Later works such as *Ma'ālim al-'Ulamā'* of Ibn Shahr Āshūb, *Al-Darajāt al-Rafi'ah fī Ṭabaqāt al-Shi'ah* of Sayyid 'Alī Khān Shirāzi, *Riyāḍ al-'Ulamā' wa Ḥyādh al-Fuḍalā'* of 'Abdullāh Isfahānī Afandī, *al-Amal al-Āmil fī 'Ulamā' Jabal al-'Āmil* of Shaykh Ḥurr al-'Āmili, *Minhāj al-Maqāl* of Mīrzā Muḥammad Istarābādī and *Rawḍāt al-Jannāt fī Aḥwāl 'Ulamā' wa al-Sādāt* of al-Khawānsārī, are limited to the religious scholars and in some instances to the *Sādāt* and poets. These and other reference books definitely laid the groundwork for Sayyid Muḥsin's grand project.

Therefore, he decided to embark on a unique work the compilation of which spanned several decades and took him to several lands. In case of countries that Sayyid Muḥsin could not visit, such as India, he entered into correspondence with the '*ulamā'* and notables of those places as well as with libraries and institutes. The result was 52 volumes, of which 35 were printed in his lifetime. *A'yān al-Shi'ah* speaks of the genius of its author and his literary skills. It is also a tribute to his analytical mind which probed through the pages of history to present to posterity a work, where he had not simply mentioned names in alphabetical order but evaluated in a critical manner their contribution to the school of the Prophet's *Ahl al-Bayt* ('a). He lists the biographies of those who

excelled in different fields ranging from traditional learning to natural sciences as well as statesmen, soldiers, artists and traders. At times, depending on the importance of the subject, the biographical accounts run into several pages.

He also discussed and dismissed the allegations of the ignorant against the Shi‘ites. For instance, in the preface to his monumental work, Sayyid Muḥsin after explaining the term Shi‘ite and the beliefs of the Shi‘ites, has analysed in detail the baseless remarks of Ibn Qutaybah and Ibn Ḥazm down to his own contemporaries Muṣṭafā Ṣādiq al-Rafi‘i and Aḥmad Amin. To prove his point he has left no stone unturned, citing *āyahs* of the holy Qur‘ān, the *ḥadīth* of Prophet Muḥammad (ﷺ) and the bare facts of history, and to any unbiased reader the method of his argumentation is convincing. The detractors who either intentionally or unintentionally tried to vilify the Shi‘ites, thus stand exposed in the dock of history as disrupters of Islamic unity.

In short the *A‘yān al-Shi‘ah* could be described as a complete reference work in Arabic on Islam, its fundamentals, its history, its culture and its universal mission as well as the life of the Prophet, his *Ahl al-Bayt* the Infallible Fourteen and the prominent among the Muslims who held fast to the *Ḥadīth al-Thaqalayn*. It brought into limelight thousands of dignitaries who because of the geographical remoteness of their areas or due to linguistic and vocational barriers might not have found themselves in a single book. The author thus did a great service to future researchers before he left the mortal world in 1371 AH. (1952 CE.).

However, it should be noted that Sayyid Muḥsin focused only on the deceased and did not mention any of those contemporaries who were alive at the time of writing. The author’s son, Sayyid Ḥasan al-Amin, who has brought out his father’s magnum opus in ten large and beautifully-bound volumes, took up from where Sayyid Muḥsin left. A scholar of repute, Sayyid Ḥasan has compiled in several big volumes a sister series titled *Malāḥiq*

A'yān al-Shi'ah and *Mustadrakāt A'yān al-Shi'ah*, adding the accounts of the contemporaries and of those notables to whom his father had probably no access because of the lack of modern facilities.

Notes:

1. Holy Qur'ān, *al-Qalam*, 68:1.
2. Fu'ād 'Ajāmī, *The Vanished Imam*, p. 80.
3. Message of Thaqalayn, vol. 3, no. 4, Summer 1998.
4. *Al-Muṣliḥ al-Islāmī Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīn fī Dhikrāhu al-Sanawiyyah al-Arba'in*, Cultural Section of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Damascus.
5. Message of Thaqalayn, vol. 3, no.4, Summer 1998.
6. Hasan al-Amīn, *Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif al-Islāmiyyah al-Shī'iyyah*, vol. 3, p. 111.
7. *Shorter Shi'ite Encyclopedia* (English), Ḥasan al-Amīn, p. 281.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 290.
9. *Arab Historians of the Crusades*, Francesco Gabrieli, p. 25.
10. Abū Ya'lā Hamzah ibn Asad al-Tamīmī known as Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl Tārikh Dimashq*.
11. Mirzā Muḥammad 'Alī Mudarris, *Rayḥānat al-Adab*.
12. Introduction to *A'yān al-Shi'ah*.

Report

The World Congress on Mullā Şadrā

Tehran, 22-27 May, 1999

The world Congress to commemorate Mullā Şadrā, after some years of consecutive attempts to prepare the basics for this great cultural event, was inaugurated in Tehran.

The power of thinking, reasoning, deliberating and as a result enjoying a humane life is a gift the Islamic philosophy and Mullā Şadrā's "Transcendent Wisdom" present to the world's cultures. A knowledge which even western philosophy is unaware of, or rather, has not profited from.

Nearly a thousand philosophers from 41 countries were gathered together at the OIC hall in Tehran on Saturday May 22, to commemorate the Iranian scholar Şadr al-Din Muḥammad al-Shirāzi, better known as "Mullā Şadrā".

The congress was inaugurated with the recitation of some Qur'anic verses, followed by Iran's national anthem which was played to the standing audience.

The message of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Āyatullāh Sayyid 'Ali Khāmene'i, was then read.

Afterwards, the Chairman of the Congress, Āyatullāh Sayyid Muḥammad Khāmene'i, welcomed the audience and delivered an address highlighting the objectives behind holding the congress as well as numerous achievements obtained on the sidelines of organizing this event.

Iranian President, Sayyid Muḥammad Khātami, was the next speaker who lectured on the exalted character of Mullā Ṣadrā, putting forth and elaborating questions on how we can learn from him.

The second day's general session was started by Āyatullāh 'Abdullāh Jawādi Āmuli who as a renowned Iranian philosopher, has spent up to half a century on researching into gnosis, philosophy and Qur'anic interpretation.

His lecture titled "*Mullā Ṣadrā and the Transcendent Wisdom*" probed into the ontological aspects of Transcendent Wisdom focusing on "*Shuhūd*" (Intuition) as the best short-cut to truth.

Elsewhere in his speech, Āyatullāh Jawādi Āmuli pointed to Mullā Ṣadrā's role in connecting philosophy to the holy Qur'ān and the sayings of Prophet Muḥammad's (ﷺ) progeny, and he considered Imam Khumayni to be on a par with the innovative Muslim philosopher.

"*Atomism in Early Islamic Thought and its Relation to Pre-Islamic Iranian Thinking*" was the title of a detailed lecture by Professor Joseph Van Ess whose "The History of Scholastic Theology in the Early Centuries of Islam" had been chosen as Iran's Book of the Year.

That was followed by "*Henry Corbin's Understanding of Mullā Ṣadrā*" from Professor Herman Landolt who is currently teaching at Canada's McGill University.

Professor Landolt in his words praised the late Corbin for presenting a true image of Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical innovations which, in his opinion, have opened a new chapter in criticizing those western philosophers who consider Ghazzālī the last in the chain of prominent Islamic philosophers.

Dr. Riḍā Dāwarī Ardakāni, Iranian philosopher and scholar who is also the chairman of the Iranian Science Academy, was the 5th lecturer of Sunday's General Session.

Outlining "*Mullā Ṣadrā's Explication of Fārābī's First Head of the State*", Dr. Dāwarī referred to Mullā Ṣadrā as one of the very

few philosophers who had understood in depth Fārābī's political philosophy and then had pursued and improved it.

Professor Joseph Margolis in *"An Overview of Recent Western Philosophy"* emphasized that modern philosophy had focused solely on science and related aspects; hence, it has made little progress in view of metaphysics.

The specialized committees of the congress, namely Mullā Ṣadrā's "Transcendent Wisdom", "Islamic Philosophy", "Comparative Philosophy", "Gnosis and Sufism", "Western Philosophy", "Logic, Language and Mind", and "The Philosophy of Science", were held over the next four days, starting on May 23rd.

After reading their respective papers in different field, the scholars fielded questions from the audience, which included Iranian and foreign academicians. A round table discussion involving some of the prominent scholars was also held and it was decided to publish the gist of their views along with the papers.

At the end of the Congress, some of the foreign participants were taken on a guided tour of Mullā Ṣadrā's place of retreat in Kahak, and the historical cities of Isfahan and Shirāz, which are inextricably connected to the life and development of thoughts of Ṣadr al-Muta'llihin.

The following is a list of papers presented to the Congress in different fields of philosophy:

Transcendent Wisdom

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| G. A'wānī | The Concept and the Reality of Existence |
| J. Morris | Mullā Ṣadrā's Conception of the <i>Barzakh</i> and the Emerging Science Spirituality |
| G. Dinānī | The Arguments of Mullā Ṣadrā for the Principality of Existence |
| B. Kuspinar | Mullā Ṣadrā's Commentary on the Verse of Light |
| A. Beheshti | The Knowledge of the Necessary Being According to Mullā Ṣadrā |
| O. Leaman | Mullā Ṣadrā's Doctrine of Existence and the Objectivity of Imagination in Islamic Philosophy |

- A. Akhbarian The Ontological Explanation of the Problem of Time in the Philosophical System of Mullā Ṣadrā
- Wahidul Anṣārī Ethics, Economics, and the Environmental Crisis: Philosophy of Man and Nature in the Tradition of Ṣadrā
- S.M. Muḥaqqiq The first Mover According to Aristotle and Mullā Ṣadrā
- Y. Michot Love of God in the *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād* of Ṣadrā
- K. Mujtahidi Mullā Ṣadrā: Symbol of Cultural Unification of Iran
- C. Bonmariage The Concept of the Analogical Gradation of Being in Mullā Ṣadrā's Philosophy
- K. Kharrāzī Mullā Ṣadrā's Theory Concerning the Relationship Between Mind and Body and its Implications in Philosophy
- P. Morewedge Logical and Ontological Options for Philosophical Analysis of Existence
- A. Acikgence Ṣadrā's Philosophical System as a Model in Islamic Philosophy
- M.A. Ejeḥ'ī The Problem of Individuation in the Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā
- J.M. Vilchez The Human Soul, an Itinerant Towards God: The Nature of Human Soul and Its Faculties According to Ṣadrā
- D.J. Stewart A Critique of Traditionalism
- M. Ṣālih An Analyzes of Mullā Ṣadrā's Commentary on the Verse of Light
- H. Ḥanafī From Transcendent Philosophy to Intranscendent Philosophy
- M. Faghfoori Ṣadr al-Dīn Shirāzī in the Context of Safavid History
- A. Shirwānī Epistemology and the Transcendent Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā
- R. Ustādi Responses to Ten Questions Regarding Mullā Ṣadrā's Commentary on the *Uṣūl al-Kāfi*
- L. Peerwānī Mullā Ṣadrā Shirāzī on the Hermeneutics of the Qur'ān
- Y. Yathribī The Analyzes and Evaluation of Ṣadrā's Views on the Primacy of Being
- J. Walbride Mullā Ṣadrā on the Platonic Forms
- R. Golpāygānī Mullā Ṣadrā and the Temporal Origination of the World

- M. Dakake The Pre-Existence of Souls in Shi'ite Tradition and the Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā
- A. Shakeebā The Reality of the Human Soul According to Mullā Ṣadrā
- S.S. Rizvi Essential Accidents, Complete Syllogisms and the possibility of Knowledge: Mullā Ṣadrā's Definition of Metaphysics
- S. Oudeimah Mullā Ṣadrā on Reincarnation
- S. al-Bodur The Problem of Existence in Mullā Ṣadrā's Thought
- Shigeru Kamada Time and Space in Mullā Ṣadrā's Mystical Thought through His Reference to Ushnuhi
- K.D. Crow Mullā Ṣadrā's *Sharḥ al-Ṣādiq's Ḥadīth al-'Aql wa al-Jahl*
- M. Legenhausen Ontological Proof in Avicenna, Mullā Ṣadrā and Western Philosophers
- H. Parsania The Foundation and Historical Development of the Ontological Proof
- D.j. Ranjin Mullā Ṣadrā on Nature
- A. Ṣādiqī Rashād Neo-Ṣadrian Philosophical Dialogue
- M. Khawānsārī An Overview of Mullā Ṣadrā Gnosis Based on His Treatise "*Iqāḍ al-Nā'imīn*"
- S.A. Ḥusaynī Ibn 'Arabī and Mullā Ṣadrā on Everlasting Punishment
- M.R. Ḥakīmī Corporeal Resurrection in the Transcendent Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā
- S. McCarron The Question of Witnessing, Quiddity and Knowledge in Mullā Ṣadrā and Sufism with Special Reference to Existence Monism (*Waḥdat-i Wujūd*)
- H. Shahparī A Meta-Cognitive Socio-Cultural Interpretation of Ṣadrā's Paradigm of Psychology
- Yūsuf-Thānī Primacy of Being and the Problem of the Natural Universal
- A. Keeler Mullā Ṣadrā's Commentary of *Ṣūrat al-Sajdah*
- M. Khātami The Transcendent Method: A Reconstruction
- M. Muḥammadi The Status of the Sempiternal Origination of the World and Substantial Motion in Two Divergent Philosophical Systems

- S. Raḡimiyān The Characteristics of the Theory of Emanation and Ontological Causation in Ṣadrā's Transcendent Philosophy
- H. Marazi The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā with Special Reference to the Eschatology of Ibn Sinā
- H. Mūsawiān Temporal Origination of the World in the Light of Ṣadrā's Theory of Transubstantiate Motion

Comparative Philosophy

- M. Khāmene'i The Spirit of Plato in Ṣadrā's Philosophy
- W. Chittick The Practice of Philosophy in Bābā Afdal and Ṣadrā
- H. Zia'i Ṣadr al-Muta'allihin and the Question of Knowing and Being
- Ter Haar Saint Anselm of Canterbury and Mullā Ṣadrā
- D. Dakake Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shirāzi and Benedict Spinoza: An Epistemological and Ontological Comparison
- G. Kākā'i The Unity of Being and its Philosophical Demonstrability in *Ibn 'Arabī* and Mullā Ṣadrā
- Ma Ping Sa'di's Golestān and its Influence on Chinese Muslims
- M. Dehbāshi Mullā Ṣadrā's Systematic Ontology and its Reflection in Modern Physics
- Z. Muṣṭafawi The Platonic Forms as Viewed by Mullā Ṣadrā
- D. Burell Thomas Aquinas and Mullā Ṣadrā Shirāzi and the Primacy of *Esse/Wujūd* in Philosophical Theology
- H. Daiber Mullā Ṣadrā on the Problem of Creation and the Role of Greek Philosophers
- R. Guerrero The Language of Being: From Ibn Sinā to Mullā Ṣadrā
- M. Nawali A Preliminary Comparative Study of the Ontological Methodology of Mullā Ṣadrā and Heidegger
- L. Stone A Comparison of the Visionary Element in the Works of 'Aṭṭār, Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā
- I. Kalin Between Physics and Metaphysics: Mullā Ṣadrā on Nature (*Ṭabi'ah*)
- Bodiur Rahman Ḥasan al-Baṣrī and Mullā Ṣadrā: A Comparative Study of Their Concepts of Freedom of Choice
- K. Kennedy Ibn Sinā's Influence on Mullā Ṣadrā's Ontology

- C. Sawyer Illumination, Ancient and Modern: A Comparison of the Thought of Jacob Boehme and the School of Isfahan
- A. Qā'imi The Foundations of Education in Islamic Philosophy and in Modern Western Education
- Li Zheng Zhong A Comparative Study of Confucian and Islamic Philosophy
- S. Murata Islamic Thinking in Chinese
- N.B.G. Qazi Mullā Ṣadrā's *Falsafat al-Wujūd* and Heidegger's Seinsphilosophie
- A. Tourāni God in Ṣadrā and Tillich
- A. Gheissari The Reception of Continental Philosophy in Iran
- E.M. Macierowski The Unity of Being and Essence in God: Ibn Sina, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Mullā Ṣadrā
- A. Smirnov Zeno's Aporias and *Kalām*: A Comparative Logical Study and its Implications for the Notion of Rationality
- C. Wilson Knowledge and Immortality in Spinoza and Mullā Ṣadrā
- A. Shāhrūdi The Synthetic Notion of Substance and a Criticism of Einstein's Theory of Relativity
- K. Kachia Iran in Medieval Georgian Philosophy of History and Literature
- D.M. Yun The Expansion of Iranian Islamic Philosophical Thought in the East and its Expansion in China
- E. Bin Ḥasan Philosophical Antinomies and an Islamic Response
- A. al-Raḥim The Logic of Mullā Ṣadrā: *Lama'āt al-Mashriqiyyah*
- J.F. Ferrer Man According to Ṣadrā and Avempace (Ibn Bājah)
- N.H.M. Abūbakr Mullā Ṣadrā's Theory of the Soul in the Context of Aristotelian Thought
- T. Kermāni Mullā Ṣadrā and the Stages of Divine Unification
- M. Ṣāni'ī The Philosophical Maxim of the 'Most Simple Nature' in Ṣadrā's Theology as Compared with Leibniz Monadology
- H. Ma'ṣūmi The Theory of Vision in Mullā Ṣadrā's Philosophy
- L. Ericson The Influence of Zoroastrianism on Judaism and Early Christianity
- E. Wolf-Gazo Transubstantiate Motion in Whitehead and Mullā Ṣadrā's Thought

- M. Mişbāhī The Problem of Essence, Existence, and Unity
According to Averroes (Ibn Rushd) and Mullā Ṣadrā
- U. Benissa Mullā Ṣadrā's Precursors in Philosophy
- N. Robinson From Marxism to Islam: The Philosophical Itinerary
of Roger Garaudy
- S. Pāzūki A Comparative Study of Suhrawardi's and Heidegger's
Interpretations of the Ancient Greek Philosophers
- T. Jaffer The Interior Drama of the Soul: The Metaphysics of
Imagination and Prophetic Act in Avicenna and Ṣadrā
- A. Shari'atmadāri A Comparative Study of Mullā Ṣadrā and Jean Piaget
Regarding Certain Issues in Psychology
- Z. Moris Mullā Ṣadrā and Hamzah Fansuri: A Comparative
Study of Some Aspects of Their Metaphysical Teachings
- C. Segovia Mullā Ṣadrā's Onto-Henology and the Western
Contemporary Debate on Nihilism
- Hu Zhong The Impact of the Persian Illuminationist School in
Chinese Islamic Works of the 17th Century
- W. al-Rahmān The Essence-Existence Distinction in Mullā Ṣadrā and
Modern Western Existentialism: A Comparative Study
- M. Rafique Mullā Ṣadrā and Sri Aurobindo: A Comparative Study
- A. Riāhī The Immateriality of the Soul According to Three
Muslim Sages (Fārābī, Avicenna, and Mullā Ṣadrā)

Islamic Philosophy

- J. Subhānī *Durr-i Thamīn* in Mullā Ṣadrā's Philosophy
- M. Takeshita Avempace and Sufism
- A. Shafi'ihā A Survey of Mullā Ṣadrā's Weltanschauung
- I. Abu Baker Epistemological Issues in Shi'ism and Sunnism
- M. Gharawī Criticism of Structuralist, Operationist-Behavioristic and
Gestalt Psychology in the Light of the Problem of
Consciousness and Mind
- K. Bāqiri Freud's Philosophical Presuppositions in the Light of
Ṣadrā's Philosophy
- Hunzai The Interpretation of the Most Beautiful Names of God
According to Two Sages of Shirāz: Hibat al-Allāh al-
Mu'ayyid al-Dīn and Ṣadr al-Muta'llihin

- S. Schmidtke Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Aḥṣā'i and Metempsychosis
- K. Shānechi Resurrection
- W. Madelung The Last Phase of the Mu'tazilah: Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and His School
- M.S. Khān The *Jāvidān Khirad* of Miskawayh: A Persian Book on Ethics and Moral Philosophy
- H.N. Isfahānī A Survey of the Ontological Proof
- Koroglu Avempace's Political Philosophy
- M.J. Shari'ati Is Mullā Ṣadrā an Innovator or a Mere Compiler?
- A. Bouhsane The Idea of Paradigm
- Sh. A'wānī Man's Dignity and Worth in the Transcendent Philosophy of Shirāzī
- A.J. Delvāri Some Salient Features of Ṣadrā's Philosophy as Compared with Some Recent Western Philosophical Theories
- Y. Shāyegān The Problem of Being in Aristotle, Alexander Aphrodisias, Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā
- A. Douay The Philosophy of Knowledge
- H. Miyāndāri The Theory of Transsubstantiate Motion and its Implications for Moral Philosophy and Medical Ethics
- Hakak A Criticism of Hume's Theory of the Origin of Ideas from the Perspective of the Transcendent Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā
- M. Amin Raḍawī Ibn Sinā's Theory of Knowledge by Presence "*Ilm Huḍūrī*"
- T. Mayer An Evaluation of Ibn Sinā's Argument For God's Existence in the Metaphysics of the *Ishārāt*
- J. Lomba Ibn Bājah: Intellect and Gnosis
- B. 'Alizādah An Inquiry Concerning Ṣadrā's Theory of Knowledge
- A. Sulaimanov Ibn Sinā's *al-Ḥikmat al-Mashriqiyyah*
- M. Gharawiyān Is Transsubstantial Motion Analogical or Not?
- B. Aḥmad Mullā Ṣadrā's Views on Life After Death
- M.T. Fa'ālī "Concept and Judgement", With Special Emphasis on Mullā Ṣadrā
- A. Syed Ṣadrā and His Philosophical *Asfār*
- A. Dawānī An Overview of Mullā Ṣadrā's Life

- Y. Pochta The Image of Islamic Society in Western History and Russian Philosophy
- A. Imāmi The Problem of Resurrection in Ibn Meskawayh Rāzi and Ṣadr al-Muta'llihin
- A. M. Kāzimi Mullā Ṣadrā on *'Ilm* and *'Ulamā'*
- A. Shirwāni Epistemology and the Transcendent Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā
- M. Hussain Yad The Characteristics of Mullā Ṣadrā's Ontology
- B. Karliqa Mullā Ṣadrā's Commentary on the *Hidāyat al-Ḥikmah* and Its Influence on Ottoman Thought
- A.Z. Qaragholu A Cursory Glance at the Criticisms Leveled Against Mullā Ṣadrā During the Past Four Centuries
- A. A'lami Mullā Ṣadrā of Shirāz and Abū al-Qāsim al-Gabā'i
- M. Palanghi The Elements of Ṣadrā's Theory of Transubstantial Motion in Plato's Philosophy
- S.M. Murshan The Relation Between Religion and Philosophy in Ibn Sinā with Reference to the Characteristics of God's Knowledge
- A. Taremi The "Four Journeys" in Mullā Ṣadrā and His Predecessors
- Abdul Sattar The Impact of Islamic Morals on the Hindu-Muslim Culture of the Indian Subcontinent
- R.S. Hishmat The Notion of Demonstration in Ibn Khaldūn's Science of *'Imrān*
- A. Aries The Phenomenology of Dialogue
- J. Lameer *Taşawwur* and *Taşdıq* in Ṣadr al-din Shirāzi and Fārābi
- M.R. Ḥijāzi The Element of Love in Ṣadrā's Moral Philosophy and Its Centrality in the Collective Body of Moral Virtues
- A. Zamāni Eschatology According to Mullā Ṣadrā
- T. Albertiny Doubt and Certainty in Ghazzāli and Descartes
- A. Karbāsizādeh Āqā Muḥammad Bīdābādi: A Renovator of the Sadrean Transcendent Philosophy
- H.R. Naẓari From Philosophical Hermeneutics to the Ontological Wisdom of the Sage of Shirāz

Gnosis and Sufism

- H. Nadimi Some Reflections on the Nature of Art

- D. Buchman Shingon Buddhism and the Sufi Dimension of Islam: Preliminary Notes on the Shared Religious Vision of Kukai and Ibn al-‘Arabi
- A. Shaykh al-Islāmi Existence According to Ibn al-‘Arabi and Mullā Ṣadrā
- R. Kāzimi Who or What Realises the Absolute in Mystical Realisation?
- C. Janes Dawn and Paradise in the Poetry of Some Sufis
- M. Kilik Mullā Ṣadrā as an Arbiter Between Two Muslim Mystics: Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-‘Arabi and ‘Alā’ al-Dawlah Simnāni
- E. Clark The Art of the Islamic Prayer Carpet: Content and Symbolism
- N. Gharawi Mullā Ṣadrā and *‘Ilm al-Ḥadīth*
- V. Haffman Al-Fārābī’s “True King” and Mullā Ṣadrā’s Path: Human Perfection and Divine Action in Islamic Esoteric Traditions
- D. Gril The Commentaries of *Sūrah al-Fātiḥah* and Theory of Existence According to Ibn al-‘Arabi
- L. Lopez-Baralt Spanish Mysticism’s Debt to Sufism: A Shared Symbology
- Ding Kegia The Influence of Persian Sufi Manuscripts upon Chinese Muslims
- M. Binā Muṭlaq Plato’s Philosophy of Language
- M. Feshāraki The Ontological Glorification of All Beings to God from Ṣadrā’s Viewpoint as Compared with Rumi
- N. Pourjavādi The Spirituality of Ḥallāj and Bāyazīd in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā
- Hermansen Mullā Ṣadrā’s Commentary on the Verse of Light
- O. Ṣāfi Mullā Ṣadrā’s Synthesis of Ibn al-‘Arabi and Mawlawī
- Dagli Imam ‘Alī (‘a) and the Flourishing of Islamic Esoterism
- H. Farzām Some Observations Concerning Ṣadorean Gnosis
- H. Raḥīm A Study of Unity and Plurality in Mullā Ṣadrā and Rumi
- F. Qarā’i Ramanuja and Mullā Ṣadrā
- J. Eshots Rationalism and Gnosticism: Reflections on the Transcendence of the Transcendent Philosophy of Ṣadrā

- P. Beneito The Sacred Time and the Seven Days of Creation
According to Ibn ‘Arabi
- S. Hirtenstein The Maid of Fourteen
- Lu Yang Islamic Architecture in China
- A. Salim The Impact of Islamic Mysticism on Indian Mysticism
- Al-Janabi Mystical Experience: Absolute Human Experience
- P. Azkā’i The Problem of Sempiternal Origination of the World
According to Abu Zakariyyā al-Rāzī
- S. Kumar Mullā Ṣadrā and Indian Mysticism
- M. Dāmādi The Main Distinctive Features of Mullā Ṣadrā’s
Philosophical System
- S. Baines Symbolic Language in Sufi Thought
- A. Godlas A Comparative Analysis of Mullā Ṣadrā’s and Ruzbihān-i
Baqli’s Commentaries on *Ṣurat al-Ḥadīd*
- Jianping Wang Persian Ṣufis’ Connection with the *Ṭariqas* in Historical
China
- M. Borujerdi The Influence of the Holy Qur’ān in the making of Mullā
Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Philosophy
- D.V. Gordevsky Irrationality as a Base of Rationality

Issues in Western Philosophy

- A. Ahmadi Sense Perception and its Relation to Universality and
Induction
- H.M. Bracken Empiricism/ Rationalism
- Gh. Haddād ‘Adil Ontology and Epistemology After Kant
- T. Rockmore Metaphysics at the End of the Century
- D.P. Lackey The Universe as a Philosophical Concept
- K. Srinivas Wittgenstein on Religious and Scientific Beliefs
- R. Arrocha Ethics and Moral Philosophy
- L. Honnefelder Bioethics and Human Genetics: Consensus Formation
Europe
- J. Dancy Understanding Tolerance
- V. Held Rights and the Presumption of Care
- H.M. Sass Death with Dignity: Significance of Religious Beliefs in
End-of-Life Medical Decision-Making
- S. Schwarzenbach Contradictions in Aristotle’s Theory of the First Soul

- T.O. Zubia Aristotelian Western Criticisms of the 20th Century: A Radical Change of Paradigm
- H. Barnes Sartre's View of Subjectivity, Consciousness and Self, Some Philosophical and Practical Consequences
- L. Stevenson Kant on Human Nature
- W.L. McBride Sartre's Response to Kant's Question 'What May I Hope?'
- M.T. Mişbāḥ Yazdī Existence of the Copula
- G. Meggle Communication, Language and Inter-Cultural Understanding
- J.M.N. Cordon Contemporary Philosophical Hermeneutics
- A. Tymieniecka Phenomenology of Life: Creative Experience and the New Philosophical Paradigm
- G.F. McLean Hermeneutics: The Living Interpretation of a Living Text in a Living Tradition
- B. Dāwari The Relationship Between Text and Meaning in Modern Hermeneutics
- K. Gloy Luceme Philosophy in 'Post-Philosophical' Times
- D. Sanchez-Meca Philosophy of Reading and Recent Issues in Contemporary Hermeneutics
- P. Biswas Rorty and Derrida on Postmodernism
- Panel Discussion: Hermeneutics**
- Panel Discussion: Issues in the History of Philosophy**
- Panel Discussion: Ethics and Moral Philosophy**
- Philosophy of Science**
- D. Ihde Visualism in Science
- L. Ropolyi Theory as Story
- R.P. Crease What is an Artifact ?
- P. Baert Aims and Philosophy of Social Sciences
- A. Pāyā "Intuition": Do We Really Need It in Our Knowledge-Garnering Pursuit ?
- A. Cordereo Quantum Theory and the Under Determination of Theories by Experience
- G. Gates Why Many Minds Make Bad Science
- T. Shomar Bohr and His Debate with Einstein

- I.Z. Tsekhmistro The Problem of Quantum Correlations 'Mechanism'
 D. Albert Foundations of Quantum Mechanics and the Goals of
 Natural Science
 D. Van Dalen What is Mathematics ? Intuitionistic Reflections
Panel Discussion: Current Issues in Philosophy of Science

Logic, Language and Philosophy of Mind

- P. Horwich What is Truth ?
 J. Mosterin Acceptance and Belief
 P. Milne Is There a Logic of Confirmation Transfer
 E. Van Gelderen Syntactic Theory in a Chomskian Framework
 K.G. Havas Do We Need to Search for the Only True World View ?
 P. Thom An Avicennan Extension of Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic
 S.G. Williams Definite Descriptions and Reference
 Y.S. Aliabadi The Sense that Presents
 T. Hondrich Consciousness as Existence Again
 H. Vahid Charity, Supervenience and Skepticism
 D. Follesdal Meaning and Perception

Panel Discussion: Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind

**Panel Discussion: Current Issues in Philosophy of Logic and
 Language**

Kheradnāmeḥ-e Sadrā

The World Congress on Mullā Ṣadrā Publishes a quarterly philosophical journal, *Kheradnāmeḥ-e Ṣadrā*. This journal is widely subscribed by philosophers and academic institutions around the globe. It is ranked as one of the most important philosophical journals in the Muslim world. The journal focuses on publishing some of the latest articles in the field of philosophy. Articles in any aspect of philosophy in Persian, English and occasionally in other languages as well are welcomed.

You may submit you articles via Fax (8831817) or E-mail (Mullasadra @www.dci.co ir).

P.S. Hope you do not forget to mention the following :

Full Name, Place of residence, Academic institution and Telephone, Fax or E-mail address.

Book Review:

Use of Force in International Relations

As Seen by International Law and Islamic Law

(Tawaşşul beh Zūr dar Rawābit-e Bayn al-Milal, Ḥamid Ḥāji Ḥaydar, Ettelā‘āt Publications, Tehran, 1997)

Among the holy ideals of man, peace constitutes one of the oldest ones, and, since it has been more prone to danger than any other value, human beings have always been seeking means and ways, both theoretically and practically, to achieve it.

However, despite its quest for peace, the human society, during its more than 3500 years of written history, has not achieved this elusive goal, and has been entangled, directly or indirectly in wars and insecurity for a great period of its life, except, it could be said, for the last two centuries, which have seen some concrete steps towards this desired state of civilization.

The first human effort to circumscribe war was to legitimize only the “just war”, and to consider all other kinds of wars illegitimate and inhibited. This limitation, however, was later withdrawn in the 18th century when war received absolute and unconditional legitimacy.

In the 20th century, the idea of using force was restricted by the covenant of the League of Nations and some other international

conventions. Later on, by ratification of the United Nations Charter, and by establishment of the United Nations Organization, war was totally prohibited except in cases such as self-defense, protecting citizens, collective self-defense, etc.

Subject to the new international law – after the compilation and ratification of the UN Charter – there exists no unanimous agreement among the legal experts and governments regarding the approved use of force.

According to an outstanding contemporary legalist, the application of force is a subject which legal experts are not willing to discuss. They are rather interested in the question of human rights and preservation of the ecosystem. Nevertheless, the fact is that the main problems of our time which are a mixture of legal and ethical questions, are as follows: Application of force by the governments, possibility of using nuclear weapons, the question of self determination – the origin of nations – and access to the resources. Compared to these problems, the question of protection of human rights and preservation of the environment are less important, because, in fact, the chief threats against the human rights and the ecosystem arise from those problems.

As the author says, the book is an attempt to elaborate on different viewpoints about application of force in international relations, and to explain the basic arguments behind each of them. He has made an effort to distinguish between indisputable principles and principles which are subject to dispute and disagreement, in order to pave the way for a comparative study of the application of force from the point of view of new international laws and that of Islamic *fiqh*, and to manifest the jurisprudential rules and regulations in this respect with a new method and through a novel exposition.

Regarding the position of Islam on war and peace, different opinions are expressed. Judgement between those opinions is possible only after a thorough study of the rules and regulations

that Islam has put forward on peace and on resort to force. For this purpose, the present study is organized in three chapters with a conclusion.

In the first chapter, the author tries to explain the subject of the discussion and to delineate the differences. By focusing on the concept of “resort to force” and by highlighting its difference with the concepts of war and intervention, he endeavours to explain the foundation and aim of international law and that of Islamic *fiqh* to show the origin of dissimilarity between rules and regulations of each regarding the application of force.

In the second chapter, he elaborates on the question of resort to force from the point of view of the common international law. This chapter probes the history of the subject, and studies the prohibition of war and resort to force from the point of view of the UN Charter. It then mentions the different causes in which the application of force is seen as unanimously prohibited by legal experts as well as the cases in which the difference of opinion exists.

The third chapter studies the question of resort to force from the point of view of Shi'i *fiqh*. It mentions the jurisprudential sources in this respect, and studies the place of common international law in *fiqh* and its decrees. Then it turns to the cases in which Muslim jurists have unanimously considered the application of force as legal and the cases in which there is a dispute.

At the end, the author indicates the similarities and differences of international legal laws with religious legal precepts regarding the concept of application of force in international relations so as to have a bright and authentic perspective on war and peace from the Islamic point of view.

Due to the evil effects of war, people, since the ancient times, have attempted to limit war or to prohibit it. In those days, the theory of “just war” became instrumental in authorizing only the

wars with a seemingly just cause and prohibiting what were considered the “unjust” ones.

Throughout its history, this theory has experienced many ups and downs, and was viewed sometimes as a religious sanction, and at other times as an ethical issue. But it was respected in one way or another until the 18th century when war was deemed legible in a general manner. It was only in the early years of the 20th century that certain measures for prohibiting war bore fruit, especially after the First World War and the drafting of the covenant of the League of Nations. In 1928, war in any form was banned for the first time in history, and at the end of the Second World War, the drafting and approval of the UN Charter further strengthened this prohibition. It was the start of a new phase and the World Body classified all kinds of wars launched for achievement of national objectives under the concept of “use of force”. Some legal experts believe that at this stage, wars have been generally prohibited, and the UN Organization, particularly the Security Council, has the responsibility for maintaining peace and international security. At the same time governments have to refrain from any unilateral measure regarding the application of force, unless for “lawful defence” against an aggression, provided the Security Council chooses not to interfere.

However, some other experts are of the view that the UN Charter not only has not prohibited wars in general, but has not even abrogated those cases of resorting to force which were authorized by common laws before the introduction of the Charter, and therefore, there are still numerous cases of “use of force in international relations” which are considered lawful. As a result, there exists no consensus among the experts in International Law regarding the application of force unilaterally by any government - not collectively by the members of the UN.

This is the position of the new laws regarding the application of force, which could be compared by what Islamic *fiqh* has said in

this field. In their authentic books, Muslim jurists have discussed this question under different topics such as “*Jihād*” (righteous struggle) and “*Amr bi al-Ma’rūf wa al-Nahy ‘an al-Munkar*” (enjoining good and forbidding evil). In order to draw comparison, the author tries to discuss those religious *fatwās* (verdicts) according to the topics of International laws.

In the second and third chapters of the book a comparison is drawn between the religious precepts dominant in the Islamic system of government concerning the application of force, and the international legal codes dominant in other systems of governments regarding the same matter, to find out the similarities and dissimilarities of the two codes on the subject.

In this manner, the well known question, whether Islam is a war-mongering religion or not, will also find its answer.

Comparative Study of Legal and Illegal Cases of Use of Force According to Modern International law & Shi‘i Fiqh

1. Hegemonic War

1-1. Principle of International Law: Initial military attack of a government against the territory of another government for domination over that country or occupation of a part of it, is forbidden (by unanimous consensus).

1-2-1. Principle of Islamic Fiqh: Military attack of an Islamic government against the territory of another government for domination over that country or occupation of a part of it, is forbidden (attitude of majority).

As is understood, the attitude of majority of Shi‘ite jurisprudents in this regard is the same as the unanimous consensus of jurists of International Law. Of course, a number of contemporary Shi‘ite jurisprudents allow initial war only for benevolent and humanitarian purposes and justified conditions under the title of *Jihād* which we call “righteous struggle”.

They believe:

1-2-2. In case the Islamic system of government is under the leadership of the supreme religious authority, and does not succeed in persuading the people of non-Muslim countries to follow Islam, and has military superiority over the unbeliever governments, it is obligatory to take action for military attack in order to eradicate paganism, and take possession of their territory, and/or compel them to accept Islam. It can also adopt the same policy against the *Ahl al-Kitāb* (Followers of the Book, i.e. the Jews, Christians & Zoroastrians) and possess their territory or compel them to accept either Islam or domination of the Islamic government.

2. Legal Individual Self-Defense

2-1-1. **Principle of International Law:** In case of effective attack of military force of a government on the territory of another government, and non-intervention of the United Nations, the invaded country has the right to apply military force in order to ward off and stop the invasion while observing the principle of proportionality in using arms & weapons against the aggressor (unanimous consensus).

2-1-2. In case of gradual penetration of military forces of a country into the territory of another country, or support of a government for the guerrilla forces in its territory against another government, the latter can resort to force against the aggressor while observing the conditions mentioned in point 2-1-1 (attitude of minority).

2-2. **Principle of Islamic *Fiqh*:** In case of direct military attack of a Muslim or non-Muslim government on an Islamic government, or gradual penetration of their military forces into the territory of an Islamic state, or their support for the guerrilla forces on their territory against an Islamic government, the invaded Islamic state has the right (and it is obligatory for it) to apply military force in order to ward off and stop the invasion while observing the principle of proportionality in using arms and weapons against the aggressor. But in case of interference of the

United Nations according to the necessity of global conditions, defense should immediately stop (unanimous consensus).

Herein, the unanimous attitude of Muslim jurists conforms with the attitude of a minority of jurists and governments regarding gradual and indirect invasion. Furthermore, the unanimous attitude of international law is the same as the unanimous attitude of *fiqh* in respect to defense against effective direct attack.

3. Preventive Defense

3-1. the Principle of International Law: When a government becomes completely sure that another government will soon launch a military attack against it, and in case use of force for defense against that impending danger is necessary and there is no other way for warding off the danger, which is so immediate that there is no opportunity for deliberation, and that use of force for defense is reasonable and in proportion with the imminent danger, under such circumstances resorting to force (as a pre-emptive measure) is legal (majority of jurists and some governments).

3-2. Principle of Islamic *Fiqh*: When an Islamic government becomes sure that another country, either Muslim or non-Muslim, will soon launch a military attack on it, and in case use of force is necessary for defense against the impending danger in order to prevent the attack, and there is no other way for warding off the danger which is so immediate that there is no opportunity for deliberation, and that use of force for defense is reasonable and in proportion with the imminent danger, under such circumstances the Islamic government is allowed to use military force in such a way and until such a time that it is sure that the enemy has dispersed. (probably unanimous)

As is clear, the attitude of majority of jurists of international law is similar to the unanimous (probable) attitude of *fuqahā'*.

4. Legal Collective Defense

4-1. Principle of International Law: In case of military attack of a country against the territory of another country, provided that the aggressed country has already expressed its desirability for help from others or after the attack has explicitly called for help, the other countries can help the aggressed country to ward off the invasion by resorting to force. This defense should have the conditions mentioned in point 2-1-1 (unanimous).

4-2. Principle of Islamic *Fiqh*: In case of military attack of a country against the territory of another country, the Islamic government can (and it is obligatory for it) help the aggressed country to ward off the invasion by resorting to force. This defense could (and should) be continued until the invasion has been called off completely. It is also necessary to observe the principle of proportionality. Declaration of desirability on the part of the aggressed country is a requisite, in case the absence of desirability of the aggressed party, could cause a major loss due to its partnership with the Islamic government in defense.

The cases are:

A- Attack of a non-Muslim government on a Muslim government;

B- Attack of a Muslim government on another Muslim government, provided that peace mediation has not been successful;

C- Attack of a non-Muslim government on another non-Muslim government, provided that it has endangered the life of a number of Muslims residing in the territory of the aggressed country;

D- Attack of a Muslim government on a non-Muslim government, provided that firstly the aggressor government has attacked without observing the conditions of "war declaration", and secondly the life of a number of Muslims residing in the aggressed territory is endangered. (unanimous)

As it is clear, the principle of Islamic *fiqh* has more restrictions and conditions than the principle of international law in this regard, in order to prevent the flames of war from spreading.

5. Military Intervention for Support of Life and Property of Citizens

5-1. Principle of International Law: Whenever the citizens of one country are endangered in another country, to the extent that the vital interests of the first country become unsettled, or the life of many of its citizens are endangered in the second country, the first country, on the condition of observing the principle of proportionality, can intervene militarily for saving the life and property of its citizens (majority of jurists and some governments).

5-2. Principle of Islamic *Fiqh*: Whenever, the citizens of an Islamic government are endangered in another country, the Islamic government can (and it is obligatory for it) to resort to force for saving the life and property of its citizens in the other country. This intervention should not exceed the degree that is necessary (almost the same as proportionality), and should not entail losses for the Islamic government (apparently unanimous).

In regard to this principle too, the *fiqhi hukm* (decree) is accepted by majority of jurists, like the principle of International law.

6. Humanitarian Military Intervention

6-1. Principle of International Law: When the policies of a government towards its own citizens or the citizens of other countries residing in its territory are such that their basic rights, or at least the right of life is violated, the other countries can intervene militarily in that country in order to bring to an end the situation.²⁶

6-2. Principle of Islamic *Fiqh*: When the policies of a government towards its own Muslim citizens or the other Muslims residing in its territory are such that their life, property or reputation are violated, the Islamic government could (and should)

intervene militarily in order to bring to an end the situation, provided the Islamic government does not suffer a more grave loss in comparison to the danger imposed on the invaded people (unanimous).

In this regard too, the unanimous *fiqhi* principle is accepted by a minority of jurists like the international law principle, but with more limitation.

7. Intervention with Approval of Host Government

7-1. Principle of International Law: In case a legal government encounters armed internal riots supported from abroad and not formed as a constituent movement for overthrowing the government, the other governments can help the government put down the foreign-backed riots by use of force, as per the explicit request and free will of the host government.

7-2. Principle of Islamic *Fiqh*: In the following cases, the Islamic government can militarily support another country faced with armed internal riots, in order to suppress the riots, provided that any losses incurred by this intervention should not exceed the expedient interests of the Islamic government.

The cases of intervention could be as follows:

A- If a Muslim government is faced with armed riots by non-Muslims;

B- If a non-Muslim government is faced with riots by non-Muslims (indirect aid);

C- If a Muslim government is faced with riots by Muslims, provided that the insurrection is not a “legal Islamic revolution”;

D- If a Muslim government under leadership of religious authority is faced with subversion from its opponents;

(the first and second cases are unanimous, the third is held by majority, and the fourth is the view of a contemporary *faqīh*).

In this regard too, the principle of Islamic *fiqh* is similar to the principle of international law, but with more conditions and stipulations, in order not to exacerbate the situation.

8- Military Intervention in the Interest of Revolutionaries of other Country

8-1. Principle of International Law: Any direct or indirect military aid of governments to the revolutionaries of another country for overthrowing the legal government, or for terrorist activities and sabotage is forbidden. (unanimous except in the case of US)

8-1. Principle of Islamic *Fiqh*: If a group of people in a country stage armed revolt against the government for overthrowing it or for other intentions, the Islamic government can support the revolutionaries by military aid, under the following conditions:

A- If the revolters and the government are not Muslim, provided that the loss of intervention does not exceed the expedient interests of the Islamic government (indirect intervention).

B- If the revolters are Muslim and the government is not Muslim or is Muslim only in name, provided that the aim of the revolters is to establish an Islamic government under the leadership of a just *faqih*, or to prevent the government from violation of important Islamic tenets, and that operations are under the leadership of a just *faqih* or *waliyy faqih*, and that the loss of intervention does not exceed the expedient interests of the Islamic government (first case is unanimous and second is a minority view of contemporary jurists).

In this regard, one unanimous and one minority verdict are against the unanimous opinion of International law.

9- Military Intervention in the Interest of Autonomous Movements

9-1. Principle of International Law: Whenever a liberation movement in a country is struggling against a colonialist or racial government, or against foreign hegemony, the other governments can use force in the interest of that movement (differential).

9-2. Principle of Islamic *Fiqh*: Whenever a liberation movement in a country is struggling against exploitation, racial rule or foreign hegemony, the Islamic government could (and should) support that movement by military intervention, provided that the loss of intervention does not exceed the expedient interests of the Islamic government (unanimous):

The cases for intervention could be as follows:

A- If the revolutionaries and government are both non-Muslim (indirect aid).

B- If the revolutionaries are Muslim and the government is not Muslim.

In this regard, the principle of Islamic *fiqh* is accepted by some of the jurists and governments like the International law principle, but with certain stipulations.

10- Retaliatory Military Intervention

10-1. Principle of International Law: Whenever a government commits an international offence against another government, the latter government can resort to retaliatory military intervention in order to punish, quell and prevent repetition or continuity of that offence. This retaliation should not be carried out against the individuals, property and places under protection, and should be in proportion with the offence of the opposite party, but in case of necessity it could be more severe (minority of jurists and governments).

10-2. Principle of Islamic *Fiqh*: Whenever a government stages armed operations against an Islamic government, the Islamic government can resort to retaliatory military intervention in order to punish, quell and prevent repetition or continuity of that offence, but this retaliation on one hand should not be against unarmed people, unless in case of necessity, and on the other hand should be in proportion with the offence of the opposite party, but in case of necessity it could be more severe (unanimous).

In this regard, the principle of Islamic *fiqh* with a little more elaboration, is accepted by a minority of jurists and governments like the principle of International law.

Analysis of Different Aspects Between Decrees of Islamic *Fiqh* & International Law Regulations

As has been clarified in the above discussion, in some cases the principles of Islamic *fiqh* seems to be more restricted than the principles of International law, and in certain cases both are similar, but only in the first and eighth cases, the verdict of some jurisprudents differs with the unanimous principles of International law. In these two cases too, while taking into consideration the principles of International law and global conditions as well as traditional law, and on the basis of preserving the existence of the Islamic government and safeguarding its vital and basic interests, the Islamic government has to conform itself with principles of International law.

Nevertheless, this important point should be borne in mind that the present limitations concerning use of force according to general International law, is a new issue, only a few decades old. It did not exist in the previous centuries and is bound to change and revision in the future; while Islam has advocated peace and universal brotherhood since the last 1400 years, and has placed limitations and prudence bonds on conflict and warfare, with its prime aim being stable peace in case of resorting to use of force.

However, in the different cases between International law and Islamic *fiqh*, we should pay attention to their origin, basis, aim and objectives.

Principles of International law are after all the products of fallible human minds and governments, while the principles and decrees of Islamic jurisprudent have a higher and enlightened source and were prescribed for the peace and prosperity of human societies by the All-Knowing and All-Wise Creator.

The basis of validity of the regulations of International law is short term interests and the will of governments which share a particular and self-centred outlook, but the basis of validity of the Islamic law is absolute authority and benign Mercy of the Almighty God for His entire creation, including those who out of ignorance disbelieve in Him.

The aim of International law is establishment of peace and international security in a limited sense among governments sharing a similar concept of sovereignty, but the aim of Islamic law is promotion and spread of the primordial concept of monotheism and justice throughout the world in harmony with innate human nature, and has its source in the superiority of Islam and its followers over the other schools, religions and their followers.

Thus, International law is an earthly law of a transient nature, while Islamic law, with its far broader vision, is based on heavenly revelation.